Knowledge that Transforms

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Speed, Accuracy, and the Optimal Timing of Choices

American Economic Review 2018 108(12), 3651-3684
We model the joint distribution of choice probabilities and decision times in binary decisions as the solution to a problem of optimal sequential sampling, where the agent is uncertain of the utility of each action and pays a constant cost per unit time for gathering information. We show that choices are more likely to be correct when the agent chooses to decide quickly, provided the agent’s prior beliefs are correct. This better matches the observed correlation between decision time and choice probability than does the classical drift-diffusion model (DDM), where the agent knows the utility difference between the choices.

International Reserves and Rollover Risk

American Economic Review 2018 108(9), 2629-2670
We study the optimal accumulation of international reserves in a quantitative model of sovereign default with long-term debt and a risk-free asset. Keeping higher levels of reserves provides a hedge against rollover risk, but this is costly because using reserves to pay down debt allows the government to reduce sovereign spreads. Our model, parameterized to mimic salient features of a typical emerging economy, can account for significant holdings of international reserves, and the larger accumulation of both debt and reserves in periods of low spreads and high income. We also show that income windfalls, improved policy frameworks, and an increase in the importance of rollover risk imply increases in the optimal holdings of reserves that are consistent with the upward trend in reserves in emerging economies. It is essential for our results that debt maturity exceeds one period.

An Efficient Ascending-Bid Auction for Multiple Objects: Comment

American Economic Review 2018 108(2), 555-560
Ausubel (2004) introduces a new ascending-bid auction rule for multiple homogeneous objects, called the Ausubel auction, which is a dynamic counterpart of the Vickrey auction. He claims that in the Ausubel auction with private values, sincere bidding by all bidders is an ex post perfect equilibrium. However, we show that this claim does not hold in general by providing a counterexample. We then modify the Ausubel auction so that sincere bidding by all bidders is an ex post perfect equilibrium.

Firms, Informality, and Development: Theory and Evidence from Brazil

American Economic Review 2018 108(8), 2015-2047
This paper develops and estimates an equilibrium model where heterogeneous firms can exploit two margins of informality: (i) not register their business, the extensive margin; and (ii) hire workers “off the books,” the intensive margin. The model encompasses the main competing frameworks for understanding informality and provides a natural setting to infer their empirical relevance. The counterfactual analysis shows that once the intensive margin is accounted for, firm and labor informality need not move in the same direction as a result of policy changes. Lower informality can be, but is not necessarily associated with higher output, TFP, or welfare.

How Do Firms Form Their Expectations? New Survey Evidence

American Economic Review 2018 108(9), 2671-2713
We survey New Zealand firms and document novel facts about their macroeconomic beliefs. There is widespread dispersion in beliefs about past and future macroeconomic conditions, especially inflation. This dispersion in beliefs is consistent with firms’ incentives to collect and process information. Using experimental methods, we find that firms update their beliefs in a Bayesian manner when presented with new information about the economy and that changes in their beliefs affect their decisions. Inflation is not generally perceived as being important to business decisions so firms devote few resources to collecting and processing information about inflation.

Just Starting Out: Learning and Equilibrium in a New Market

American Economic Review 2018 108(3), 565-615
We document the evolution of the new market for frequency response within the UK electricity system over a six-year period. Firms competed in price while facing considerable initial uncertainty about demand and rival behavior. We show that prices stabilized over time, converging to a rest point that is consistent with equilibrium play. We draw on models of fictitious play and adaptive learning to analyze how this convergence occurs and show that these models predict behavior better than an equilibrium model prior to convergence.

Mismatch of Talent: Evidence on Match Quality, Entry Wages, and Job Mobility

American Economic Review 2018 108(11), 3303-3338
We examine the impact of mismatch on entry wages, separations, and wage growth using unique data on worker talents. We show that workers are sorted on comparative advantage across jobs within occupations. The starting wages of inexperienced workers are unrelated to mismatch. For experienced workers, on the other hand, mismatch is negatively priced into their starting wages. Separations and wage growth are more strongly related to mismatch among inexperienced workers than among experienced workers. These findings are consistent with models of information updating, where less information is available about the quality of matches involving inexperienced workers.

Intergenerational Mobility and Preferences for Redistribution

American Economic Review 2018 108(2), 521-554
Using new cross-country survey and experimental data, we investigate how beliefs about intergenerational mobility affect preferences for redistribution in France, Italy, Sweden, the United Kingdom, and the United States. Americans are more optimistic than Europeans about social mobility. Our randomized treatment shows pessimistic information about mobility and increases support for redistribution, mostly for “equality of opportunity” policies. We find strong political polarization. Left-wing respondents are more pessimistic about mobility: their preferences for redistribution are correlated with their mobility perceptions; and they support more redistribution after seeing pessimistic information. None of this is true for right-wing respondents, possibly because they see the government as a “problem” and not as the “solution.”

BKK the EZ Way: International Long-Run Growth News and Capital Flows

American Economic Review 2018 108(11), 3416-3449
We study the response of international investment flows to shortand long-run growth news. Among developed G7 countries, positive long-run news for domestic productivity induces a net outflow of investments, in contrast to the effects of short-run growth shocks. We document that a standard Backus, Keho, and Kydland (1994) (BKK) model fails to reproduce this novel empirical evidence. We augment this model with Epstein and Zin (1989) preferences (EZ-BKK) and characterize the resulting recursive risk-sharing scheme. The response of international capital flows in the EZ-BKK model is consistent with the data.

Do Recessions Accelerate Routine-Biased Technological Change? Evidence from Vacancy Postings

American Economic Review 2018 108(7), 1737-1772
We show that skill requirements in job vacancy postings differentially increased in MSAs that were hit hard by the Great Recession, relative to less hard-hit areas. These increases persist through at least the end of 2015 and are correlated with increases in capital investments, both at the MSA and firm levels. We also find that effects are most pronounced in routine-cognitive occupations, which exhibit relative wage growth as well. We argue that this evidence is consistent with the restructuring of production toward routine-biased technologies and the more-skilled workers that complement them, and that the Great Recession accelerated this process.