Knowledge that Transforms

This study examines the effect on investors' judgments of corporate social responsibility (CSR) measures when integrated with financial information in a single report versus when presented in a separate CSR report. Advocates for integrated reports argue that CSR information will be perceived as more relevant and have a greater impact on users when observed in an integrated report. However, we provide experimental evidence that CSR measures have greater influence on investors' judgments when investors observe the CSR information and financial information depicted in separate reports. We also provide evidence that this greater influence of CSR measures is caused by investors' evaluations taking on a “multidimensional perspective” that includes both a social responsibility and a financial dimension, which is triggered by observing the separate CSR report. Activating a social responsibility dimension elevates the perceived relevance of CSR measures, increasing their influence on investors' judgments. Our study contributes to practice by highlighting a potential unintended consequence of issuing integrated versus separate CSR reports: that investors incorporate CSR information less when it is integrated with financial information versus separately reported.

We create and validate measures capturing internal and external motivations to report honestly as trait‐like characteristics. Both measures have high levels of reliability, as well as convergent and divergent validity. To test their predictive validity, we conduct two experiments. In the first experiment, MTurk participants have the opportunity and incentive to misreport with no immediate consequences, and in the second experiment, participants with management experience report how they would make a hypothetical accounting allocation decision. In both experiments, we find that participants who are higher in internal motivations to report honestly are more likely to report honestly than those lower in internal motivations, confirming this measure's predictive validity. Both experiments also provide limited support for the predictive validity of our external measure, finding that those who are higher in external motivation do not report differently than those who are lower in external motivations in the absence of controls. Our study also reveals that individuals who are higher in internal motivations have a diminished reaction to different management controls: MTurk participants to a control that punishes misreporting, and manager participants to a control that rewards honest reporting. Results suggest that management and those charged with governance should consider that some employees can react negatively to controls that are perceived as constraining. Our measures are useful to researchers who investigate honest reporting by allowing them to identify, ex ante, individuals who want to be honest versus wanting to appear honest.

Using novel receivable‐based loan data, we study the effect of aging‐report loan covenants on borrowers' accounts receivable reporting quality. Our purpose is to highlight a channel that lenders use to obtain private information and to understand whether lenders' information acquisition affects the financial reporting quality of borrowers. Compared to receivable‐based borrowers without aging‐report requirements (control firms), borrowers with such requirements (test firms) increase their receivable reporting quality significantly after loan initiations. The shift in reporting quality is more pronounced when borrowers have weak bargaining power. Our results lend support to the argument that lender information access affects borrowers' reporting quality.

This study examines the association between customer base concentration and corporate public disclosure policy. When the customer base is more concentrated, large customers face lower costs of accessing the supplier firm's private information, reducing customers' overall demand for the supplier's public information, suggesting a negative association between customer concentration and the amount of public disclosure. Alternatively, large customers have greater bargaining power and may demand that the supplier firm provide more public disclosures. Consistent with customer concentration facilitating private information flow from the supplier to customers, we find that the frequencies of management earnings and sales forecasts are negatively associated with customer concentration among firms with major corporate customers. These associations are stronger when the supplier and customers are engaged in more relationship‐specific investments, when customers' private information acquisition costs are lower, and when it is less costly for customers to find another supplier.

Theory suggests that financial report‐based debt covenants engender incentives for the manager to relax covenant constraints through accounting choices in order to avoid costly covenant violations. Prior studies directly testing this hypothesis in the context of financial misreporting fail to find consistent evidence. Using a more refined measure of debt covenant restriction, we find that debt covenant restriction is positively associated with the probability of financial statement misstatements. This positive association is driven by performance covenants rather than capital covenants and is more consistent with the manager striving to avoid a “false‐positive” violation than to delay the violation. Our results also imply that managers resort to both income‐increasing and non–income‐increasing misreporting to relieve covenant constraints and rely more on the latter when faced with greater earnings management constraints. Additionally, the auditor charges higher audit fees to firms with more binding covenants even outside the violation state, and audit fees increase with constraints relative to both performance and capital covenants, reflecting greater financial reporting risk and bankruptcy risk, respectively. Within capital covenants, we find some evidence of even higher audit fees for tighter intangible‐inclusive versus intangible‐exclusive capital covenants. Lastly, our evidence suggests that the positive association between covenant constraints and misreporting is attenuated when the auditor has more experience with debt covenants, has greater bargaining power over the client, or faces greater litigation risk.

Management earnings forecasts expressed as a range have become the most common form of quantitative management guidance. Traditionally, the proxy for the sign and the magnitude of the information conveyed by these forecasts—the forecast news—is calculated as the difference between a pre‐forecast earnings expectation and the midpoint of the forecasted range. We provide strong evidence that this traditional measure understates the amount of information conveyed by range forecasts. More importantly, we demonstrate that information conveyed by the upper and lower bounds of the forecasts can be used to improve the classification of forecasts as conveying good or bad news and for calculating the magnitude of that news. We rely on these findings to suggest alternative methods of classifying management range forecasts as conveying good versus bad news and to refine the calculation of forecast news to include the broader information set. Our analysis also suggests that the information conveyed by the range when the forecasts are bundled (issued concurrent with an earnings announcement) is significantly different than when forecasts are not bundled. Overall, our study documents the importance of incorporating range‐related information when assessing the sign and the magnitude of the information conveyed by management range forecasts.

