Knowledge that Transforms

This paper studies an overlapping generations model with stochastic production and incomplete markets to assess whether the introduction of an unfunded social security system leads to a Pareto improvement. When returns to capital and wages are imperfectly correlated, a system that endows retired households with claims to labor income enhances the sharing of aggregate risk between generations. Our quantitative analysis shows that, abstracting from the capital crowding-out effect, the introduction of social security represents a Pareto-improving reform, even when the economy is dynamically efficient. However, the severity of the crowding-out effect in general equilibrium tends to overturn these gains.

In recent decades, U.S. foreign trade grew much faster than GDP, but there is no consensus why. Notably lacking is an understanding of the role of multinational corporations (MNCs), which mediate over half of world trade. We use Bureau of Economic Analysis data on U.S. MNCs to study the rapid growth of MNC-based trade from 1983 to 1996. Using a model of U.S. MNCs and Canadian affiliates, we decompose this growth by source. Tariff reductions can largely explain increases in arms-length MNC-based trade. But intra-firm trade growth is attributed mostly to “technical change.” We present additional evidence suggesting just-in-time production facilitated intra-firm trade. (JEL F13, F14, F23)

Researchers in a variety of important economic literatures have assumed that current income variables as proxies for lifetime income variables follow the textbook errors-in-variables model. In our analysis of Social Security records containing nearly career-long earnings histories for the Health and Retirement Study sample, we find that the relationship between current and lifetime earnings departs substantially from the textbook model in ways that vary systematically over the life cycle. Our results can enable more appropriate analysis of, and correction for, errors-in-variables bias in any research that uses current earnings to proxy for lifetime earnings.

We study cross-country differences in the aggregate production function when skilled and unskilled labor are imperfect substitutes. We find that there is a skill bias in cross-country technology differences. Higher-income countries use skilled labor more efficiently than lower-income countries, while they use unskilled labor relatively and, possibly, absolutely less efficiently. We also propose a simple explanation for our findings: rich countries, which are skilled-labor abundant, choose technologies that are best suited to skilled workers; poor countries, which are unskilled-labor abundant, choose technologies more appropriate to unskilled workers. We discuss alternative explanations, such as capital-skill complementarity and differences in schooling quality.

All in the Extended Family: Effects of Grandparents, Aunts, and Uncles on Educational Attainment by Linda Datcher Loury. Published in volume 96, issue 2, pages 275-278 of American Economic Review, May 2006

We develop a model in which firms set impersonal salary levels before matching with workers. Wages fall relative to any competitive equilibrium while profits rise almost as much, implying little inefficiency. Furthermore, the best firms gain the most from the system while wages become compressed. In light of our results, we discuss the performance of alternative institutions and the recent antitrust case against the National Resident Matching Program.

Using large samples of estate tax returns, we construct new series on wealth concentration in Paris and France from 1807 to 1994. Inequality increased until 1914 because industrial and financial estates grew dramatically. Then, adverse shocks, rather than a Kuznets-type process, led to a massive decline in inequality. The very high wealth concentration prior to 1914 benefited retired individuals living off capital income (rentiers) rather than entrepreneurs. The very rich were in their seventies and eighties, whereas they had been in their fifties a half century earlier and would be so again after World War II. Our results shed new light on ongoing debates about wealth inequality and growth.

This paper investigates how noisy evaluation of worker skills affects human capital investments and hiring. Individuals distort investments toward skills that most managers can evaluate. Dynamically, when workers become managers, managerial expertise can become increasingly skewed over time, raising investment distortions and reducing output. If firms select managerial expertise strategically, efficient investments can be retrieved when (a) identifying whether workers' skills matter more than distinguishing among skilled workers, and (b) initial investment distortions are small. Otherwise, such strategic design worsens long-run outcomes. Finally, we determine when short-run affirmative action policies are effective.

We examine the role of banks in the transmission of monetary policy. In economies where banks use real demand deposits to finance their lending, fluctuations in the timing of production can force banks to scramble for real liquidity, or even fail, which can greatly affect lending and aggregate output. The adverse effect on output can be reduced if banks finance with nominal deposits. Nominal deposits also open a “financial liquidity” channel for monetary policy to affect real activity. The banking system may be better off, however, issuing real deposits (e.g., foreign exchange denominated) under some circumstances.

Studies of the impact of migration on sending households (e.g., Dean Yang, 2004; Alejandra C. Edwards and Manuelita Ureta, 2003) have largely neglected the fact that certain allocations can only be imperfectly monitored when household members are not coresident (see Ralph Chami et al., 2003, for an exception). In this case, allocations can be coordinated only to the extent that they can be verified, and household decision making may not be fully cooperative. The existence of such behavior among household members would suggest that expanding opportunities for migration will have different effects on expenditure patterns than simply increasing the amount of income received by the household. Changes in earned income and the potential to earn income will affect bargaining among spouses, but noncooperative behavior will have an additional effect on the final distribution of household resources. With the