Knowledge that Transforms

In this essay, I review the new book by Torsten Persson and Guido Tabellini, The Economic Effects of Constitutions, which investigates the policy and economic consequences of different forms of government and electoral rules. I also take advantage of this opportunity to discuss the advantages and disadvantages of a number of popular empirical strategies in the newly emerging field of comparative political economy.

Experiments, ethnography, and introspection provide evidence economic agents do not act to maximize their narrowly defined self interest. Expanding the domain of preferences to include the utility of others provides a coherent way to extend rational choice theory. There are two approaches for including extended or social preferences in strategic models. One posits that agents have extended preferences, but maintains the conventional assumption that these preferences are stable. Prominent examples of this approach permit agents to exhibit concern for status, inequality, and social welfare. The other approach permits the strategic context to determine the nature of individual preferences. Context-dependent preferences can capture the possibility that agents are motivated in part by reciprocity. They may sacrifice personal consumption in order to lower the utility of unkind agents or to raise the utility of kind agents. This paper surveys the evidence in favor of social preferences and describes the implications of the leading theoretical models of extended preferences. It presents behavioral assumptions that characterize different types of social preferences. It investigates the extent to which social preferences may arise as the limit of evolutionary processes. It discusses the relationship between norms of reciprocity and social preferences in repeated interactions.

We survey the literature on search-theoretic models of the labor market. We show how this approach addresses many issues, including the following: Why do workers sometimes choose to remain unemployed? What determines the lengths of employment and unemployment spells? How can there simultaneously exist unemployed workers and unfilled vacancies? What determines aggregate unemployment and vacancies? How can homogeneous workers earn different wages? What are the tradeoffs firms face from different wages? How do wages and turnover interact? What determines efficient turnover? We discuss various modeling choices concerning wage determination and the meeting process, including recent models of directed search.

This paper demonstrates that mall store contracts are written to internalize externalities through both an efficient allocation and pricing of space, and an efficient allocation of incentives across stores. Certain stores generate externalities by drawing customers to other stores, whereas many stores primarily benefit from external mall traffic. Therefore, to varying degrees, the success of each store depends upon the presence and effort of other stores, and the effort of the developer to attract customers to the mall. Using a unique data set of mall tenant contracts, we show that rental contracts are written to (i) efficiently price the net externality of each store and (ii) align the incentives to induce optimal effort by the developer and each mall store according to the externality of each store's effort.

This paper exploits the introduction of a pronatalist transfer policy in the Canadian province of Quebec that paid up to C$8,000 to families having a child. I implement a quasi-experimental strategy by forming treatment and control groups defined by time, jurisdiction, and family type. The incentive was available broadly, rather than to a narrow population as studied in previous work, providing an exceptional opportunity to investigate heterogeneous responses. I find a strong effect of the policy on fertility, and some evidence of a heterogeneous response that may help reconcile these results with previous estimates.

We construct a novel data set matching occupational data from separate establishments to the establishments' corporate parents, in order to study labor market links across establishments within diverse firms. We find substantial wage components common to all establishments within firms, even after netting out industry and occupation effects. However, employment changes are localized to establishments. The data suggest that internal labor markets of multiestablishment firms are linked throughout their entire organizations, but that establishment-level demand shocks do not permeate the firm.

This paper estimates the effect of Wal-Mart expansion on retail employment at the county level. Using an instrumental variables approach to correct for both measurement error in entry dates and endogeneity of the timing of entry, I find that Wal-Mart entry increases retail employment by 100 jobs in the year of entry. Half of this gain disappears over the next five years as other retail establishments exit and contract, leaving a long-run statistically significant net gain of 50 jobs. Wholesale employment declines by approximately 20 jobs due to Wal-Mart's vertical integration. No spillover effect is detected in retail sectors in which Wal-Mart does not compete directly, suggesting Wal-Mart does not create agglomeration economies in retail trade at the county level.

This paper addresses the link between trade exposure and wage volatility. First, it shows, in a simple model, that trade exposure magnifies the impact of domestic productivity shocks on industry-specific labor demand, particularly for the less export-intensive industries, and that, if labor is not perfectly mobile, this implies a rise in wage volatility. Then, it tests these predictions, using industry data. The empirical results confirm that wage volatility increases with an industry's degree of openness, and that it declines with an increase in the industry's export intensity.

This paper presents a structural econometric framework for discrete and continuous consumer choices in which unobserved intrapersonal and interpersonal preference heterogeneity is modeled explicitly. It outlines a simulation-assisted estimation methodology applicable in this framework. This methodology is illustrated in an application to analyze data from the U.C. Berkeley Internet Demand Experiment.

This paper evaluates the use of measures of regional economic activity to forecast tax revenues for New York State and New York City at 3-, 6-, and 12-month horizons. We construct sales- and withholding-tax base series and then apply the methodology of Stock and Watson (1989, 1991) to estimate regional indexes of coincident economic indicators. Employing an out-of-sample forecasting framework, we find that the use of the coincident indexes leads to statistically and economically significant improvements in tax base forecasts compared to those generated from univariate autoregressions. In addition, the coincident indexes produce forecasts that are generally more accurate than forecasts that rely on the use of the coincident indicators separately. Though our analysis focuses on forecasting movements in tax revenue at the state or local level, it is also intended to draw attention to the value the indexes may provide in other applications.