This paper proposes a framework for studying competitive (pure) bundling in an oligopoly market. We find that under fairly general conditions, relative to separate sales, bundling raises market prices, benefits firms, and harms consumers when the number of firms is above a threshold (which can be small). This is in contrast to the findings in the duopoly case on which the existing literature often focuses. Our analysis also sheds new light on how consumer valuation dispersion affects price competition more generally.
We extend Ellsberg's two-urn paradox and propose three symmetric forms of partial ambiguity by limiting the possible compositions in a deck of 100 red and black cards in three ways. Interval ambiguity involves a symmetric range of 50 − n to 50 + n red cards. Complementarily, disjoint ambiguity arises from two nonintersecting intervals of 0 to n and 100 − n to 100 red cards. Two-point ambiguity involves n or 100 − n red cards. We investigate experimentally attitudes towards partial ambiguity and the corresponding compound lotteries in which the possible compositions are drawn with equal objective probabilities. This yields three key findings: distinct attitudes towards the three forms of partial ambiguity, significant association across attitudes towards partial ambiguity and compound risk, and source preference between two-point ambiguity and two-point compound risk. Our findings help discriminate among models of ambiguity in the literature.
International Financial Reporting Standards ( IFRS ) allow firms to record adjustments (gains or losses) from the revaluation of investment properties in their income statements. After Hong Kong adopted IFRS in 2005, property companies were required to move their revaluation gains and losses ( RGL ) from equity to income. We find RGL to be a significant determinant of executive compensation in these firms after 2005, but not before. We further find evidence that the RGL ‐compensation association is driven by firms with relative weak corporate governance structure, such as firms in which the controlling shareholders own a relatively small percentage of shares, firms in which the controlling shareholders have control rights that exceed ownership rights, and firms that are no longer run by their founders.
The Securities and Exchange Commission ( SEC ) reviews company filings (10‐Q, 10‐K, S‐1, etc.) submitted to them. If a review identifies potential deficiencies, the SEC staff sends the company a comment letter seeking clarification, additional information, and ultimately, perhaps, revision of the filing or future filings. We examine the content, resolution, and ensuing informational consequences of SEC comment letters. The content analysis shows that nearly half of all comments involve accounting application, financial reporting, and disclosure issues. More than 17 percent of our sample cases result in immediate amended filings to resolve the issue(s) arising from the comment letters, and financial statements and/or footnotes are frequently revised. Following comment letter resolution, the adverse selection component of the bid‐ask spread declines and Earnings Response Coefficients ( ERC s) increase. Our results provide little support for the conjecture that the market interprets the receipt of a comment letter as a signal that the firm has poor reporting quality. Finally, we find no evidence that comment letter firms increase the quantity or change the type of voluntary disclosure, thereby eliminating a possible competing explanation for the improved information environment. We conclude the SEC 's oversight has beneficial informational effects.
We explore how the Balanced Scorecard ( BSC ), as a management accounting technique, was developed and marketed as a general management practice. Drawing on actor network theory ( ANT ), we analyze interviews with key actors associated with the BSC , insights gained from attending BSC training workshops, and other documentary evidence to construct a history of the BSC . Our historical analysis offers theoretical tools to understand how the various features of the accounting technique were translated and transformed, that is, shaped and solidified. This translation entailed processes of modification, labelling, framing, and specification of abstract categories and cause‐effect relations. We also examine the networks and associations that both shape the form of the BSC and mobilize the interests of various constituencies around it to produce what can be regarded as a global management technology. Finally, we highlight the strategies and actions used to maintain control of this technique through its continuous reinvention, and, by doing so, we emphasize the idea of strategic agency.