There is a maintained assumption within the accounting literature that client bankruptcies preceded by clean audit opinions (Type II going concern opinion (GCO) errors) damage an auditor's reputation. Consistent with this view, the PCAOB proposes that stakeholders may use Type II GCO errors as indicators of low audit quality. This study examines audit committee and investor responses to Type II GCO errors. I find no evidence that audit offices with Type II GCOs are more likely to be dismissed, have lower subsequent audit fees, or have a lower likelihood of being selected for new audit engagements. These findings are consistent with audit committees not using Type II GCO errors as indicators of low auditor quality. Using event study analysis, I find evidence of modest incremental negative investor responses for clients of audit offices with Type II GCO errors. However, these negative investor responses are found only during the financial crisis period of 2008–2010 and are observed only within windows of 30 days or less. Given this limited evidence that stakeholders do respond to Type II GCO errors, I examine whether stakeholders should respond to Type II GCO errors. I find that audit office Type II GCO errors are positively associated with subsequent restatements, an established measure of low audit quality. Taking the results as a whole, I do not find that audit offices incur substantial reputational costs for Type II GCO errors. However, the negative investor response and the positive association with restatements provide some evidence that Type II GCO errors may serve as indicators of low audit quality.

This paper investigates the common, yet previously opaque, practice of using foreign audit firms (component auditors) to conduct portions of audit work for U.S. public companies. U.S. regulators have expressed concern for the transparency and quality of audits using component auditors. Employing data disclosed in the newly mandated PCAOB Form AP, we find that component auditor use is largely structural, determined by the size and complexity of clients' multinational operations. We do not find that the mere use of component auditors is detrimental to audit outcomes, but rather the amount of work conducted by component auditors is associated with lower audit quality (i.e., higher likelihood of misstatement), higher likelihood of nontimely reporting, and higher audit fees, which collectively suggest that component auditor engagements are associated with adverse outcomes. Furthermore, we find that only the work performed by less competent component auditors and those facing geographic and cultural/language barriers, including significant geographic and cultural distance, weak rule of law, and low English language proficiency, is associated with adverse audit outcomes. Overall, these findings provide initial archival evidence that the use of certain component auditors on U.S. multinational audits is associated with audit coordination issues, which suggests that PCAOB Form AP disclosures provide relevant information.

We investigate whether accounting conservatism, which has been found to be effective in constraining management opportunism in other settings, constrains upward tone management (UTM) in the Management's Discussion and Analysis (MD&A) portion of the 10‐K filing. We hypothesize that conservatism makes it harder for managers to opportunistically downplay bad news and magnify good news when discussing current performance. Consistent with this hypothesis, we find that UTM is negatively associated with several accounting conservatism proxies. Additionally, we hypothesize and find that this association is stronger for firms where managers have higher incentives to manipulate tone. In supplemental analyses, we find evidence to suggest that our results are not due to an endogenous relationship between conservatism and UTM. We also find that conservatism neither encourages downward tone management (DTM) nor constrains managers from conveying real information about future good news. Together, our results suggest that accounting conservatism improves disclosure narratives.

Prior research documents that auditors fail to revise audit plans to effectively address identified fraud cues. While auditors may understand what evidence would address such cues, we propose that auditors fail to apply this understanding because they use implemental mindsets when making decisions for themselves (i.e., deciding). However, we also propose that auditors use deliberative mindsets when advising. To test our predictions, we assign auditors to a decider or an advisor role in a realistic case that contains seeded fraud cues and asks them to consider revising last year's plan. We also manipulate whether the case prompts auditors to revise the plan unconventionally . Results indicate decider‐condition auditors use implemental mindsets: Prompted deciders follow the unconventional plan without regard to underlying fraud risk and unprompted deciders stick with the same‐as‐last‐year plan. Advisor‐condition auditors use more deliberative mindsets: In the prompt and no prompt conditions, they identify plans that are strongly linked to their own fraud risk assessments and that better align with experts' recommended plan for effectively addressing the seeded fraud cues. Supplemental analyses suggest deciding and advising auditors both follow the experts' plan when they believe in its potential effectiveness but, after controlling for the influence of perceived effectiveness, deciding auditors follow it to a greater extent simply because they believe the PCAOB wants it. By contrast, advising auditors do not exhibit signs of excessive PCAOB influence. Our findings provide evidence that seeking informal advice (or thinking like an advisor) helps auditors to effectively revise audit plans in response to identified fraud risk—it helps when a prompt is present or not, suggesting it complements rather than merely substitutes for interventions meant to improve auditors' judgment and decision making.