Knowledge that Transforms

We evaluate the net costs and benefits of the whistleblower ( WB ) provisions adopted under the Dodd‐Frank Reform Act of 2010 by examining investor responses to events related to the proposed regulations. We focus our main analysis on a sample of firms that lobbied against implementation of the WB provisions by submitting a comment letter to the SEC . Lobbying firms are characterized by weaker existing WB programs and greater degrees of managerial entrenchment than a matched control sample of similar non‐lobbying firms. Short‐window excess stock returns around events related to implementation of the WB rules are significantly more positive for the portfolio of lobbying firms than for their matched controls; this effect is also more pronounced for lobbying firms with weaker existing WB programs. These results suggest that investors expect the new WB provisions to provide net benefits by improving shareholder protection.

Firms are under increasing pressure to implement effective internal whistleblowing systems. While firms can provide incentives to encourage internal whistleblowing, it remains controversial how such incentives should be structured. We examine whether the effectiveness of incentives encouraging internal whistleblowing is a joint function of the framing of such incentives (reward or penalty) and the strength of descriptive norms supporting internal whistleblowing. We predict and find in a lab experiment that penalties lead to a greater increase in internal whistleblowing (compared to rewards) when descriptive norms supporting whistleblowing are stronger. Our study contributes to the previous accounting literature on dishonesty and the role of management control systems design in promoting honesty and ethical norms in organizations. We also contribute to an emerging accounting literature on the links between controls, norms, and individual behavior by distinguishing between descriptive norms and injunctive norms and by highlighting the interplay between these two types of norms. Our results have important implications for organizations considering adopting incentives to encourage internal whistleblowing.

Since most audit engagements identify multiple proposed audit adjustments, auditors must decide how best to present and negotiate these adjustments with their clients. Prior research indicates that auditors can negotiate adjustments individually (a sequential strategy) or can negotiate multiple adjustments within the same negotiation setting (a simultaneous strategy). This paper examines the relative effectiveness of a simultaneous versus sequential negotiation strategy in eliciting concessions from clients and engendering greater client satisfaction. Participants negotiated audit adjustments with a simulated auditor who employed one of the two negotiation strategies. We find evidence that a simultaneous strategy elicits significantly greater total concessions from client managers and also generates more positive attitudes toward the auditor. We also manipulate the magnitude of the issues negotiated and find that significantly greater concessions are offered when larger issues are presented first. These findings have important implications for auditors, as they suggest that negotiating issues simultaneously and presenting larger issues first can result in significantly improved negotiation outcomes.

We examine the effects of the 1998 merger of Price Waterhouse ( PW ) and Coopers & Lybrand ( CL ) on the audit quality of the merged firm PricewaterhouseCoopers (PwC) at both the firm and office levels, where audit quality is surrogated by the auditor's propensity to issue a going‐concern opinion, clients’ likelihood of meeting or beating analysts’ earnings forecasts, and clients’ accrual quality. At the firm level, we find that the merger increased audit quality for PwC relative to the audit quality of the other Big N firms. At the office level, our findings, albeit mixed, collectively suggest that the improvement in firm‐level audit quality was likely driven by the improvement in audit quality at PwC's overlapping offices, that is, offices in cities where both PW and CL had separate offices prior to the merger. Further, our findings suggest that although the PW / CL merger increased auditor concentration in local audit markets with PwC overlapping offices, the merger improved (rather than hurt) audit quality in those markets. Overall, our study contributes to the extant sparse literature on the effect of Big N mergers on audit quality, and is of potential interest to regulators.

The recent financial crisis has brought to the forefront the need for companies to effectively manage their risks. In this regard, one approach that has gained prominence is enterprise risk management ( ERM ). Importantly, little is known about the link between ERM and the financial reporting process. This link is critical, because it is imperative that financial reporting adequately depicts the financial status (e.g., valuations, estimates) and associated risks of a company as revealed by ERM . Additionally, from an auditing perspective, ERM affects the risks of misstatement, which should impact audit planning. Accordingly, the objective of this study is to examine the experiences of audit partners, CFO s, and audit committee ( AC ) members (“the governance triad”) on the link between ERM and the financial reporting process. To determine whether members of the governance triad focus on monitoring, strategy, or both, we also examine their definition of and experiences with ERM with respect to agency and/or resource dependence theory. To address these issues, we conduct semistructured interviews of experienced individuals that form the governance triads from 11 public companies. There are three major findings from our study. First, importantly, all three types of participants see a strong link between ERM and the financial reporting process. Second, despite recognition of the broad nature of ERM , the predominant experiences of the actual roles played by triad members center on agency theory, while resource dependence may be relatively underemphasized by all triad members. Finally, CFO s and AC members indicate that auditors may be especially underutilizing ERM in the audit process, suggesting an “expectations gap.”

