Knowledge that Transforms

This paper estimates the direct effects and indirect spillover effects of investment tax credits on firms. Exploiting a differential tax credit rate change by firm size in the German manufacturing sector, I find that lowering a firm's investment cost by 7.6 percent increases its capital stock by 17.7 percent and employment by 12.0 percent. Positive local spillovers generate one additional manufacturing job for each directly created job, are strongest between firms in industries connected through input-output linkages, and arise within distances of five kilometers. Firms dependent on local consumer demand also increase employment, while within-industry spillovers generate small negative effects.

Adverse selection benefits firms able to identify talent. An informed intermediary expropriates agents’ ability by threatening to fire and expose them to undervaluation of their skill. An agent’s track record gradually reduces intermediary’s information advantage. In response, the intermediary starts churning well-performing agents she knows are less skilled. The accelerated reduction in information advantage boosts profits, as retained agents accept below-reservation wages to build reputation faster. Agents prefer starting their careers working for an intermediary, as benefits from building reputation faster more than offset expropriation costs. Our analysis applies to professions where talent is essential and performance is publicly observable.

We conduct a field experiment with US households to study how expectations about long-run home price growth shape spending decisions. We exogenously vary survey respondents' expectations by providing different expert forecasts. Homeowners' spending, measured using rich home-scanner data, is inelastic to home price expectations. By contrast, renters reduce their spending when expecting higher home price growth. These patterns reflect positive wealth effects for owners from higher future wealth and negative income effects for both groups due to higher future housing costs. Our study highlights consequences of asset price growth and long-term expectations about the economy for household behavior.

We introduce a new model of stochastic choice that assigns each choice option a utility, along with a salience parameter reflecting economic frictions. We characterize our model behaviorally and investigate its comparative statics properties. We show that the model generates intuitive closed-form solutions in equilibrium settings where firms can choose price, quality, and advertising. In addition, we show that the model allows for flexible substitution patterns and changes in market shares across choice sets. We demonstrate that our model can be easily identified and can outperform alternatives in demand prediction.

We demonstrate that predictable uninformed cash flows forecast aggregate market stock returns. Buying pressure from dividend payments (announced weeks prior) predicts higher value-weighted market returns, with returns for the top quintile of payment days four times higher than the lowest. This holds internationally and increases when reinvestment is high and market liquidity is low. We estimate a market-level price multiplier of 1.9. These results suggest price pressure is a widespread result of flows, not an anomaly.

We study whether the quality of managers can affect public service provision in the context of public health. Using novel data from public hospitals in Chile, we show how the introduction of a competitive recruitment system and better pay for public hospital CEOs reduced hospital mortality by 8 percent. The effect is not explained by a change in patient composition. We find that the policy changed the pool of CEOs by displacing doctors with no management training in favor of CEOs who had studied management. Productivity improvements were driven by hospitals that recruited higher quality CEOs.

My research suggests that world inequality is explained by the incidence of extractive and inclusive institutions. But why do some countries have extractive institutions? I distinguish between two main reasons; first, power relations; second, the “normative order.” Normative orders provide justifications and legitimacy for institutions which may not generate prosperity, but may achieve other goals. These distinctions are critical because they create very different challenges in trying to make institutions more inclusive and create prosperity. I show how countries move from the economic periphery as a consequence of changing both. My own intellectual journey has been in the other direction, however, hence the title of the paper: I was fortunate to be born in Britain, but I have had to unlearn much of my own experience, socialization and training in order to see other societies on their own terms. That’s crucial to be able to help them, but also to learn from them.

We study optimal income taxation in a spatial equilibrium model with heterogeneous locational preferences, labor supply decisions, and competitive housing and labor markets. Expressions characterizing the optimal tax schedule in each community are provided that capture the fiscal externalities associated with migration and the effects of redistribution between households and landlords. Correlation between skill and locational preferences yields optimal transfers to poor areas, while sorting based on comparative advantage can motivate transfers in either direction. A calibration to areas targeted by the US Empowerment Zone program yields sizable optimal spatial transfers that are sensitive to assumed levels of migration responsiveness.

We test the effectiveness of a behavioral program grounded in the idea that status granting and self-persuasion might yield a robust behavioral change in disadvantaged adolescents. We enlist socially connected senior middle school students with high emotional intelligence as “student-teachers” and entrust them with delivering a curriculum to their junior peers. The program empowers student-teachers, leading them to improve their social environment. It reduces disciplinary incidents and antisocial behavior among student-teachers and their friendship networks. The intervention significantly enhances the likelihood of admission to selective high schools for student-teachers, offering a cost-effective way to help disadvantaged adolescents escape neighborhood disadvantages.

Many US colleges now use test-optional admissions. A frequent claim is that by not seeing standardized test scores, a college can admit a student body it prefers, say, with more diversity. But how can observing less information improve decisions? This paper proposes that test-optional policies are a response to social pressure on admission decisions. We model a college that bears disutility when it makes admission decisions that “society” dislikes. Going test optional allows the college to reduce its “disagreement cost.” We analyze how missing scores are imputed and the consequences for the college, students, and society.