Knowledge that Transforms

Valuation ratios divide stock price by accounting metrics such as earnings, earnings growth, and book value. This study adapts the general valuation framework in Ohlson and Juettner‐Nauroth (2005) and Ohlson (2005) to present a unified approach for developing valuation ratios based on fundamentals, referred to as fundamental valuation ratios. One starts with a valuation model that is driven by an accounting metric a and its abnormal growth, then divides the valuation model by a to get a fundamental valuation ratio. For any valuation ratio, one can find a corresponding fundamental valuation ratio, as long as the valuation model is based on the same metric a as the valuation ratio denominator.

We investigate whether potential pension contracting benefits lead institutions that provide pension services to acquire ownership blocks in firms and the implications of such blockholdings on the firms' corporate governance. We use the 2006 Pension Protection Act, which expanded pension participation in certain states, as a quasi‐exogenous shock and find an increase in block ownership by pension‐providing institutions in firms with substantial operations in affected states. Further, we find that the acquisition of a large block increases the likelihood that the institution will provide future pension services to the firm. With regard to corporate governance, we find that the acquisition of large pension blockholdings is associated with higher CEO pay and lower CEO turnover following poor financial performance. However, contrary to the prediction of the private benefits hypothesis, we do not find consistent evidence that large pension blockholdings are associated with declining firm profitability, suggesting that pension institutions are incentivized to exert monitoring to preserve the investment value of their blockholdings. Overall, our evidence is consistent with pension service institutions acquiring ownership blocks to obtain pension contracts, but our evidence does not support the prediction that they use their influence to compromise shareholder value.

Previous studies on accounting innovations emphasize the key role played by innovators and other core actors in theorizing and popularizing such innovations. This paper extends this literature by drawing attention to the role of actors who occupy a more peripheral position within the innovation‐based field. We regard accounting innovations as strategic action fields, in which core and peripheral actors interact to shape the trajectory of the innovation. In contrast to core actors, peripheral actors only weakly identify with the innovation‐based field and often occupy a core position in some other industry, professional, and/or geographical field. Given their embeddedness in these other fields, they are likely to try to accommodate an innovation with existing practices. Such frame blending can be problematic for core actors who envisage a more radical frame shift. Using the case of Beyond Budgeting, we show how the interplay between core and peripheral actors shapes the trajectory of an innovation, in terms of the composition of the field and the framing tactics that dominate at different stages in the development of the field. Our paper advances a perspective on accounting innovations which highlights the variable nature of the innovation space, in terms of different actors entering and exiting this space over time, as well as the importance of considering the overlaps between an innovation‐based field and other (industry, professional, geographical) fields.

China's split‐share reform of 2005 (the Reform) converts the previously restricted shares held by founding shareholders to shares tradable on the open market. Against this backdrop, we study how underwriter‐affiliated analysts and firms' large shareholders interact in the event of the latter's sales of restricted shares. We document that recommendations made by affiliated analysts are significantly more optimistic when firms' large shareholders plan to sell their restricted shares. This optimism, however, is associated with negative post‐sale stock returns, suggesting large shareholders profit from share sales. Furthermore, large shareholders sell more restricted shares through the affiliated brokerages for which analysts have issued more optimistic recommendations and firms under their control are more likely to appoint such brokerages as lead underwriters when they refinance in the future. The affiliated analysts also conduct more site visits to the firms after the share sales, thereby improving their earnings‐forecast accuracy. Our analysis shows how conflicts of interest by financial intermediaries arise following the Reform and lead to large shareholders' extraction of rents from public investors.

Previous research has highlighted the crucial roles that accounting plays in both the construction and development of the state. However, only limited attention has been paid to how accounting is both conceived and implemented as a technology of government. Taking a historical perspective, and through extensive archival analysis of the Canadian experience, we explore here the ways in which accounting practices were significantly expanded and elaborated over time. Progressively, accounting was successful in increasingly infiltrating the machinery of the state, resulting in greater power and influence being accorded to state accounting professionals. We contribute to existing governmentality research on accounting in two principal ways. First, we demonstrate how the territorializing power of accounting has transnational dimensions. The Canadian initiative was galvanized by simultaneous initiatives taking place in the United Kingdom, the United States, and a range of other Commonwealth nations. The similar trajectories of these various initiatives leads to a view of accounting as something that is co‐constructed across borders, a process we refer to here as transnational territorialization. Second, we demonstrate the crucial role played by key individuals in this transnational territorialization. Auditors general worked both individually and in concert to skillfully sell the evaluative potential of accounting to key power brokers in the state apparatus, thereby creating advantageous positions for themselves. This highlights the crucial role required by skillful and reflexive social agents in the elaboration of accounting technologies, something that hitherto has been underappreciated in extant literature on both auditing and governmentality.