We develop parametric estimates of the imitation‐driven herding propensity of analysts and their earnings forecasts. By invoking rational expectations, we solve an explicit analyst optimization problem and estimate herding propensity using two measures: First, we estimate analysts’ posterior beliefs using actual earnings plus a realization drawn from a mean‐zero normal distribution. Second, we estimate herding propensity without seeding a random error, and allow for nonorthogonal information signals. In doing so, we avoid using the analyst's prior forecast as the proxy for his posterior beliefs, which is a traditional criticism in the literature. We find that more than 60 percent of analysts herd toward the prevailing consensus, and herding propensity is associated with various economic factors. We also validate our herding propensity measure by confirming its predictive power in explaining the cross‐sectional variation in analysts’ out‐of‐sample herding behavior and forecast accuracy. Finally, we find that forecasts adjusted for analysts’ herding propensity are less biased than the raw forecasts. This adjustment formula can help researchers and investors obtain better proxies for analysts’ unbiased earnings forecasts.
We study circumstances when analysts’ forecasts diverge from managers’ forecasts after management guidance, and the consequences of this divergence for investors and analysts. Our results show that investors’ return response to earnings surprises based on analyst forecasts is significantly weaker when analyst and management forecasts diverge, and that this attenuating effect is stronger when the management forecast is more credible. When the divergent management forecast is more accurate than the analyst consensus forecast, the subsequent‐quarter analyst consensus forecast is significantly more accurate than that of the current quarter, and exhibits less serial correlation. Overall, our findings suggest that, when analyst and management forecasts diverge, investors find the two sources to contain complementary information, and analysts learn to improve their subsequent forecasts.
Vertical pay dispersion is the difference in pay across different hierarchical levels within an organization (Milkovich and Newman ). While vertical pay dispersion may be useful in attracting, retaining, and motivating highly skilled employees (Lazear and Rosen ; Lazear ; Prendergast ), our study investigates a potential disadvantage; specifically, the negative impact of perceived unfairness of vertical pay dispersion on employees' budgeting decisions. We predict and find that high vertical pay dispersion motivates subordinates to misreport costs to a greater extent than low vertical pay dispersion. Furthermore, we predict and find that superiors, on average, exercise more lenient cost controls when vertical pay dispersion is high rather than low. Supplemental analysis indicates superiors are more lenient on average because of their aversion to inequity caused by vertical pay dispersion. Our results suggest that high vertical pay dispersion can compromise the overall corporate budgeting environment, where higher levels of misreporting by subordinates goes unchecked by superiors.
We present new evidence on debt covenant violation ( DCV ) consequences that have not previously been examined in the literature. In particular, we show that a DCV triggers significant information asymmetry and uncertainty on the part of shareholders and auditors as reflected in higher bid–ask spreads, return volatility, and audit fees. Further, these consequences occur even when lender‐imposed costs are relatively lower, consistent with the act of default itself triggering shareholder and auditor uncertainty. The results highlight costs to the firm of having bright‐line rules in contracts, and add to an understanding of the consequences of DCV s.
The question of why some companies pay fewer taxes than others is a widely investigated topic of interest. One of the well‐known explanations is a phenomenon called tax avoidance . We develop a grounded theory model of influences on corporate tax planning through a series of 19 in‐depth German tax expert interviews. Our research identifies three independent hurdles in the tax planning process, which can help to explain different levels of tax expense across companies. Those three hurdles sequentially address which tax planning methods are available (defined by business characteristics), desirable (given via aims of tax planning), and implementable (determined by tax manager power). A large part of previous research has estimated the influence of firm characteristics, which we incorporate in the broader term business characteristics, on tax expense, while the other influences that we identify have largely been left “out of the equation.” In the light of the current public debates on tax avoidance, we reveal two important findings: First, we find that companies vary widely in the aggressiveness of their aims of tax planning, which contrasts sharply with the picture often drawn by undifferentiated media reports. Second, tax managers can assume very different levels of power in their organization. The implementation of desirable tax planning methods varies depending on this level of tax manager power. In conclusion, our three‐hurdle grounded theory provides generalizable insights into important influences on corporate tax planning which help to explain the observed variation in tax expenses across firms.