Knowledge that Transforms

Using samples of restating and nonrestating U.S. firms, the study empirically investigates the relationship between the incidence of fraudulent financial reporting and accounting‐based performance outcomes. The outcomes are framed as gains and losses relative to a reference point, defined as the mean performance of industry peers. Consistent with cumulative prospect theory (CPT), the findings show that fraud incidence is positively (negatively) related to the probability of a loss (gain); more (less) sensitive to the probability of a loss (gain) (i.e., loss‐aversion); and more (less) sensitive to an extra unit of the probability at a high‐ or low‐ (medium‐) probability level (i.e., nonlinear probability weighting function). The study extends the fraudulent financial reporting literature by formulating fraud incidence as a function of performance outcomes using peer performance as a reference point. By testing CPT's individual‐level behavioral implications on firm‐level archival data, the study reconceptualizes the investigation of fraudulent financial reporting in terms of risk attitude and extends prior investigations of CPT from laboratory experiments to a real‐world setting of fraudulent financial reporting.

Prior research indicates that a firm's use of derivatives to manage business risks is viewed favorably by investors. However, these studies do not consider a potentially key factor in this setting—namely, the typical behavior (or norms) regarding derivatives by other firms in the industry or the firm itself. In this paper, we report the results of multiple experiments that test whether norms are influential in affecting investors’ evaluations of firms’ derivatives choices. Our results show that the generally favorable reactions to derivative use actually reverse and become unfavorable when firms’ derivative decisions are inconsistent with industry or firm norms. Somewhat surprisingly, though, we find that industry and firm norms are not viewed similarly by investors. These results expand our understanding of how investors respond to firm's derivative use decisions and demonstrate the role of norms as factors that influence investors’ judgments in financial reporting settings. Our results have implications for firm managers making decisions about derivative use.

Even though there is a worldwide consensus as to the necessity of an audit of annual financial statements for public companies, there is divergence of views as to the review of interim financial statements. While some jurisdictions make it mandatory (e.g., Australia, France, United States ), others allow the review without requiring it (e.g., Canada, United Kingdom ). Using a sample of companies listed in Canada, we examine the costs associated with these reviews and the benefits they generate in terms of improvement in the quality of interim financial statements for the years 2004 and 2005. Controlling for the decision to purchase the reviews, we find that audit fees are 18 percent higher for firms with interim reviews and, contrary to many regulators' assumption, we find no evidence that this cost increase is proportionally higher for smaller firms. Regarding the benefits of interim reviews, we find no significant association between either accruals‐ or nonaccruals‐based measures of earnings management and the fact that the interim statements are reviewed by the auditor, neither in the interim reports nor in those of the fourth quarter. The results suggest that auditors' involvement with interim reports may not be as effective as previously thought at controlling the quality of interim financial statements.

This study examines a setting in which a tax‐reporting decision is delegated to a firm's tax manager. Using financial accounting measures of tax expense to evaluate the tax manager allows the firm to efficiently attain the level of tax avoidance it prefers, despite the fact that the consequences of the tax‐reporting decision will occur in the future. The study also examines how well two accounting measures of tax aggressiveness — cash taxes paid and the unrecognized tax benefit — distinguish between conservative and aggressive firms.

We examine 533 CEO severance contracts for financial services firms from 1997 to 2007 and find that ex ante severance pay is positively associated with risk-taking after controlling for the incentive effects provided by equity-based compensation. We report a positive causal relation between the amount of severance pay and risk-taking using popular market-based risk measures as well as the distance-to-default and the Z-score. We also find that severance pay encourages excessive risk-taking using metrics such as tail risk and asset quality. Our results are consistent with the risk-shifting argument and provide support for recent reforms on severance pay in the financial sector.

Earnings items are typically classified in financial reports based on their persistence and measurement subjectivity. Archival research examines investors' use of persistence and measurement subjectivity classifications for forecasting and valuation. However, this research typically examines only one of these classifications at a time and ignores the potential interactive implications of an earnings item's persistence and measurement subjectivity classifications. We recruited experienced financial analysts to participate in two experiments that examined the effect of measurement subjectivity classifications on analysts' use of persistence classifications when forecasting earnings items. We find that analysts rely less on an earnings item's persistence classification when measurement subjectivity is high relative to when measurement subjectivity is low. We also find that presentation format affects analysts' use of these two classifications. Specifically, we find that the matrix format (i.e., rows display persistence classifications and columns display measurement subjectivity classifications) facilitates analysts' combined use of persistence and measurement subjectivity classifications relative to the sequential format (i.e., the classifications are displayed separately). These findings suggest that archival research could improve its examination of market participants' use of earnings classifications for forecasting and valuation by recognizing that the implications of an earnings item's persistence classification can vary according to the item's measurement subjectivity classification. By also demonstrating how presentation format affects analysts' use of earnings classifications, our study provides further insights into this fundamental issue in accounting research and standard setting.