This paper draws on extensive fieldwork to explore the nature, scope, and implications of management preparations for the question and answer session (Q&A) that occurs during a firm's results presentation. Prior literature has associated the value of this encounter with investor‐manager interactivity. As such, it is assumed that there are high levels of managerial authorship, ownership, and spontaneity as executives face questions from analysts. Following on, it is generally assumed that this translates into an increased risk of unintended disclosure, through verbal and nonverbal messaging. However, our data indicate that management engages in vast preparatory work to mitigate the risks associated with real (“original,” natural, spontaneous, un‐staged) interactivity. Instead, the Q&A is carefully planned, organized, scripted, and rehearsed. As such, the event is transformed into a hyperreal encounter in the Baudrillardian sense. Despite this, the value of the Q&A is not necessarily impaired. Instead, these managerial backstage preparations arguably make the encounter realer than real. We suggest that the Q&A that we observe (the “copy”) is more useful than the original might have been. Our work provides evidence and discussion of two interconnected paradoxes: perfection and self‐reference. This study not only raises important questions, challenges, and opportunities for researchers interested in the study of investor‐manager interactions but also speaks to those with an interest in workplace meetings and Q&A more broadly.

In this study, we examine the joint effect of vertical pay dispersion and peer observability on subordinates' misreporting choices. We adopt a participative budgeting setting in which two subordinates report to one superior, and we manipulate vertical pay dispersion (low/high) and peer observability (absent/present). Subordinates have private information about actual project costs and can over‐report project costs to the superior without detection and thus create budgetary slack. When a peer's reporting choices are observable, we predict and find that peer reporting choices have an asymmetric influence on the focal subordinates' reporting choices, and this asymmetric influence depends on the level of vertical pay dispersion. Specifically, we find that when vertical pay dispersion is low, subordinates who observe peer reports containing low slack misreport less , whereas observing peer reports that contain high slack has no significant effect. However, when vertical pay dispersion is high , subordinates who observe peer reports containing high slack misreport more , whereas observing peer reports that contain low slack has no significant effect. Driven by these asymmetric effects, subordinates misreport less in the presence of peer observability than in its absence when vertical pay dispersion is low and misreport more in the presence of peer observability than in its absence when vertical pay dispersion is high. Overall, our findings suggest that when a firm has a more egalitarian pay structure (i.e., low vertical pay dispersion), an open information policy is conducive to a more honest reporting environment, whereas under a more hierarchical pay structure (i.e., high vertical pay dispersion), open information policies can compromise the honesty of subordinates' reports.

Prior studies use fundamental earnings forecasts to proxy for the market's expectations of earnings because analyst forecasts are biased and are available for only a subset of firms. We find that as a proxy for market expectations, fundamental forecasts contain systematic measurement errors analogous to those in analysts' biased forecasts. Therefore, these forecasts are not representative of investors' beliefs. The systematic measurement errors from using fundamental forecasts to proxy for market expectations occur because investors misweight the information in many firm‐level variables when estimating future earnings, but fundamental forecasts are formed using the historically efficient weights on firm‐level variables. Thus, we develop an alternative ex ante proxy for the market's expectations of future earnings (“the implied market forecast”) using the historical (and inefficient) weights, as reflected in stock returns, that the market places on firm‐level variables. A trading strategy based on the implied market forecast error, which is measured as the difference between the implied market forecast and the fundamental forecast, generates excess returns of approximately 9 percent per year. These returns cannot be explained by investors' reliance on analysts' biased forecasts. Overall, our results reveal that market expectations differ from both fundamental forecasts and analysts' forecasts.

By analyzing a large panel of elections in 55 countries, we show that political uncertainty surrounding elections can affect asymmetric cost responses to activity changes (i.e., cost stickiness). In comparison to non‐election years, we find that the asymmetry in cost behaviors is stronger during election years in regressions that control for other firm‐level and country‐level determinants. In another series of tests, we report strong, robust evidence supporting the predictions that the importance of political uncertainty to cost stickiness is concentrated in countries with sound political and legal institutions. Collectively, the results imply that managers retain slack resources when political uncertainty is high but to be resolved soon.

We select a small set of recommendations that lie in the upper and lower tail of the empirical distribution of divergences between a recommendation, and the consensus over the window (−30, −1) days prior to that recommendation. We classify these extremely divergent recommendations as bold, and then subdivide them into informative bold recommendations that lead other analysts (leading‐bold) and those that are ignored by other analysts (contra‐bold) based on the consensus change in the 30 days after the announcement. We focus on the information conveyed to the market by these bold, leading‐bold, and contra‐bold recommendations through their effects on cumulative abnormal returns (CAR). We find that bold recommendations are not anticipated by market participants (CARs are negative before a bold buy and positive before a bold sell). The next finding is that the market responds strongly to both leading and contra‐bold recommendations over the (0, +4)‐day window and that these reactions are stronger than that to nonbold recommendations. In contrast, over the longer (0, +30)‐day window, leading‐bold recommendations earn additional returns whereas contra‐bold ones reverse significantly due to lack of confirmation. The overall pattern is one of rational market reaction both in the short and long windows. We support the rationality of the market reaction by showing that the percentage of leading‐bold recommendations exceeds that of contra‐bold recommendations, and that these two types of recommendations cannot be separated using observable analyst characteristics such as experience or brokerage size.