Knowledge that Transforms

This paper studies, through a randomized field experiment involving community health workers in Pakistan, if public sector organizations can improve worker performance by investing in their mission motivation. The findings reveal that training aimed at strengthening mission motivation improves workers' performance in their core responsibility of monthly household visits, as well as in multiple tasks performed during and outside these visits. This holistic improvement in performance leads to improved health outcomes for children in the communities served by these workers. These results highlight the importance of promoting organizational missions as a strategy to improve public sector performance in low-income countries. (JEL C93, I11, J13, J24, L31, M53, O12)

We show that the strong negative effect of higher mortgage rates on cash-out refinancing reflects substitution into other borrowing products, not large changes in total new household borrowing. We exploit plausibly exogenous changes in interest rates due to unconventional monetary policy surprises to show that changes in cash-out and other borrowing are roughly offsetting. The elasticity of new household borrowing with respect to mortgage rates is low and varies little with the borrower’s outstanding mortgage rate. Our results suggest that the cash-out refinance channel of unconventional monetary policy is weak and not path dependent. (JEL E43, E52, G21, G51)

We study how couples allocate retirement-saving contributions across each spouse’s account. In a new dataset covering over a million US individuals, we find retirement contributions are not allocated to the account with the highest employer match rate. This lack of coordination—which goes against the assumptions of most models of household decision-making—is common, costly, persistent over time, and cannot be explained by inertia, auto-enrollment, or simple heuristics. Complementing the administrative evidence with an online survey, we find that inefficient allocations reflect both financial mistakes as well as deliberate choices, especially when trust and commitment inside the households are weak. (JEL D13, G51, J26, J32)

How quickly does a fiat money become valueless? I study the speculative hyperinflation equilibria of continuous-time economies with decentralized markets where money is essential. I establish necessary and sufficient conditions under which money dies in finite time. A necessary condition is that the liquidity return of money grows unbounded as the value of money approaches zero. Under CRRA preferences, the longevity of money shrinks with the money growth rate and the frequency of liquidity needs, but it increases with seller’s market power. Money duration also depends on the strictness of legal restrictions and the rates of return of competing currencies. (JEL E31, E42, E51, E52, E62)

We develop a framework to estimate the marginal cost of air pollution regulation and apply it to assess policy efficiency. We exploit a provision of the Clean Air Act that requires new plants to pay incumbent facilities to reduce emissions. This “offset” policy creates hundreds of local pollution markets, differing by pollutant and location. Theory and transaction data suggest that offset prices reveal marginal abatement costs. We compare these prices to marginal benefits of pollution reduction estimated using leading air quality models and find that, on average, marginal benefits exceed marginal costs by more than a factor of ten. (JEL D61, H23, K32, Q52, Q53, Q58)

Multinationals in the extractive sectors of weak states face resource theft by armed groups. Criminality is often abetted by state corruption, even though firms are willing to pay for protection. I study indigenization in Nigeria’s oil sector, which increased local firms’ participation substantially. Despite lower quality, local firms increase output by reducing oil theft. A bargaining model illustrates that political connections align law enforcement incentives, solving commitment problems. Data on law enforcement raids show that local firms receive preferential protection. Connections to military elites drive the local advantage. The aggregate gains from indigenization are at most between 2.3 and 5.7 percent of GDP. (JEL D73, F23, L71, O13, O17, Q34, Q35)

We develop, identify, and estimate a model of imperfect competition in both labor and product markets. Our context is the US construction industry, where firms compete for workers, private market projects, and government procurements. Our empirical approach leverages bidding data from procurement auctions linked to employer-employee tax records. We find imperfect competition in both markets generates a total wage markdown of more than 30 percent and a total price markup of around 45 percent. By contrast, if one erroneously assumed a perfectly competitive product (labor) market, then one would conclude wages (prices) are marked down (up) by only 20 percent (16 percent). (JEL D21, D24, H76, J31, L13, L74)

Using data from over 100 US retirement plans and a representative UK panel, I document the impact of auto-enrollment (AE) on retirement savings at different horizons. I replicate the impact of AE on participation and contributions in the short run (at 12 months), but I show that these gains are attenuated over the medium run (at 36 months). At this longer horizon, the average savings increases are modest, though AE significantly lowers inequality in savings. To assess AE’s lifetime impact, I estimate a life cycle consumption-savings model that can fit the observed patterns with a switching cost of approximately $250, smaller than previous estimates. (JEL D15, G51, J26, J32)

We investigate long-run earnings responses to taxes in the presence of dynamic returns to effort. First, we develop a theoretical model of earnings determination with dynamic returns to effort. In this model, earnings responses are delayed and mediated by job switches. Second, using administrative data from Denmark, we verify our model's predictions about earnings and hours-worked patterns over the life cycle. Third, we provide a quasi-experimental analysis of long-run earnings elasticities. Informed by our model, the empirical strategy exploits variation among job switchers. We find that the long-run elasticity is around 0.5, considerably larger than the short-run elasticity of roughly 0.2. (JEL D31, H24, H31, J22, J31, J62)

For globally systemically important banks (GSIBs) with US headquarters, we find significant reductions in market-implied probabilities of government bailout after the Global Financial Crisis (GFC), along with roughly 170 percent higher wholesale debt financing costs for these banks after controlling for insolvency risk. Since the GFC, bank creditors appear to expect much larger losses in the event that a GSIB approaches insolvency. In this sense, we estimate a decline of “too big to fail.” (G01, G12, G21, G28, G33, H81)