Knowledge that Transforms

Decision-makers often face limited liability and thus know that their loss will be bounded. We study how limited liability affects the behavior of an agent who chooses how much information to acquire and process in order to take a good decision. We find that an agent facing limited liability processes less information than an agent with unlimited liability. The informational gap between the two agents is larger in bad times than in good times and when information is more costly to process.

We begin with two uncontroversial hypotheses - firm productivity is expensive to measure and employment entails relationship-specific investments. These assumptions imply that firms would optimally choose fixed-wage contracts, and complement these with bonus pay when measuring employee performance is not too costly. These assumptions imply that under an optimal employment contract hours of work is less responsive, while total compensation is more responsive to shocks under bonus-pay contracts compared to fixed wage contracts. Using data from the Panel Study of Income Dynamics (PSID) where shocks are proxied using the local unemployment rate, we find strong support for these two implications.

The financial crisis has refocused attention on money and credit fluctuations, financial crises, and policy responses. We study the behavior of money, credit, and macroeconomic indicators over the long run based on a new historical dataset for 14 countries over the years 1870–2008. Total credit has increased strongly relative to output and money in the second half of the twentieth century. Monetary policy responses to financial crises have also been more aggressive, but the output costs of crises have remained large. Credit growth is a powerful predictor of financial crises, suggesting that policymakers ignore credit at their peril. JEL: E32, E44, E52, G01, N10, N20

This paper considers three challenge areas for mechanism design and describes the role approximation plays in resolving them. Challenge 1: optimal mechanisms are finely tuned to precise details of the distribution on agent preferences. Challenge 2: in environments with multi-dimensional agent preferences economic analysis has failed to provide general characterizations optimal mechanisms. Challenge 3: optimal mechanisms are parameterized by unrealistic knowledge of the distribution of agents' private preferences. This paper surveys positive resolutions to these challenges with emphasis on basic techniques and their relevance to theory and practice.

This paper re-examines Adda and Cornaglia's (2006) evidence on the compensatory behavior of smokers who, in face of higher taxes, are found to reduce their consumption of cigarettes while maintaining their cotinine––a biomarker for nicotine––levels constant. This comment examines the robustness of the empirical findings in Adda and Cornaglia (2006) using: appropriate clustered standard errors, a larger sample from the same years and survey as the data in Adda and Cornaglia (2006), cigarette-prices instead of and in addition to cigarette-taxes, and sampling weights. The empirical findings of Adda and Cornaglia (2006) are not robust. Further, little systematic evidence of compensatory behavior is found among subsamples of smokers

This paper provides evidence of the role of globalized banks in transmitting financial stresses to the real economy during the global financial crisis. A novel dataset is constructed from quarterly balance sheet reports provided by all UK-resident banks to the Bank of England. I find that the shock to bank funding from non-resident creditors was transmitted domestically through a significant reduction in bank credit supply. Resident subsidiaries and branches of foreign-owned banks reduced lending by a larger amount than domestically-owned banks, while the latter calibrated the reduction in domestic lending more closely to the size of the funding shock.

Risk and time are intertwined. The present is known while the future is inherently risky. This is problematic when studying time preferences since uncontrolled risk can generate apparently present-biased behavior. We systematically manipulate risk in an intertemporal choice experiment. Discounted expected utility performs well with risk, but when certainty is added common ratio predictions fail sharply. The data cannot be explained by prospect theory, hyperbolic discounting, or preferences for resolution of uncertainty, but seem consistent with a direct preference for certainty. The data suggest strongly a difference between risk and time preferences.

The Vietnam conflict was the defining event for a generation, with nearly 8 million Americans serving in the armed forces. A large literature in economics has focused on effects of Vietnam-Era service post-war, while little research looks at contemporaneous effects of the mobilization, despite the potential for this mobilization to change marriage markets for particular cohorts. We use exogenous variation across states and over time in men drafted per 100 men 19-25 to look at the effects of the wartime mobilization on birth rates. We find robust evidence that higher rates of inducted men led to significantly lower birth rates.

We estimate an equilibrium model of decision making in the US Supreme Court that takes into account both private information and ideological differences between justices. We measure the value of information in the court by the probability that a justice votes differently from how she would have voted without case-specific information. Our results suggest a sizable value of information: in 44 percent of cases, justices' initial leanings are changed by their personal assessments of the case. Our results also confirm the increased politicization of the Supreme Court in the last quarter century. Counterfactual simulations provide implications for institutional design.

We implemented a randomized field experiment in Malawi examining borrower responses to being fingerprinted when applying for loans. This intervention improved the lender's ability to implement dynamic repayment incentives, allowing it to withhold future loans from past defaulters while rewarding good borrowers with better loan terms. As predicted by a simple model, fingerprinting led to substantially higher repayment rates for borrowers with the highest ex ante default risk, but had no effect for the rest of the borrowers. We provide unique evidence that this improvement in repayment rates is accompanied by behaviors consistent with less adverse selection and lower moral hazard.