Knowledge that Transforms

We revisit the transmission mechanism from monetary policy to household consumption in a Heterogeneous Agent New Keynesian (HANK) model. The model yields empirically realistic distributions of wealth and marginal propensities to consume because of two features: uninsurable income shocks and multiple assets with different degrees of liquidity and different returns. In this environment, the indirect effects of an unexpected cut in interest rates, which operate through a general equilibrium increase in labor demand, far outweigh direct effects such as intertemporal substitution. This finding is in stark contrast to small- and medium-scale Representative Agent New Keynesian (RANK) economies, where the substitution channel drives virtually all of the transmission from interest rates to consumption. Failure of Ricardian equivalence implies that, in HANK models, the fiscal reaction to the monetary expansion is a key determinant of the overall size of the macroeconomic response. (JEL D31, E12, E21, E24, E43, E52, E62)

Mazzocco and Saini (2012) propose and implement a test of efficient risk sharing that allows for preference heterogeneity. They motivate their approach as yielding different results from those of a standard efficiency test with homogeneous preferences. We show that the standard efficiency test results are misreported in their paper and that the correctly reported results do not present as compelling a case for the importance of accounting for heterogeneous preferences. (JEL D12, D81, G22, O12, O18, R23, Z13)

We model the joint distribution of choice probabilities and decision times in binary decisions as the solution to a problem of optimal sequential sampling, where the agent is uncertain of the utility of each action and pays a constant cost per unit time for gathering information. We show that choices are more likely to be correct when the agent chooses to decide quickly, provided the agent’s prior beliefs are correct. This better matches the observed correlation between decision time and choice probability than does the classical drift-diffusion model (DDM), where the agent knows the utility difference between the choices. (JEL C41, D11, D12, D83)

We study the optimal accumulation of international reserves in a quantitative model of sovereign default with long-term debt and a risk-free asset. Keeping higher levels of reserves provides a hedge against rollover risk, but this is costly because using reserves to pay down debt allows the government to reduce sovereign spreads. Our model, parameterized to mimic salient features of a typical emerging economy, can account for significant holdings of international reserves, and the larger accumulation of both debt and reserves in periods of low spreads and high income. We also show that income windfalls, improved policy frameworks, and an increase in the importance of rollover risk imply increases in the optimal holdings of reserves that are consistent with the upward trend in reserves in emerging economies. It is essential for our results that debt maturity exceeds one period. (JEL E21, E43, F32, F34, H63)

Ausubel (2004) introduces a new ascending-bid auction rule for multiple homogeneous objects, called the Ausubel auction, which is a dynamic counterpart of the Vickrey auction. He claims that in the Ausubel auction with private values, sincere bidding by all bidders is an ex post perfect equilibrium. However, we show that this claim does not hold in general by providing a counterexample. We then modify the Ausubel auction so that sincere bidding by all bidders is an ex post perfect equilibrium. (JEL D44)

This paper develops and estimates an equilibrium model where heterogeneous firms can exploit two margins of informality: (i) not register their business, the extensive margin; and (ii) hire workers “off the books,” the intensive margin. The model encompasses the main competing frameworks for understanding informality and provides a natural setting to infer their empirical relevance. The counterfactual analysis shows that once the intensive margin is accounted for, firm and labor informality need not move in the same direction as a result of policy changes. Lower informality can be, but is not necessarily associated with higher output, TFP, or welfare. (JEL D22, E26, H26, J46, O14, O17)

We survey New Zealand firms and document novel facts about their macroeconomic beliefs. There is widespread dispersion in beliefs about past and future macroeconomic conditions, especially inflation. This dispersion in beliefs is consistent with firms’ incentives to collect and process information. Using experimental methods, we find that firms update their beliefs in a Bayesian manner when presented with new information about the economy and that changes in their beliefs affect their decisions. Inflation is not generally perceived as being important to business decisions so firms devote few resources to collecting and processing information about inflation. (JEL D22, D83, D84, E31, E52)

We document the evolution of the new market for frequency response within the UK electricity system over a six-year period. Firms competed in price while facing considerable initial uncertainty about demand and rival behavior. We show that prices stabilized over time, converging to a rest point that is consistent with equilibrium play. We draw on models of fictitious play and adaptive learning to analyze how this convergence occurs and show that these models predict behavior better than an equilibrium model prior to convergence. (JEL D22, D83, L13, L94, L98)

We examine the impact of mismatch on entry wages, separations, and wage growth using unique data on worker talents. We show that workers are sorted on comparative advantage across jobs within occupations. The starting wages of inexperienced workers are unrelated to mismatch. For experienced workers, on the other hand, mismatch is negatively priced into their starting wages. Separations and wage growth are more strongly related to mismatch among inexperienced workers than among experienced workers. These findings are consistent with models of information updating, where less information is available about the quality of matches involving inexperienced workers. (JEL D83, J24, J31, J41, J63, J64)

Using new cross-country survey and experimental data, we investigate how beliefs about intergenerational mobility affect preferences for redistribution in France, Italy, Sweden, the United Kingdom, and the United States. Americans are more optimistic than Europeans about social mobility. Our randomized treatment shows pessimistic information about mobility and increases support for redistribution, mostly for “equality of opportunity” policies. We find strong political polarization. Left-wing respondents are more pessimistic about mobility: their preferences for redistribution are correlated with their mobility perceptions; and they support more redistribution after seeing pessimistic information. None of this is true for right-wing respondents, possibly because they see the government as a “problem” and not as the “solution.” (JEL D63, D72, H23, H24, J31, J62)