Knowledge that Transforms

We examine how firms respond to the increased workplace transparency due to the coverage on Glassdoor.com, which collects and disseminates reviews on employee satisfaction. Leveraging the staggered timing of first‐time reviews on Glassdoor, we use a difference‐in‐differences design and find that after being reviewed on Glassdoor, firms improve their workplace practices, measured by corporate social responsibility scores on employee relations and diversity. Consistent with firms improving their workplace practices to remain competitive in the labor market, we find that such improvement concentrates in firms with negative initial reviews and with high labor intensity. We also find firms increase disclosures about workplace practices after being reviewed and the increase concentrates in firms with high institutional ownership, consistent with firms providing more disclosures to appease investors. Overall, our findings suggest that the increased workplace transparency through social media has a disciplinary effect on corporate policies.

We construct a novel measure of disclosure choice by firms. Our measure is computed using linguistic analysis of conference calls to identify whether a manager's response to an analyst question is a “non‐answer.” Using our measure, about 11% of analyst questions elicit non‐answers from managers, a rate that is stable over time and similar across industries. A useful feature of our measure is that it enables an examination of disclosure choice within a call. Analyst questions with a negative tone, greater uncertainty, greater complexity, or requests for greater detail are more likely to trigger non‐answers. We find performance‐related questions tend to be associated with non‐answers, and this association is weaker when performance news is favorable. We also find analyst questions about proprietary information are associated with non‐answers, and this association is stronger when firm competition is more intense.

Basu's [“The Conservatism Principle and the Asymmetric Timeliness of Earnings.” Journal of Accounting and Economics 24 (1997): 3–37] measurement of conditional conservatism as the asymmetric timeliness of earnings underlies hundreds of studies. However, many subsequent studies cast doubt on the extent to which Basu's measure captures conditional conservatism versus statistical biases or alternative constructs (collectively, “biases”), thereby questioning the validity of the inferences that empirical researchers draw from analyses using the measure. We modify Basu's measure in four simple ways to remove these biases. Our key modification is the inclusion of interactive controls for return variance, a volatility proxy that captures Patatoukas and Thomas’ [“More Evidence of Bias in Differential Timeliness Estimates of Conditional Conservatism.” The Accounting Review 86 (2011): 1765–1794] return variance effect and various sources of economic optionality and adjustment costs. This inclusion captures volatility‐related effects on both the level of earnings and the sensitivity of earnings to returns, and it allows the magnitudes of these effects to vary with the sign of returns. We conduct validation analyses using placebo‐dependent variables, synthetic returns, and nonconditionally conservative earnings components that show our modified Basu measure is largely free of known biases. We further show that our measure is associated with contracting and other economic variables as predicted by theory. Our findings suggest that researchers can rely on our modified Basu measure to identify the determinants and effects of conditional conservatism.

We use novel satellite data that track the number of cars in the parking lots of 92,668 stores for 71 publicly listed U.S. retailers to study the local information advantage of institutional investors. We establish car counts as a timely measure of store‐level performance and find that institutional investors adjust their holdings in response to the performance of local stores, and that these trades are profitable on average. These results suggest that local investors have an advantage when processing information about nearby operations. However, some institutional investors do not adjust for the quality of their local information and continue to rely on local signals even when they are poor predictors of firm performance and returns. This overreliance on poor local information is reduced for institutional investors with greater industry expertise and those with greater incentives to maximize short‐term trading profits.

We study the effect of financial incentives on whistleblowing and the consequences for whistleblowers under the cash‐for‐information program of the False Claims Act (FCA). Exploiting appeals‐court decisions that increase financial incentives for whistleblowing, we find that greater incentives increase the number of lawsuits filed with the regulator, the regulator's investigation length, the percentage of intervened lawsuits, and the percentage of settled lawsuits. Using information from lawsuits, a professional networking site, and background checks for up to 1,168 whistleblowers, we find that whistleblowers’ long‐term annual income decreases by approximately 8.6% or $6,500 but do not find evidence of social costs. In comparison, whistleblowers can expect to receive approximately $140,000 for blowing the whistle. Overall, our results suggest that the FCA cash‐for‐information program helps expose corporate misconduct and helps compensate whistleblowers for their income loss.

