Before choosing among two actions with state-dependent payoffs, a Bayesian decision-maker with a finite memory sees a sequence of informative signals, ending each period with fixed chance. He summarizes information observed with a finite-state automaton. I characterize the optimal protocol as an equilibrium of a dynamic game of imperfect recall; a new player runs each memory state each period. Players act as if maximizing expected payoffs in a common finite action decision problem. I characterize equilibrium play with many multinomial signals. The optimal protocol rationalizes many behavioral phenomena, like �stickiness,� salience, confirmation bias, and belief polarization.
We study a principal–agent model in which the agent is boundedly rational in his ability to understand the principal's decision rule. The principal wishes to elicit an agent's true profile so as to determine whether or not to grant him a certain request. The principal designs a questionnaire and commits himself to accepting certain responses. In designing such a questionnaire, the principal takes into account the bounded rationality of the agent and wishes to reduce the success probability of a dishonest agent who is trying to game the system. It is shown that the principal can construct a sufficiently complex questionnaire that will allow him to respond optimally to agents who tell the truth and at the same time to almost eliminate the probability that a dishonest agent will succeed in cheating.
Philosophers, psychologists, and economists have long argued that certain decision rights carry not only instrumental value but may also be valuable for their own sake. The ideas of autonomy, freedom, and liberty derive their intuitive appeal—at least partly—from an assumed positive intrinsic value of decision rights. Providing clean evidence for the existence of this intrinsic value and measuring its size, however, is intricate. Here, we develop a method capable of achieving these goals. The data reveal that the large majority of our subjects intrinsically value decision rights beyond their instrumental benefit. The intrinsic valuation of decision rights has potentially important consequences for corporate governance, human resource management, and optimal job design: it may explain why managers value power, why employees appreciate jobs with task discretion, why individuals sort into self-employment, and why the reallocation of decision rights is often very difficult and cumbersome. Our method and results may also prove useful in developing an empirical revealed preference foundation for concepts such as “freedom of choice” and “individual autonomy.”
This paper studies the interaction between default and liquidity for corporate bonds that are traded in an over-the-counter secondary market with search frictions. Bargaining with dealers determines a bond's endogenous liquidity, which depends on both the firm fundamental and the time-to-maturity of the bond. Corporate default decisions interact with the endogenous secondary market liquidity via the rollover channel. A default-liquidity loop arises: Assuming a relative illiquid secondary bond market in default, earlier endogenous default worsens a bond's secondary market liquidity, which amplifies equity holders' rollover losses, which in turn leads to earlier endogenous default. Besides characterizing in closed form the full interdependence between liquidity and default for credit spreads, our calibrated model can jointly match empirically observed credit spreads and liquidity measures of bonds across different rating classes.
The costs and benefits of the Sarbanes‐Oxley Act of 2002 ( SOX ) have been oft‐debated since the inception of the Act. Much of the extant literature has assessed the costs and benefits of SOX to publicly traded companies. We focus on the costs of SOX compliance for private firms wanting to exit the private market via either an acquisition by a public firm or an IPO . Consistent with our predictions we establish two principal findings. First, SOX appears to have shifted the preferences of private firms from going public to exiting the private market via acquisition by a public acquirer. Second, private target deal multiples are increasing in variables that proxy for a private target's level of pre‐acquisition SOX compliance. These findings suggest that SOX ‐related costs have both restricted the action space of possible exit strategies for private firms and led to lower deal multiples for those private acquisition targets that are less likely to be SOX compliant prior to acquisition.
Considerable debate continues regarding the use of earnings histograms as evidence consistent with earnings management. Durstchi and Easton (2005) offer scaling and sample selection as alternative explanations for apparent discontinuities in cross-sectionally pooled histograms of earnings. We revisit the broad question of whether irregularities in reported earnings numbers can constitute evidence consistent with earnings management. We use a matched-pair design to avoid sample selection issues and study three irregularities in reported earnings per share (EPS). We first study the discontinuity pattern in the last digit (cents) of reported EPS noted by Thomas (1989) that the last digit of EPS is more likely to be zero and five and less likely to be nine for profit firms while the pattern does not appear for loss firms. Second, we consider the threshold irregularity in EPS changes noted by Degeorge, Patel, and Zeckhauser (1999), that one-cent decreases are underrepresented, relative to expectations. Third, we also revisit the rounding pattern in (unreported) third decimals of EPS noted by Das and Zhang (2003) that the one tenth of a cent is more likely between five and nine for profit firms. Our study enhances confidence in each reported irregularity's validity by identifying matched pairs of firm-years reporting EPS under two measurement regimes: one in place during the reporting period in real time, the other subsequently reported to conform to a new reporting standard. We report evidence consistent with EPS management that is not plausibly attributable to either sample selection or scaling.
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The nominating committee (NC) of the board identifies and nominates individuals for board service, thus establishing the board's composition. Despite this important role, relatively little is known about the NC process, including NC members' actions and thought processes. Based on interviews of 20 U.S. public company NC members, including 16 chairs, we focus on two primary questions: (1) what is the extent of influence that the Chief Executive Officer (CEO) has over committee processes, and (2) to what extent are committee processes formalized (i.e., framed and acted upon in a mechanistic way)? We find that there is continuing recognition of CEO influence in the director nomination process, the level of which varies widely by company. Also, there is considerable variability in the formalization of the director nomination process (e.g., some NCs use search firms and a matrix/grid approach to assessing director skill sets across the board, while others do not). Finally, we find that many interviewees have professional or personal ties to the CEO and that nearly all of the NCs focus on “chemistry” and comfort in the director nomination process, where the often‐stated goal is to enhance the board's ability to function effectively and to reduce risk in the director nomination process. The overall message of the interviews perhaps is best captured by one interviewee, who described a “strange little dance.” Throughout the interviews, we find evidence that the NC must “dance” through a complex decision landscape.