Knowledge that Transforms

The paper analyzes dynamic principal–agent models with short period lengths. The two main contributions are: (i) an analytic characterization of the values of optimal contracts in the limit as the period length goes to 0, and (ii) the construction of relatively simple (almost) optimal contracts for fixed period lengths. Our setting is flexible and includes the pure hidden action or pure hidden information models as special cases. We show how such details of the underlying information structure affect the optimal provision of incentives and the value of the contracts. The dependence is very tractable and we obtain sharp comparative statics results. The results are derived with a novel method that uses a quadratic approximation of the Pareto boundary of the equilibrium value set.

I consider nonparametric identification of nonseparable instrumental variables models with continuous endogenous variables. If both the outcome and first stage equations are strictly increasing in a scalar unobservable, then many kinds of continuous, discrete, and even binary instruments can be used to point-identify the levels of the outcome equation. This contrasts sharply with related work by Imbens and Newey, 2009 that requires continuous instruments with large support. One implication is that assumptions about the dimension of heterogeneity can provide nonparametric point-identification of the distribution of treatment response for a continuous treatment in a randomized controlled experiment with partial compliance.

A sequence of experiments documents static and dynamic “preference reversals” between sooner-smaller and later-larger rewards, when the sooner reward could be immediate. The theoretically motivated design permits separate identification of time consistent, stationary, and time invariant choices. At least half of the subjects are time consistent, but only three-quarters of them exhibit stationary choices. About half of subjects with time inconsistent choices have stationary preferences. These results challenge the view that present-bias preferences are the main source of time inconsistent choices.

This paper studies two-sided matching markets with non-transferable utility when the number of market participants grows large. We consider a model in which each agent has a random preference ordering over individual potential matching partners, and agents' types are only partially observed by the econometrician. We show that in a large market, the inclusive value is a sufficient statistic for an agent's endogenous choice set with respect to the probability of being matched to a spouse of a given observable type. Furthermore, while the number of pairwise stable matchings for a typical realization of random utilities grows at a fast rate as the number of market participants increases, the inclusive values resulting from any stable matching converge to a unique deterministic limit. We can therefore characterize the limiting distribution of the matching market as the unique solution to a fixed-point condition on the inclusive values. Finally we analyze identification and estimation of payoff parameters from the asymptotic distribution of observable characteristics at the level of pairs resulting from a stable matching.

This paper presents a test of the exogeneity of a single explanatory variable in a multivariate model. It does not require the exogeneity of the other regressors or the existence of instrumental variables. The fundamental maintained assumption is that the model must be continuous in the explanatory variable of interest. This test has power when unobservable confounders are discontinuous with respect to the explanatory variable of interest, and it is particularly suitable for applications in which that variable has bunching points. An application of the test to the problem of estimating the effects of maternal smoking in birth weight shows evidence of remaining endogeneity, even after controlling for the most complete covariate specification in the literature.

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We formalize the Keynesian insight that aggregate demand driven by sentiments can generate output fluctuations under rational expectations. When production decisions must be made under imperfect information about demand, optimal decisions based on sentiments can generate stochastic self-fulfilling rational expectations equilibria in standard economies without persistent informational frictions, externalities, nonconvexities, or strategic complementarities in production. The models we consider are deliberately simple, but could serve as benchmarks for more complicated equilibrium models with additional features.

This paper studies regulated health insurance markets known as exchanges, motivated by the increasingly important role they play in both public and private insurance provision. We develop a framework that combines data on health outcomes and insurance plan choices for a population of insured individuals with a model of a competitive insurance exchange to predict outcomes under different exchange designs. We apply this framework to examine the effects of regulations that govern insurers' ability to use health status information in pricing. We investigate the welfare implications of these regulations with an emphasis on two potential sources of inefficiency: (i) adverse selection and (ii) premium reclassification risk. We find substantial adverse selection leading to full unraveling of our simulated exchange, even when age can be priced. While the welfare cost of adverse selection is substantial when health status cannot be priced, that of reclassification risk is five times larger when insurers can price based on some health status information. We investigate several extensions including (i) contract design regulation, (ii) self‐insurance through saving and borrowing, and (iii) insurer risk adjustment transfers.

We analyze the Vickrey mechanism for auctions of multiple identical goods when the players have both Knightian uncertainty over their own valuations and incomplete preferences.In this model, the Vickrey mechanism is no longer dominant-strategy, and we prove that all dominant-strategy mechanisms are inadequate.However, we also prove that, in undominated strategies, the social welfare produced by the Vickrey mechanism in the worst case is not only very good, but also essentially optimal.

I examine markets for flexible commitment devices populated by agents who value both commitment and ‡exibility, and whose preferences exhibit varying degrees of time inconsistency. I show that, if the agents’ time inconsistency is observable, then both a profit-maximizing monopolist and a welfare-maximizing planner help each agent commit to the efficient level of ‡exibility. If instead the agents’ time inconsistency is unobservable, the monopolist and the planner face a screening problem. I find that, to screen a more time-inconsistent from a less time-inconsistent agent, the monopolist and (possibly) the planner inefficiently curtail the ‡exibility of the device tailored to the first agent, and include unused options in the device tailored to the second agent. My results have important policy implications for designing special savings devices, that use tax incentives to help