Knowledge that Transforms

We propose a novel 4/2 rough and smooth stochastic volatility model by combining the rough Heston (rough 1/2) and smooth 3/2 models through a convex specification. This parsimonious two-factor model admits semi-closed-form pricing formulas for equity and volatility index (VIX) derivatives, while capturing key stylized facts documented in empirical studies. The model flexibly generates elasticity of variance estimates consistent with empirical findings from equity markets and produces realistic variance distributions. Although the rough 1/2 component carries a small weight, our numerical experiments confirm a degree of roughness comparable with that obtained with the rough Heston model. Empirical analysis using S&P 500 and VIX option data shows that the model outperforms benchmark specifications both in- and out-of-sample. We further provide insights into how rough volatility modeling influences the estimation of risk-neutral return moments and variance risk premia.

This paper shows that authorized participants’ (APs) regulatory constraints weakened the arbitrage relationship between bond ETFs’ primary market activity and their premia during the market turmoil triggered by the dash-for-cash episode in March 2020. Arbitrage activity weakened more severely when those APs with a history of creating or redeeming an ETF’s shares had low regulatory capital ratios, consistent with persistence in arbitrage activity. The results also reveal that the direction of prior arbitrage activity matters, and show that the decline in arbitrage intensity was especially pronounced for ETFs holding less liquid bonds, whose lead market makers had lower regulatory capital ratios, and for those associated with non-bank-affiliated APs. Finally, the paper provides a novel estimate of the elasticity of primary market activity to ETF premia, contributing to the literature on limits to arbitrage and intermediary frictions.

We examine whether insiders’ pledging of company stock as collateral for personal loans influences a company’s debt contracting. We attempt to identify causality through difference-in-differences analyses of an unexpected legislative change that exogenously reduced board directors’ pledging incentives. We find that firms with higher initial pledging levels, which subsequently experienced a significant decline in pledging ratios due to the regulation, benefited from lower loan spreads and less stringent non-price loan terms. We further hypothesize and provide evidence that the positive impact of insider pledging on corporate borrowing costs is less pronounced in closely held firms. Examining the mechanisms, we find that share pledging is positively related to earnings management, firm risk-taking behaviors, and agency problems. Overall, these findings suggest that banks perceive insider share pledging as engendering significant risks.

We analyze how changes in capital requirements and policy rate shocks affect international lenders’ decisions to drop out of syndicated loans. Increases in capital requirements in the lender country and decreases in borrower country policy rates imply a greater likelihood that foreign lenders stop supplying capital in international syndicated loans. These results are robust to the inclusion of borrower country, lender country, and loan-round fixed effects. Using lender country capital regulations as instruments, we find evidence of significant economic spillover effects as international lender exits imply smaller loan amounts and shorter maturities. Economic Policy Uncertainty (EPU) and culture variables also help explain lenders’ decisions to exit a syndicate.

This study investigates how economic policy uncertainty (EPU) affects venture capital (VC) contract terms. Using a unique database of contracts between VCs and entrepreneurial firms in China, we provide evidence that EPU positively affects the presence of investor-friendly covenants in VC contracts. Our mechanism analysis shows that screening for high-quality startups and VCs’ increased bargaining power are potential channels. Furthermore, we find that including more investor-friendly covenants mitigates the negative effect of EPU on VC exit performance.

We investigate the effect of CEO relative age, an early-life measure defined as age relative to others in the same school cohort determined by the cutoff date policy at primary school entry, on corporate risk-taking. We base our analysis on the arguable randomness of managers’ birth months and a novel data set containing the birth month information of 2,595 CEOs from 1,011 Chinese listed firms. We find that firms with “relatively older” CEOs, i.e., those who were older than their classmates at school entry, compared with firms with “relatively younger” CEOs, have greater volatility in their profitability and stock returns, use debt financing more aggressively, engage in more diversifying and value-destroying acquisitions, and experience deteriorating performance. The results are robust to a battery of alternative specifications.

We introduce implied variance asymmetry (IVA) — the weighted difference between out-of-the-money call and put option prices — as a predictor of cross-sectional option returns. We find that IVA negatively predicts future delta-hedged call returns and positively predicts future delta-hedged put returns. These predictive relationships reflect distinct investor behaviors: retail investors drive the overpricing of high-IVA call options through speculative demand, whereas informed short-sellers bid up prices of low-IVA puts as substitutes for constrained stock short-selling. Furthermore, stocks and put options characterized by low IVA and high short-sale costs experience significantly lower subsequent excess returns. This pattern suggests that low-IVA put buyers pay a premium and they correctly anticipate future stock price declines. In contrast, high-IVA call options exhibit temporary mispricing driven by uninformed speculation, which rapidly reverses.

This paper proposes a novel monetary policy uncertainty (MPU) measure aggregating information from policy communication, policy operation and news coverage. We find that the aggregate MPU measure significantly commands a negative risk premium in the cross-section of the Chinese stock market. Stocks with higher (lower) MPU beta, favored (avoided) for hedging against MPU shocks, contribute to the premium through their under-performance (outperformance). Our results remain robust after controlling for economic uncertainty, economic policy uncertainty, and monetary policy surprises. We further show that the aggregate MPU measure outperforms its individual components in both portfolio- and stock-level asset pricing tests.

Analyzing a sample of Chinese firms, we find that when companies receive more coverage from FinTech advisory firms, their stock prices move less in tandem with the overall market. This suggests that FinTech coverage improves how accurately stock prices reflect firm-specific information. Our results hold true across multiple testing methods and alternative ways of measuring stock price synchronicity. Further analysis shows that FinTech coverage reduces stock price synchronicity primarily by addressing information gaps between companies and investors. Additionally, greater FinTech coverage improves stock liquidity and lowers the costs of raising debt or equity financing. When examining the topics covered by FinTech firms, we find that diverse coverage topics are linked to lower stock price synchronicity, with discussions on finance, corporate governance, and negative sentiment playing a particularly effective role. Finally, a textual analysis reveals that FinTech coverage includes significantly more firm-specific information than traditional analyst reports.

We investigate the real effects of tail risk on firm-level capital investment. Using an option-implied tail measure, we find that tail risk impedes investment, controlling for investment opportunities and existing uncertainty measures. This relation is stronger for firms with higher tail exposure and crash risk. The tail risk effect is more pronounced for firms with higher investment irreversiblility and demand uncertainty, consistent with the real options mechanism. Corporate resilience built by hedging activities attenuates the effect, while stressed debt financing conditions weaken the resilience and amplify the effect. Tail risk also delays investment spikes. Two instrumental variables enhance the causal interpretation. Overall, we highlight the distinctive role of tail risk in shaping real investment.