Knowledge that Transforms

We investigate the link between real exchange rates and sectoral TFP for eurozone countries. We show that real exchange rate variation, both cross-country and time-series, closely accords with an amended Balassa-Samuelson interpretation, incorporating sectoral productivity shocks and a labor market wedge. We construct a DSGE model to generate a cross section and time series of real exchange rates to compare to data. Estimates from simulated regressions are very similar to estimates for eurozone data. Our findings contrast with previous studies that have found little relationship between productivity and real exchange rates among high-income countries that have floating nominal exchange rates. (JEL E12, E23, E24, F31, F33, F43)

This paper estimates the incidence of corporate taxes on wages using a 20-year panel of German municipalities exploiting 6,800 tax changes for identification. Using event study designs and difference-in-differences models, we find that workers bear about one-half of the total tax burden. Administrative linked employer-employee data allow us to estimate heterogeneous firm and worker effects. Our findings highlight the importance of labor market institutions and profit-shifting opportunities for the incidence of corporate taxes on wages. Moreover, we show that low-skilled, young, and female employees bear a larger share of the tax burden. This has important distributive implications. (JEL H25, H31, H71, J16, J24, J31)

We present a novel empirical benchmark for analyzing credit risk using “pseudo firms” that purchase traded assets financed with equity and zero-coupon bonds. By no-arbitrage, pseudo bonds are equivalent to Treasuries minus put options on pseudo firm assets. Empirically, like corporate spreads, pseudo bond spreads are large, countercyclical, and predict lower economic growth. Using this framework, we find that bond market illiquidity, investors' overestimation of default risks, and corporate frictions do not seem to explain excessive observed credit spreads but, instead, a risk premium for tail and idiosyncratic asset risks is the primary determinant of corporate spreads. (JEL E23, E32, E44, G13, G24, G32)

Governments are present-biased toward spending. Fiscal rules are deficit limits that trade off commitment to not overspend and flexibility to react to shocks. We compare coordinated rules, chosen jointly by a group of countries, to uncoordinated rules. If governments’ present bias is small, coordinated rules are tighter than uncoordinated rules: individual countries do not internalize the redistributive effect of interest rates. However, if the bias is large, coordinated rules are slacker: countries do not internalize the disciplining effect of interest rates. Surplus limits enhance welfare, and increased savings by some countries or outside economies can hurt the rest. (JEL D82, E43, E62, H62)