Knowledge that Transforms

We show that small innovators (i.e., small firms with recent patent grants) earn higher future returns than small non-innovators. However, we find no such innovation premium among large firms. The higher returns are driven by risk, not underreaction to announcements of recent patent grants. We find that being small and innovative interacts with financial constraints to explain the higher returns. These interactions are more important in the presence of greater information asymmetry. The higher cost of equity among small innovators has implications for their investment, growth, and capital structure decisions.

Research on conference calls documents that the question and answer (Q&A) portion is informative to markets. However, prior studies focus on the attributes of the participating individuals, primarily managers and analysts. We instead use the conversation as our unit of analysis, and examine whether conversational engagement between managers and analysts in earnings calls is informative to market participants. Using an experiment, we first demonstrate that linguistic style matching (LSM), a form of verbal coordination, is a reasonable empirical proxy for conversational engagement. We next use a quasi-experiment to confirm that investors can detect differences in engagement. Finally, using a hand-collected archival dataset comprised of audio recordings and textual transcripts from over 2400 earnings calls, we show that LSM in manager-analyst conversations during the Q&A is positively associated with absolute stock returns during the conversation, suggesting that conversations with greater engagement are more informative to capital markets and facilitate price formation.

This study examines the effect of corporate tax enforcement on managerial self-dealing, with a focus on manipulated gifts of insider stock. Prior work suggests that managers employ a variety of manipulative techniques to maximize their personal tax benefits from donating corporate stock, such as strategically timing gifts based on private information and fraudulently backdating gifts to the date with the highest price. Building on prior literature suggesting that the tax authority can discipline managerial misconduct, we hypothesize that IRS scrutiny from a corporate tax audit raises managers' perceived risk of detection, who refrain from making manipulated stock gifts while the firm is under audit. Using a novel, firm-specific measure to identify firms under audit, we find direct evidence that heightened scrutiny from tax enforcement serves as an effective monitoring mechanism and reduces managers' self-dealing behavior.

This discussion makes several observations regarding the past 25 years of China-related accounting research reviewed in Lennox and Wu (2022). First, we discuss factors of supply and demand that led to the rise of China-related studies and how this growth has contributed to the internationalization of accounting research. We note that the taxonomy of the literature by geographic region rather than topic or methodology is unusual and makes it difficult to formulate a common framework that would help organize the many contributions. Next, we distill distinct patterns in authorship, choice of topics, and asserted contributions of China-related studies. Studies are increasingly shaped by the availability of new data and regulatory reforms. These features should be interpreted carefully, as most reforms are interconnected and reflect the purposeful outcome of a tightly controlled economy. As a result, issues of generalizability arise. Alternatively, researchers could embrace the China setting and strive to identify the local institutional forces that make it special. We see such a more institutional, context-specific view of China-related—or better—international research as an opportunity for the field. We close by presenting five broad themes we view as promising areas for future China-related research.

This paper reviews the empirical methods used in the accounting literature to draw causal inferences. Recent years have seen a burgeoning growth in the use of methods that seek to exploit as-if random variation in observational settings—i.e., “quasi-experiments.” We provide a synthesis of the major assumptions of these methods, discuss several practical considerations relevant to the application of these methods in the accounting literature, and provide a framework for thinking about whether and when quasi-experimental and non-experimental methods are well-suited for addressing causal questions of interest to accounting researchers. While there is growing interest in addressing causal questions within the literature, we caution against the idea that one should restrict attention to only those causal questions for which there are quasi-experiments. We offer a complementary approach for addressing causal questions that does not rely on the availability of a quasi-experiment, but rather relies on a combination of economic theory, developing and falsifying alternative explanations, triangulating results across multiple settings, measures, and research designs, and caveating results where appropriate.

We analyze nearly 7,000 shareholder activist campaigns across 56 countries and show that shareholder activism is now a global phenomenon. Our analyses provide evidence on factors that explain the spread of activism and two related questions. First, we measure the extent to which country-level governance regulations facilitate shareholder engagement, a necessary condition for activism, and show that our measure of shareholder-empowering governance regulation explains cross-country variation in the emergence of activism. Second, we show that changes in these regulations also affect outcomes for firms that face a high threat of activism but that are not targeted by activists (i.e., there are spillovers)—including increased profitability, higher payouts, and reduced investment. These effects are most pronounced in countries with weak minority shareholder rights, where activism had previously been relatively unimportant.

We find that suppliers are more likely to redact mandated disclosures when major customers have proprietary information to protect (in the form of R&D intensity, trade secrets, and nondisclosure agreements), controlling for suppliers' own proprietary cost concerns. Furthermore, the effect on suppliers' redactions is concentrated in subsamples for which customers have greater power, measured by customer size, industry leadership, and the number of suppliers. Additionally, suppliers also curtail operations-related disclosures in the management discussion and analysis (MD&A) and product- and service-related press releases when customers likely have proprietary information to protect. Overall, these findings suggest that dependent suppliers internalize their customers' disclosure incentives and curtail disclosures, catering to customers’ demand for information protection.

Armstrong et al. (2022) review the empirical methods used in the accounting literature to draw causal inferences. They document a growing number of studies using quasi-experimental methods and provide a critical perspective on this trend as well as the use of these methods in the accounting literature. In this discussion, I complement their review by broadening the perspective. I argue for a design-based approach to accounting research that shifts attention from methods to the entire research design. I also discuss why studies that aim to draw causal inferences are important, how these studies fit into the scientific process, and why assessing the strength of the research design is important when evaluating studies and aggregating research findings.

We examine the deterrence effect of the Dodd–Frank whistleblower provision on accounting fraud. To facilitate causal inference, we use state False Claims Acts (FCAs), under which whistleblowing about accounting fraud at a firm invested in by a state's pension fund can result in monetary rewards from that state's government. We divide our sample into firms exposed and not exposed to whistleblowing risk from a state FCA during the 2008–2010 period that preceded the 2011 SEC implementation of the Dodd–Frank whistleblowing provision. We hypothesize that firms already exposed to a state FCA whistleblower law are less affected by the Dodd–Frank whistleblower provision. Using the companies exposed to a state FCA as control firms in our Dodd–Frank tests, the remaining firms constitute the treatment sample. We find that exposure to Dodd–Frank reduces the likelihood of accounting fraud of treatment firms by 12%–22% relative to control firms, but do not find that it affects audit fees.

We analyze the disposition of auditor‐proposed adjustments to financial statements. Our analyses address concerns, expressed by regulators and others, that auditors and their clients fixate on quantitative thresholds and overlook qualitative factors in assessing the materiality of discovered misstatements. Using a large sample of Public Company Accounting Oversight Board (PCAOB)‐inspected audits, we examine the frequency with which management records versus waives auditor‐proposed adjustments and whether waiving‐proposed adjustments ha consequences for reporting reliability and the audit process. We find waived adjustments are linked to lower financial reporting quality measured by material misstatements, to incentives to meet/beat earnings targets, and to the audit process, as measured by higher next‐period audit effort and fees and higher next‐period proposed adjustments. These effects on the audit process are consistent with auditors responding to the increased risk associated with waived adjustments. In an exploratory analysis, we find that controlling for the amount of proposed adjustments, auditor resignations are negatively associated with waived adjustments.