Knowledge that Transforms

This study analyzes the impact of informed trading on voluntary corporate disclosure in the presence of two factors: the cost of disclosure and the value of a manager's informedness. In the absence of both factors, informed trading has no impact on disclosure even when traders are not certain whether the manager has information. When disclosure is costly, informed trading serves as a free substitute for the disclosure of favorable information, and reduces disclosure . Surprisingly, when the manager's informedness is valuable for the firm, informed trading can also increase disclosure . Traders can discover unfavorable information about the firm, so managers with such information have less incentive to pool with uninformed managers and disclose to show that they are informed. The study also demonstrates that informed trading can have either a positive or a negative effect on firm value by crowding in or crowding out information production in the firm. These results hold for general information structures and are robust if traders can choose how much information can be acquired.

We investigate whether reviews of transactional filings by the SEC unexpectedly constrain SEC resources, leading to lower quality comment letters for periodic reports. The Sarbanes‐Oxley Act requires the SEC to review periodic reports (e.g., 10‐Ks) at least once every three years. However, the SEC also reviews transactional filings (e.g., initial public offerings and acquisitions), which are unpredictable and often occur in waves. We find comment letters for periodic reports are of lower quality (in terms of outputs, inputs, and firm responses) during periods of abnormally high transactional filings. We also find that comment letters issued during periods of abnormally high versus low transactional filings are associated with increased information asymmetry and lower earnings response coefficients in the quarter after the resolution of the comment letter. Overall, our results suggest that unexpected resource constraints affect the quality of SEC oversight of periodic reports.

To meet the objectives of financial reporting in the IASB's Conceptual Framework, the “balance‐sheet approach” embraced by the Framework is necessary but not sufficient. Critical, but largely overlooked, is the role of uncertainty, which we argue defines the role of accrual accounting as a distinctive source of information for investors when investment outcomes are uncertain. This role is in some sense paradoxical: on the one hand, uncertainty undermines both the balance sheet (because uncertain assets are unrecognized) and the income statement (because mismatching is unavoidable). However, these inevitable accounting effects can be exploited to provide information about uncertainty, though not by a balance‐sheet approach alone. Rather, balance sheet recognition and measurement criteria are established by consideration of the impact of uncertainty on matching and mismatching in the income statement. This combination of balance‐sheet and income‐statement approaches enhances the communication of information to investors under conditions of uncertainty, thereby giving greater clarity and purpose in satisfying the objective of the Framework to provide information about “the amount, timing, and uncertainty of future cash flows.”

Online financial communities provide a unique opportunity to directly examine individual investors' attention to accounting information on a large scale and in great detail. I analyze accounting‐related content in large samples of Yahoo! message board posts and StockTwits and find investors pay attention to a range of accounting information, fixating particularly on earnings, cash, and revenues. Consistent with the expectation that investors react to relevant information events, I find accounting‐related discussion elevated around the filings of earnings releases and 8‐K reports, but the reaction to periodic reports is confined to small firms. I also find investors expand their acquisition of accounting information and processing efforts in poor information environments. Greater attention to accounting information at earnings releases does not appear to be meaningfully associated with better information processing.

This study investigates the relation between audit regulation and cost of equity capital. There is scant empirical evidence on this relation because changes in audit regulation are frequently accompanied by other major regulatory changes. We exploit variation in the timing of regulatory changes induced by foreign governments' staggered allowance of PCAOB inspections. Using a difference‐in‐differences design, we find that foreign SEC registrants with auditors from countries that allow PCAOB inspections enjoy a lower cost of capital, relative to foreign SEC registrants with auditors from countries that prohibit inspections. Furthermore, we find that this cost of capital effect is attenuated for companies with higher‐quality governance mechanisms. Finally, we document that inspection access is associated with higher‐quality analyst forecasts, which suggests that this change in audit regulation reduces information risk for market participants.

