Knowledge that Transforms

We use producer-level data to evaluate the role of financial frictions in determining total factor productivity (TFP). We study a model of establishment dynamics in which financial frictions reduce TFP through two channels. First, finance frictions distort entry and technology adoption decisions. Second, finance frictions generate dispersion in the returns to capital across existing producers and thus productivity losses from misallocation. Parameterizations of our model consistent with the data imply fairly small losses from misallocation, but potentially sizable losses from inefficiently low levels of entry and technology adoption. (JEL E32, E44, F41, G32, L60, O33, O47)

Though risk aversion and the elasticity of intertemporal substitution have been the subjects of careful scrutiny, the long-run risks literature as well as the broader literature using recursive utility to address asset pricing puzzles has ignored the full implications of their parameter specifications. Recursive utility implies that the temporal resolution of risk matters and a quantitative assessment thereof should be part of the calibration process. This paper gives a sense of the magnitudes of implied timing premia. Its objective is to inject temporal resolution of risk into the discussion of the quantitative properties of long-run risks and related models. (JEL D81, G11, G12)

Internet-based educational resources are proliferating rapidly. One concern associated with these (potentially transformative) technological changes is that they will be disequalizing—as many technologies of the last several decades have been—creating superstar teachers and a winner-take-all education system. These important concerns notwithstanding, we contend that a major impact of web-based educational technologies will be the democratization of education: educational resources will be more equally distributed, and lower-skilled teachers will benefit. At the root of our results is the observation that skilled lecturers can only exploit their comparative advantage if other teachers complement those lectures with face-to-face instruction. This complementarity will increase the quantity and quality of face-to-face teaching services, potentially increasing the marginal product and wages of lower-skill teachers.

This paper studies a New Keynesian business cycle model with agents who are averse to ambiguity (Knightian uncertainty). Shocks to confidence about future TFP are modeled as changes in ambiguity. To assess the size of those shocks, our estimation uses not only data on standard macro variables, but also incorporates the dispersion of survey forecasts about growth as a measure of confidence. Our main result is that TFP and confidence shocks together can explain roughly two thirds of business cycle frequency movements in the major macro aggregates. Confidence shocks account for about 70 percent of this variation. (JEL D81, D84, E12, E32)

We model the strategic provision of advice in environments where a principal's optimal action depends on an unobserved, binary state of interest. Experts receive signals about the state and each recommends an action. The principal and all experts dislike making errors in their decision and recommendations, respectively, but may have different costs of different errors. Is it in the principal's interest to let experts share information? Although sharing improves experts' ability to avoid errors, we identify a simple environment in which any principal, regardless of how he trades off the different errors, is worse off if he permits information sharing.

The paper reports the architecture of a continuous combinatorial auction. Preferences are based on sets of items and feasibility requires the nonintersection of sets. Countdown clocks replace eligibility and activity requirements typical of rounds-based auctions. Bids remain in the system to be combined with new bids to form winning collections. Increment requirements dictate improvements over appropriate collections of existing bids. The auction evolved from experimental methods and operates at high levels of efficiency. Field applications are reported and result in natural equilibration in a few hours as opposed to days or weeks required by round-based architectures.

Online education has flexibility and cost advantages over in-class teaching and these advantages will grow with improvements in information technology. We consider likely market structures given that the quality aspects of online education exhibit endogenous fixed costs. Concentration in the market for courses could be high, as it is currently in the market for textbooks. The not-for-profit sector will exhibit lower costs, lower concentration, and possibly zero price.

A principal delegates multiple decisions to an agent, who has private information relevant to each decision. The principal is uncertain about the agent's preferences. I solve for max-min optimal mechanisms—those which maximize the principal's payoff against the worst case agent preference types. These mechanisms are characterized by a property I call “aligned delegation”: all agent types play identically, as if they shared the principal's preferences. Max-min optimal mechanisms may take the simple forms of ranking mechanisms, budgets, or sequential quotas. (JEL D44, D83, J16)

Acemoglu et al. (2008) document that the correlation between income per capita and democracy disappears when including time and country fixed effects. While their results are robust for the full sample, we find evidence for significant but heterogeneous effects of income on democracy: negative for former colonies, but positive for non-colonies. Within the sample of colonies we detect heterogeneous effects related to colonial history and early institutions. The zero mean effect estimated by Acemoglu et al. (2008) is consistent with effects of opposite signs in the different subsamples. Our findings are robust to the use of alternative data and estimation techniques. (JEL D72, O17, O47)

This paper revisits the results of Moskowitz and Vissing-Jørgensen (2002) on returns to entrepreneurial investments in the United States. Following the authors' methodology and new data from the Survey of Consumer Finances, I find that the “private equity premium puzzle” does not survive the period of high public equity returns in the 1990s. The difference between private and public equity returns is positive and large period-by-period between 1999 and 2007. Whereas in the 2008–2010 period, overlapping with the Great Recession, public and private equities performances are substantially closer. I validate these results in the aggregate data going back to the 1960s. (JEL G11, G12, L26)