Knowledge that Transforms

We develop a survey instrument to measure self-control problems in a sample of highly educated adults. This measure relates in the manner that theory predicts to liquid wealth accumulation and personality measures. Yet while self-control problems are typically seen as resulting in overconsumption and low wealth, we identify a significant group who underconsume and thereby accumulate high levels of wealth. In addition, self-control problems are smaller in scale for older than for younger respondents. Those who put money aside in retirement accounts may be delaying access to a point at which self-control problems are no longer important.

Two well-known, but seemingly contradictory, features of exchange rates are that they are close to a random walk (RW) while at the same time exchange rate changes are predictable by interest rate di¤erentials. The RW hypothesis received strong support from the work of Richard A. Meese and Kenneth Rogo ¤ (1983) who were the …rst to show that macro models of exchange rate determination could not beat the RW in predicting exchange rates. On the other hand, Eugene F. Fama (1984) showed that high interest rate currencies tend to subsequently appreciate. This is known as the forward discount puzzle and stands in contrast to Uncovered Interest Parity (UIP), which says that a positive interest di¤erential should lead to an expected depreciation of equal magnitude. The RW hypothesis and the forward discount puzzle are not as contradictory as it seems since the predictability of exchange rate changes by interest di¤erentials is limited. For example, Fama (1984) reports an average R2 of 0.01 when regressing monthly exchange rate changes on beginning-of-period interest di¤erentials. Instead of opposing these two features of the data, in this paper we investigate whether in fact they may be related to each other.

Testing for Indeterminacy: An Application to U.S. Monetary Policy: Comment by Andreas Beyer and Roger E. A. Farmer. Published in volume 97, issue 1, pages 524-529 of American Economic Review, March 2007

In this paper we examine whether risk sharing networks are formed so as to maximize the mutual gains from pooling income risk. The bene…t from risk pooling is largest when households have different income pro…les - e.g., different occupations - and are subjected to di¤erent sources of risk - e.g., live far apart. Gains from risk sharing therefore increase with social and geographical distance. But distance also raises the cost of interpersonal links. The net e¤ect on link formation is a priori indeterminate. We investigate this issue empirically using survey data from the rural Philippines.

This paper studies cross-community risk sharing. There is now a large body of theoretical and empirical work on informal insurance, where people mitigate risk by sharing income. A consistent empirical finding is that risk-sharing is not complete within villages, often the observed sets of individuals.2 One reason, researchers suspect, is that risk-sharing does not take place at the village level, but between individuals and families.3 We build a theoretical model where risk-sharing takes place between pairs of agents. There are idiosyncratic shocks to individual income and community-level shocks. We consider how the opportunity for cross-community links affects the shape and efficiency of risk sharing arrangements. We find that when links across villages form, there can be less risk sharing within a village. Welfare is higher for those directly or indirectly connected across villages, but lower for those with no path connecting them to the other village. Overall, welfare can be higher. Thus, empirical findings that insurance within a village is not complete is not necessarily evidence of an inefficient pattern of risk-sharing relations. Rather, the finding is consistent with risk-sharing patterns that involve cross-community relations, and such patterns may yield higher aggregate welfare despite incomplete insurance within a village.

This paper estimates the productivity gains from reducing tariffs on final goods and from reducing tariffs on intermediate inputs. Lower output tariffs can increase productivity by inducing tougher import competition, whereas cheaper imported inputs can raise productivity via learning, variety, and quality effects. We use Indonesian manufacturing census data from 1991 to 2001, which include plant-level information on imported inputs. The results show that a 10 percentage point fall in input tariffs leads to a productivity gain of 12 percent for firms that import their inputs, at least twice as high as any gains from reducing output tariffs.

By using graphical representations of simple portfolio choice problems, we generate a very rich dataset to study behavior under uncertainty at the level of the individual subject. We test the data for consistency with the maximization hypothesis, and we estimate preferences using a two-parameter utility function based on Faruk Gul (1991). This specification provides a good interpretation of the data at the individual level and can account for the highly heterogeneous behaviors observed in the laboratory. The parameter estimates jointly describe attitudes toward risk and allow us to characterize the distribution of risk preferences in the population.

In a recent contribution, Mark Walker and John Wooders (2001) analyzed serve choices in Grand Slam tennis matches to provide an empirical test of the mixed strategy equilibrium. They argued convincingly that unlike subjects in laboratories, professional players have sufficient experience to play games well, and that they are also highly motivated to win these games. Their results indicated that there were no statistical differences in win rates for male players across various strategies, which is consistent with the equilibrium prediction. They fairly noted, however, that even the top male players tended to switch from one strategy to another too often, resulting in serial dependence. This paper reexamines the results of Walker and Wooders (2001) by collecting and analyzing a broader dataset, including men’s, women’s, and juniors’ matches. We find that the support of the minimax hypothesis is stronger. The plays in our data pass all of the tests in Walker and Wooders (2001) and therefore are more consistent with the theory of equilibrium than those in Walker and Wooders (2001). In short, the two hypotheses implied by the equilibrium, i.e., the equal probability of winning serve directions and the serial independence of serves, are borne out in our data.

This paper shows how the intraday allocation and pricing of overnight loans of federal funds reflect the decentralized interbank market in which these loans are traded. A would-be bor-rower or lender typically finds a counterparty institution by direct bilateral contact. Once in contact, the two counterparties to a potential trade negotiate terms that reflect their incentives for borrowing or lending, as well as the attrac-tiveness of their respective options to forego a trade and to continue “shopping around. ” This over-the-counter (OTC) pricing and allocation mechanism is quite distinct from that of most centralized markets, such as an electronic limit order book market in which every order is anony-mously exposed to every other order with a cen-tralized order-crossing algorithm. While there is a significant body of research on the microstructure of specialist and limit order book markets, most OTC markets do not have comprehensive transaction-level data available for analysis. The federal funds mar-ket is a rare exception. We go beyond a previ-ous study of the microstructure of the federal funds market (Craig H. Furfine 1999) by model-ing how the likelihood of matching a particular borrower with a particular lender, as well as the interest rate that they negotiate, depend on their respective incentives to add or reduce balances and their ability to conduct further trading with other counterparties (proxied by the level of their past trading volumes). Our results are consistent with the thrust of search-based OTC financial

We demonstrate that aggregate employment and consumption can increase without a corresponding movement in productivity in a model with heterogeneous agents where the only aggregate disturbance is a productivity shock. The interaction between incomplete capital markets and indivisible labor results in a low employment-productivity correlation and creates a time-varying wedge between the marginal rate of substitution (for commodity consumption and hours) and productivity. Our results caution against viewing the measured wedge as an inefficiency due to a failure of labor-market clearing or as a fundamental driving force behind business cycles.