Knowledge that Transforms

Due to a lack of an information history, IPO firms' information precision is not only generally low but also likely to be estimated initially with considerable error. I hypothesize and find that the deviation between expected and realized information precision is predictably associated with the magnitude and the persistence of long‐run abnormal returns after an IPO . Specifically, an upward (downward) revision of information precision results in positive (negative) abnormal returns over the period in which investors update their beliefs. In addition, the positive abnormal returns of firms with unexpectedly high realized information precision are less persistent than the negative abnormal returns of firms with unexpectedly low realized information precision, which can extend up to 18 months after the IPO . The findings imply that long‐term investors in IPO stocks do not necessarily behave irrationally, but that both positive and negative post‐ IPO abnormal performance is also consistent with rational investors gradually updating the perceived information precision parameter of these stocks.

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Prior studies find that CEOs receive higher pay if the enterprise is more complex because more complex enterprises are, in theory, matched with the managerial skills of higher-ability CEOs. While multinational diversification is typically a characteristic of enterprise complexity, we argue that multinational diversification also introduces a risk that executives will divert an enterprise’s resources to obtain private benefits. We first establish that CEO pay is, on average, increasing in the extent of multinational diversification, consistent with intuition that more complex enterprises are matched to higher‐ability CEOs. We then demonstrate that the CEO pay‐for‐complexity premium is lower if the multinational diversification reflects a relatively high risk of managerial diversion. For sufficiently high levels of multinational diversification accompanied by a high risk of managerial diversion, we find that CEOs receive a relative reduction in pay rather than a pay premium for multinational diversification. We also find evidence that this pay effect occurs in part through adjustments to a CEO’s pay‐for‐performance sensitivity.

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The recent financial crisis has stimulated a renewed interest in understanding the determinants of stock price crash risk (i.e., left tail risk). Recent research shows that opaque financial reports enable managers to hide and accumulate bad news for extended periods. When the accumulated bad news reaches a certain tipping point, it will be suddenly released to the market at once, resulting in an abrupt decline in stock price (i.e., a crash). This study extends this line of research by examining the impact of financial reporting opacity on perceived or expected crash risk. Prominent economists, such as Olivier Blanchard, argue that removing the perception of tail risks (in addition to realized tail risks) is crucial in restoring investor confidence and stabilizing the stock market. Using the steepness of option implied volatility skew as a proxy for perceived crash risk, we find that accrual management, the presence of financial statement restatements, and auditor‐attested internal control weakness are all positively and significantly associated with the level of perceived crash risk. Our results suggest that improving financial reporting transparency is an important mechanism for firms and policymakers to reduce the perception of tail risks and stabilize the stock market.

This paper studies housing markets where a subset of houses in a restricted area is available exclusively to a subset of “eligible” buyers. An empirical part shows that houses on Stanford campus (available only to faculty) trade at substantial discounts to comparable houses off campus. The theoretical part describes an assignment model with heterogeneous houses and buyers which predicts such discounts if the matchup of quality and buyer pools is sufficiently different inside versus outside the restricted area. The restriction can distort allocations by making eligible buyers choose either higher or lower qualities than ineligible buyers with the same characteristics.

We augment a standard monetary dynamic general equilibrium model to include a Bernanke-Gertler-Gilchrist financial accelerator mechanism. We fit the model to US data, allowing the volatility of cross-sectional idiosyncratic uncertainty to fluctuate over time. We refer to this measure of volatility as risk. We find that fluctuations in risk are the most important shock driving the business cycle.

We show that relaxing the assumption of CES preferences in monopolistic competition has surprising implications when trade is restricted. Integrated and segmented markets behave differently, the latter typically exhibiting reciprocal dumping. Globalization and lower trade costs have different effects. The former reduces spending on all existing varieties, the latter switches spending from home to imported varieties; when demands are less convex than CES, globalization raises whereas lower trade costs reduce firm output. Finally, calibrating gains from trade is harder. Many more parameters are needed, while import demand elasticities typically overestimate the true elasticities, and so underestimate the gains from trade.