Knowledge that Transforms

Should incentive contracts expose the agent to market‐wide shocks? Counterintuitively, I show that market risk cannot be filtered out from the compensation and managed independently by the agent. Under plausible risk preferences, the principal should offer a contract in which performance pay increases following a favorable market shock. In the aggregate, however, the effect of market risk on individual contracts diversifies away and the agency problem does not directly affect the cost of capital. The analysis suggests caution in interpreting changes in cost of capital in terms of the stewardship role of accounting information.

Although public sector special audit and performance audit are frequently involved in blame, very few studies (save for Radcliffe 1997) provide detailed empirical accounts on how auditing participates in blame allocation. This study sets out to study one case of blame allocation by describing and characterizing the origins of failure and antecedents leading to the need for blame allocation, the institutional entities and arrangements that participate in the blame game, and how these entities, including the supreme audit institution, are mobilized in the processes of blame allocation. Applying a case methodology with Actor–Network Theory principles, the study extends Hood's (2002, 2007) research on blame and blame avoidance strategies by showing how a blame‐frame evaluates and allocates blame. The contribution of the paper is in four parts: first, it reveals the mechanisms that cause scapegoating of particular people and the role of auditors as experts in such mechanisms; second, it assists to develop an understanding of some factors at the core of the “accountability paradox” noted by Roberts (2009); third, it contributes to explanations as to why failing public sector reforms survive controversy and scandal since a scapegoating process can “reboot” reforms by erasing the reform's problems; and fourth, it demonstrates that an understanding of blame can be a useful addition to Actor–Network Theory.

“Decision usefulness ” has been the organizing criterion for accounting policy and accounting scholarship for over forty years. Its authority however, was not gained over time through explicit theory development or argumentation, but was instead “born full grown ” (Staubus, 1999, p. 163)as a conceptual “takeover in the dead of night ” (p. 338). In essence, the concept of decision usefulness assumed a central place as the rationale for accounting choice by stealth rather than by careful argument or based on empirical evidence. The lack of an extended period of argumentation and debate over the meaning of decision usefulness meant its conceptual weaknesses were allowed to remain remarked upon but never resolved. In this paper we argue that as the central focus defining and guiding accounting policy, decision usefulness has not proven any more useful than earlier, allegedly normative theories of accounting did. The recent debates on IFRS versus GAAP provide vivid testament to the inadequacy of decision usefulness as a criterion for selecting among alternative accounting choices. We briefly examine the history of decision usefulness and its emergence as the chief criterion for selecting policy. We then argue that in light of recent developments in our

We develop a data‐generated tool for distinguishing between fraudulent and truthful reports based on the language used in the management discussion and analysis section of annual and interim reports. Using this method, we are able to assign a probability of truth to each report which is then shown to be an effective indicator of fraud. Our work goes beyond the development of a tool alone, however, by conducting an extensive comparison of our probability‐of‐truth measure with eight alternative detection tools representing both quantitative and language‐based approaches. Comparisons are made across a variety of samples and show that our language‐based approach can be effective in both cross‐sectional and time‐series settings. It is useful both in distinguishing between fraudulent and truthful firms and in identifying fraudulent reports from a series of reports issued by a single firm. This second setting is one in which accounting‐based detection tools have frequently struggled. We establish that, not only is our probability‐of‐truth measure significantly associated with fraud, so too is the change in this measure from a firm's previous reports. Prior reports may serve an important benchmarking role in using language‐based tools to identify fraud.

Statement of Financial Accounting Standards 123R suggests that lattice valuation models may improve the estimates of reported employee stock option values relative to the more commonly used Black–Scholes (BS) model. However, lattice model critics have expressed concerns that managers may use lattice models' flexibility to opportunistically understate option values. In this study, we investigate a sample of firms that recently adopted a lattice model to value employee stock options to provide evidence on this issue by identifying the determinants of lattice model adoption and examining the effect of lattice model use on reported option values. We report three main results. First, we find that firms are more likely to adopt a lattice model when it is more likely to produce lower values than the BS model and when managers have incentives to lower stock option expense. Second, we find that firms adopting a lattice model increase understatement of reported option values more than firms that continue to use the BS model and that the incremental understatement is due to use of the lattice model. Third, we conduct several tests to examine whether the valuation effect of lattice model use is consistent with efforts to correct for documented shortcomings in the BS model and find no evidence that this is the case. Taken together, the evidence in this study suggests that firms adopt and implement lattice models primarily to lower reported option values.

This study experimentally tests the hypothesis that investor reaction to favorable investment ratings is influenced by attributes of analysts’ supporting arguments. Specifically, I argue that argument ambiguity and the mix of positive and negative argumentation interact to influence how investors process and, in turn, react to information contained in analysts’ arguments. When positive arguments are unambiguous, I predict and find that investors react to the content of the arguments because they perceive the arguments provide sufficient support for the rating. In this case, investors react more favorably when the report includes strictly positive argumentation (i.e., one‐sided argumentation) than when it includes a mix of positive and negative argumentation (i.e., two‐sided argumentation). In contrast, when positive arguments are ambiguous, two‐sided argumentation acts as a credibility cue and leads to a higher likelihood of investment than one‐sided argumentation. These results provide important insights about the conditions under which investors react to justifications in favorable analyst reports and shed light on how analysts can credibly convey favorable information.

This paper investigates the effect of CFO gender on corporate financial reporting decision making. Focusing on firms that experience changes of CFO from male to female, the paper compares the firms' degree of accounting conservatism between pre‐ and post‐transition periods. We find that female CFO s are more conservative in their financial reporting. In addition, we find that the relation between CFO gender and conservatism varies with the level of various firm risks, including litigation risk, default risk, systematic risk, and CFO ‐specific risk such as job security risk. We further find that the risk aversion of female CFO s is associated with less equity‐based compensation, lower firm risk, a higher tangibility level, and a lower dividend payout level. Overall, the study provides strong support for the notion that female CFO s are more risk averse than male CFO s, which leads female CFO s to adopt more conservative financial reporting policies.