This paper investigates information leakage from analyst reports prior to their public release. Previous studies document abnormal trading by institutions or short selling before announcement of recommendation changes. Such prerelease abnormal trading is interpreted as evidence of information leakage from analyst reports. However, if sophisticated investors obtain information similar to what analysts have from other sources, abnormal prerelease trading patterns would be observed even if there were no information leakage from analyst reports. This paper, using a unique data set from Korea, aims to determine whether a direct causal link between recommendation changes and prerelease trading exists, by comparing trading behavior of client investors with non‐client investors. We find that abnormal prerelease trading by client investors, especially client institutions, is earlier in timing and greater in magnitude than that of other investor groups, supporting the information leakage hypothesis. We further find that net buying by client institutions and client large individuals is positively associated with firm, analyst, and earnings forecast change variables that influence formulation of recommendation changes and their impacts.

This study compares auditors' and chief financial officers' pre‐negotiation judgments and considers the potential differential impact the end of the audit (deadline pressure) has on each party. General negotiation literature suggests that individuals change their behaviors as deadline pressure increases (i.e., when there is less time in which to conduct a negotiation) in order to increase the probability of reaching an agreement. In an audit context, the end‐of‐engagement deadline is often based on regulatory filing deadlines (e.g., SEC filings for public companies), which are not determined by either negotiating party. The audit context is also unique in that there are asymmetric consequences for each party (the auditor and client management) for failing to reach an agreement and different negotiation tactics used by the two parties potentially leading to differing levels of concessions. We predict that auditors, who are in a stronger negotiation position, will generally concede less than client management when determining their pre‐negotiation position and will tend to use more contentious strategies. However, such contentious strategies require time. Thus, we expect, based on negotiation theory, that as deadline pressure increases, auditors' concessionary behavior will be more affected than that of client management. Consistent with expectations, results of our experiment suggest that CFOs concede more than auditors in general; however, auditors are more reactive to deadline pressure and increase concessions when faced with high deadline pressure, while CFOs do not. We also measure planned strategy use and find results to be consistent with theory: when deadline pressure is high, auditors are less likely to use contentious tactics, while CFOs' strategy choices are unaffected by deadline pressure. These results suggest that characteristics of the unique auditor–client negotiation environment, such as deadline pressures, have potentially differential effects on both parties due to the differing negotiation strategies employed by these parties.

Verrecchia (1983) investigates a manager's incentives for costly, discretionary disclosure of his information to risk‐averse traders when the functional form of prices is exogenously specified. We extend Verrecchia (1983) by deriving the endogenously determined functional form of prices that would arise when all traders have constant risk tolerance. We show that these endogenously determined prices are inconsistent with the assumed prices in Verrecchia (1983) when the manager elects to not disclose. We derive the manager's disclosure strategy for our setting and extend the comparative static results in Verrecchia (1990) for risk‐neutral traders to a setting where traders have constant risk tolerance and prices are endogenously derived. Further, in our setting, discretionary disclosure does not affect how traders price risk of different outcomes. Also, we offer a representation of risk‐averse traders' prices using risk‐adjusted distributions. Finally, these results provide implications for empirical‐archival discretionary disclosure studies.

We present the first large‐sample empirical evidence on U.S. auditors' responses to changes in entity‐level audit risk during 2006–2007, the period leading up to the financial crisis of 2008–2009. Treating fiscal year 2005 engagements as a pre‐crisis benchmark, we find that audit attention during fiscal year 2006 and 2007 bank audit engagements shifted in line with the shifting audit risks. One implication of these findings is that auditors were able to recognize and respond to financial statement impacts of the macroeconomic shocks that unfolded during the lead‐up to the crisis. Another implication is that auditors' failure to issue advance warnings of increasing auditee riskiness during the time leading up to the financial crisis more likely reflects limitations of extant accounting and auditing rules rather than a lack of auditor awareness or attention to those risks.