We use reverse mergers to examine the impact of litigation risk on audit fees. In a reverse merger, a private company merges with a public company, and the private company's management takes over the resulting publicly traded firm. Reverse mergers create a unique test setting to provide estimates on the litigation risk premium because, while the litigation risk for formerly private firms whose equity becomes publicly traded increases, the remaining auditee‐ and auditor‐related characteristics remain virtually unchanged. We document a litigation risk premium of approximately 27 percent. Moreover, we document that equity dispersion impacts the audit fee pricing of litigation risk and this relation is dramatically magnified in the publicly traded realm. Finally, we find that institutional investors demand higher audit effort in the form of higher audit fees in both the private‐ and public‐equity settings.

In this paper, we propose and empirically test a cross‐sectional profitability forecasting model which incorporates two major improvements relative to extant models. First, in terms of model construction, we incorporate mean reversion through the use of a two‐stage partial adjustment model and inclusion of a number of additional relevant determinants of profitability. Second, in terms of model estimation, we employ least absolute deviation (LAD) analysis instead of ordinary least squares because the former approach is able to better accommodate outliers. Results reveal that forecasts from our model are more accurate than three extant models at every forecast horizon considered and more accurate than consensus analyst forecasts at forecast horizons of two through five years. Further analysis reveals that LAD estimation provides the greatest incremental accuracy improvement followed by the inclusion of income subcomponents as predictor variables, and implementation of the two‐stage partial adjustment model. In terms of economic relevance, we find that forecasts from our model are informative about future returns, incremental to forecasts from other models, analysts’ forecasts, and standard risk factors. Overall, our results are important because they document the increased accuracy and economic relevance of a cross‐sectional profitability forecasting model which incorporates improvements to extant models in terms of model construction and estimation.

Although prior research reports that firms that consistently beat their earnings expectations are rewarded with a market‐valuation premium, most firms are inconsistent in the sign of their benchmark performance, sometimes missing and sometimes beating. In this paper, we report the results of multiple experiments to test the idea that potential investors, evaluating firms that have inconsistent benchmark performance, use a counting heuristic to discriminate among them. Our results provide strong support for the hypothesis that these investors distinguish among firms by counting the number of beats and misses they experience over an observed time interval. The judgmental effect of this beat‐frequency is incremental to the effect of the magnitude of the beats and misses of the benchmark. Our study has implications for firm managers who have inconsistent benchmark performance, suggesting that market participants do make systematic discriminations among such inconsistent firms. It also has implications for researchers by introducing a new theoretical construct to the literature—namely, the counting heuristic.

Prior research (e.g., Dechow, Huson, and Sloan ) documents that, on average, compensation practices appear to shield CEO pay from income‐decreasing special items. In some circumstances, compensation shielding can be efficient. For example, it may encourage CEOs with earnings‐sensitive pay to take an action that reduces current earnings but nevertheless enhances value. Compensation shielding can be inefficient in other circumstances, such as when a board of directors is captured by an overly powerful CEO or the magnitude of negative special items has been overstated (e.g., by shifting core expenses into special items). This paper explores whether strong governance can explain cross‐sectional variation in compensation shielding, and whether stronger governance and auditing are associated with less shifting of expenses. We find that strong corporate governance mechanisms, as captured by board (and committee) independence, the Sarbanes‐Oxley (2002) Act (SOX) and its related governance reforms, and switches to Big 4 auditors, are all associated with less compensation shielding. While our evidence suggests that strong overall governance is associated with a reduction in manipulation of core earnings through classification shifting in the cross‐section, we find inconclusive evidence to suggest that board independence or SOX influence classification shifting.

Consistent with the notion that dividends are very sticky, Daniel, Denis, and Naveen ( ) report evidence that firms manage earnings upward when pre‐managed earnings are expected to fall short of dividend payments. However, we find that this evidence is not robust when controlling for firms' tendency to manage earnings upward to avoid reporting earnings declines; only firms with high leverage exhibit a statistically weak tendency to manage earnings to close deficits of pre‐managed earnings relative to dividends. We further report that the decision to cut dividends depends on whether reported earnings fall short of past dividends, but not on earnings management that eliminates a shortfall in pre‐managed earnings relative to dividend payments. Overall, our evidence suggests that firms that face dividend constraints are more likely to cut dividends than to manage earnings to avoid dividend cuts.