This paper reviews the evidence on the efficacy of neighborhood and school interventions in improving the long-run outcomes of children growing up in poor families. We focus on studies exploiting exogenous sources of variation in neighborhoods and schools and which examine at least medium-term outcomes. Higher-quality neighborhoods improve family safety, adult subjective well-being and health, and girls' mental health. But they have no detectable impact on youth human capital, labor market outcomes, or risky behaviors. In contrast, higher-quality schools can improve children's academic achievement and can have longer-term positive impacts of increasing educational attainment and earnings and reducing incarceration and teen pregnancy.
This paper analyzes the properties of runoff electoral systems when voters are strategic. A model of three-candidate runoff elections is presented, and two new features are included: the risk of upset victory in the second round is endogenous, and many types of runoff systems are considered. Three main results emerge. First, runoff elections produce equilibria in which only two candidates receive a positive fraction of the votes. Second, a sincere voting equilibrium does not always exist. Finally, runoff systems with a threshold below 50 percent produce an Ortega effect that may lead to the systematic victory of the Condorcet loser.
I study a dynamic economy featuring adverse selection in asset markets. Borrowing constrained entrepreneurs sell past projects to finance new investment, but asymmetric information creates a lemons problem. I show that this friction is equivalent to a tax on financial transactions. The implicit tax rate responds to aggregate shocks, generating amplification in the response of investment and cyclical variation in liquidity.
This paper presents evidence that school districts' use of an alternative academic calendar, the year-round school calendar, results in a reduction in maternal employment for women with school-aged children that varies in magnitude across racial groups. Negative employment effects are larger in districts with a particularly high proportion white and smaller in districts with a particularly high proportion of minorities. The larger effects in primarily white school districts is not likely to be explained by income differences, yet could potentially be explained by the lower reliance on relatives for child care among whites than minorities.
We develop a stylized model of frictional local labor markets with the goal of studying the efficiency of unemployment differences across areas. The model adapts the widely used Diamond-Mortensen-Pissarides framework to a local labor market setting with a competitive housing market. The result is a simple search analogue of the classic Roback model that provides a tractable environment for studying the effects of local job creation efforts.
We consider an economy populated by institutional investors alongside standard retail investors. Institutions care about their performance relative to a certain index. Our framework is tractable, admitting exact closed-form expressions, and produces the following analytical results. We find that institutions tilt their portfolios towards stocks that compose their benchmark index. The resulting price pressure boosts index stocks. By demanding more risky stocks than retail investors, institutions amplify the index stock volatilities and aggregate stock market volatility and give rise to countercyclical Sharpe ratios. Trades by institutions induce excess correlations among stocks that belong to their benchmark, generating an asset-class effect.
We present a theory of charitable fund-raising in which it is costly to solicit donors. We fully characterize the solicitation strategy that maximizes donations net of fund-raising costs. It is optimal for the fund-raiser to target only the “net contributors”––donors who would give more than their solicitation costs. We show that as the income inequality increases, so does the level of the public good, despite a (potentially) non-monotonic fund-raising strategy. This implies that costly fund-raising can provide a novel explanation for the non-neutrality of income redistributions and government grants often found in empirical studies.
We consider a model where firms differ in their productivity and workers are differentiated by skill and gender. A reduction in tariffs induces more productive firms to modernize their technology and enter the export market. New technologies involve computerized production processes and lower the need for physically demanding skills. As a result, the relative wage and employment of women improves in blue-collar tasks, but not in white-collar tasks. We empirically confirm these theoretical predictions using a panel of Mexican establishments and the tariff reductions associated with the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA).
While cross-sectional data show increasing income inequality in the United States, it is also important to examine how incomes change over time. Using income tax data, this paper provides new evidence on long-term and intergenerational mobility, and persistence at the top of the income distribution. Half of those aged 35-40 in the top or bottom quintile in 1987 remain there in 2007; the others have moved up or down. While 30 percent of dependents aged 15-18 from bottom quintile households are themselves in the bottom quintile after 20 years, most have moved up. Persistence is lower in the highest income groups.
Our theory of cultural-institutional persistence and innovation is based on uncoordinated updating of individual social norms and contracts, so that both culture and institutions co-evolve. We explain why Pareto-dominated cultural-institutional configurations may persist over long periods and how transitions nonetheless occur. In our model the exercise of elite power plays no role in either persistence or innovation, and transitions occur endogenously. This is unlike models in which elites impose inferior institutions or cultures as a self-interested distributional strategy. We show that persistence will be greater the more inferior is the Pareto-dominated configuration and the more rational and individualistic is the population.