I reexamine whether media articles with substantive editorial content inform the market's reaction to firms' earnings news. Using variation in earnings announcement coverage because of restructuring at The Wall Street Journal (WSJ), my analyses suggest that WSJ earnings articles improve price discovery and increase trading volume at S&P 500 earnings announcements. Additionally, textual analysis suggests media articles that differ more from the firm's earnings release increase trading volume, and that the differences speed up (slow down) price discovery when they corroborate (contradict) the tone of the firm's news. Such high difference articles are slightly longer, are more readable and specific, include more references to the industry and economy, repeat less “stale” news published in previous WSJ articles, and quote more investor and expert sources. Overall, my paper contributes to research on the role of the media in earnings news by providing evidence that journalists' editorial content helps investors understand firms' earnings, instead of simply entertaining or increasing awareness.

This paper provides early evidence on the effect of global regulation mandating a switch from loan loss provisioning (LLP) based on incurred credit losses (ICLs) to LLP based on expected credit losses (ECLs). Using a sample of systemically important banks from 74 countries, we find that ECL provisions are more predictive of future bank risk than ICL provisions. Corroborating that the switch to ECL provisioning results in more information to assess bank risk, we also observe that the announcement of a larger first‐time impact of the accounting change elicits lower stock returns and higher changes in credit default swap spreads. Critically, these patterns are most pronounced when credit conditions deteriorate. Additional analyses show that the higher information content of the ECL model stems from the provisions for nondefaulted loans, which did not exist under ICL. Our study contributes to the debate on the effect of the ECL model on procyclicality, an especially pressing issue in the context of the current pandemic.

To shed light on the role that academic research plays in Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) rulemaking, this paper examines the SEC's patterns of consumption of academic research from 2007 through 2017. We show how the Business Roundtable v. SEC ruling in 2011 increased consideration given to academic research during SEC rulemaking. We find that after the ruling, the SEC cites more papers in its proposed rules and, in particular, more papers that illustrate the costs of regulation. This change in academic citations results in fewer negative comment letters on proposed SEC regulations. We survey academics whose research was cited by the SEC, and the majority respond that the SEC's description of their work is completely or mostly accurate. When we survey general academics, their average rating of the SEC's accuracy is lower, although the rating improves regarding specific SEC quotes citing academic research. Although there is still room for a more substantive discussion of research, having a higher standard of cost‐benefit analysis leads to a more balanced discussion of academic research.

Consensus estimates, formed by taking an average of analyst forecasts, play an important role in capital markets (e.g., provide investors with a proxy for earnings expectations). We show I/B/E/S, a prominent information intermediary, removes 6% of one‐quarter‐ahead earnings forecasts before calculating the consensus, and among the 23% of firm‐quarters with at least one forecast removed, this figure rises to 16%. We provide evidence suggesting that I/B/E/S subjectively applies policies that govern its removal decisions and accepts feedback from firms that contributes to this subjectivity. Specifically, we find optimistic forecasts are removed more frequently than pessimistic forecasts, and such asymmetry increases further when removals allow firms to meet or beat the consensus. Furthermore, we find that these effects are more pronounced when managers’ incentives to just meet or beat the consensus are stronger (i.e., higher subsequent insider sales or higher compensation delta), or managers have greater ability to influence I/B/E/S. Lastly, we demonstrate that these subjective removals benefit I/B/E/S by improving consensus accuracy, explaining why I/B/E/S is willing to be influenced by firms.

Economic downturns create uncertainty about a firm's operations and make it disproportionately harder for outside market participants to assess the firm's prospects. We posit that in this environment, management earnings forecasts will be more informative to investors and analysts. Consistent with this prediction, we find larger stock price reactions and analyst forecast revisions to news in management forecasts during downturns. Holding the amount of news in forecasts constant, stock price reactions to management forecasts are also greater than those to analyst forecasts. We also find that relative to analyst forecasts, management forecast accuracy increases during downturns, suggesting that investors justifiably assess management forecasts as more informative. Overall, we document that macroeconomic conditions create time‐series variation in the informativeness of different sources of information to outside market participants.