We argue that volatility in a manager's disclosure tone across time should be a function of two components: (i) the firm's innate operating risk and (ii) the extent to which the manager's disclosure transparently reflects that risk. Consistent with this argument, we find that both operating risk and disclosure transparency are important determinants of disclosure tone volatility. We then examine whether investors incorporate the incremental information provided by disclosure tone volatility into their assessments of firm risk. If disclosure tone volatility primarily provides investors with incremental information about a firm's operating risk, we should find a positive association between tone volatility and market‐based assessments of risk. On the other hand, if disclosure tone volatility primarily provides investors with incremental information about a manager's disclosure transparency, we should find a negative association between tone volatility and market‐based assessments of risk. Consistent with an operating risk explanation, we find a positive association between disclosure tone volatility and market‐based assessments of firm risk after controlling for a comprehensive set of proxies for operating risk and transparency. We find little support for an information risk explanation, even when we examine multiple measures specifically designed to capture information risk. Taken together, our results suggest that although disclosure tone volatility is a function of both a firm's operating risk and a manager's disclosure transparency, investors appear to respond as if disclosure tone volatility only provides incremental information about a firm's operating risk.

We investigate the extent to which market participants use compensation payouts released in the DEF 14A proxy statement (DEF14A) to assess future firm performance by examining sell‐side analysts' earnings forecasts. Consistent with prior work, we confirm that CEO compensation unexplained by current observable economic factors is positively associated with future firm performance. We find that both the likelihood that analysts revise their forecasts following release of the DEF14A and the magnitude and direction of analysts' forecast revisions are positively associated with unexplained CEO compensation. These associations are stronger after the SEC required additional compensation‐related disclosures in late 2006 but lower if the firm has weak corporate governance or more precise other information. Analysts' reactions are not complete, however. Analysts' forecast errors measured months after the DEF14A release are associated with past unexplained compensation, especially in the pre‐2006 period and for analysts who do not revise at the DEF14A release. Taken together, our results suggest that compensation payouts released in the DEF14A contain useful forward‐looking information that is recognized by at least some sophisticated market participants and that the increased disclosure regulations assisted market participants in incorporating this information.

Research on the effects of voluntary disclosure quality on the cost of equity capital is often plagued by endogeneity concerns. In this paper, I use a dynamic panel system GMM estimator, which provides internal instruments from the firm's history that directly address endogeneity arising from unobserved heterogeneity and simultaneity. By using hand‐collected voluntary disclosure scores for firms listed in the Swiss stock exchange, I examine the dynamic relation between voluntary disclosure quality and the cost of equity capital in a panel over a period of 10 years. The results suggest that the relation between voluntary disclosure quality and the cost of equity capital becomes insignificant after controlling adequately for potential dynamic endogeneity, simultaneity, and unobserved heterogeneity.

U.S. multinational corporations increasingly use intra‐firm, cross‐border research collaboration to disperse R&D across different countries. This paper investigates the implications of such collaboration on the abilities of firms to garner benefits from R&D tax incentives. We find that the association between R&D intensity and tax incentives is three to five times larger when firms have extensive cross‐border collaboration connected to a country. We also find that the effect is stronger when local intellectual property protection is weaker and when local innovation resources are higher. Our results suggest that cross‐border collaboration helps firms achieve more tax‐efficient R&D investments both by reducing the nontax frictions posed by weak intellectual property protection and by increasing the nontax benefits of foreign R&D.

The executive compensation literature presumes that shareholders offer risk‐averse managers stock options to entice them to take on more risk, resulting in riskier investment decisions and thus a greater return on investment. However, recent empirical work challenges this assumption, and theoretical research even argues that high levels of option‐based compensation for generally under‐diversified managers may actually lead to greater risk aversion . We evaluate the incentive structure of employee stock options by examining the level of R&D investment and the return on that investment conditional on the portfolio “vega,” which captures the sensitivity of option value to stock price volatility. Our results suggest that both investment in R&D and the return on R&D, as measured by future earnings and patent awards, varies concavely with vega. That is, low to moderate levels of vega correspond to increasing investment in and returns on R&D, consistent with vega inducing more profitable investments, but marginal returns decline as vega increases. Collectively, these results, bolstered by several supplemental analyses, suggest that this surprising relation between vega and risky investment is driven by greater risk aversion at higher levels of vega. Overall, our results imply that employee stock options may not always align the incentives of managers and shareholders.