Knowledge that Transforms

We analyze optimal pension systems relying on simple policy instruments in a lifecycle environment which admits endogenous decisions of how much to work as well as when to retire. The optimality in this context means the highest welfare that can be achieved within a restricted set of instruments, while keeping the total cost of the pension system unchanged. The policy instruments we consider are the optimized retirement benefit functions modeled after a stylized version of the current US Social Security.

The matching with contracts model (Hatfield and Milgrom 2005) is widely considered to be one of the most important advances of the last two decades in matching theory. One of their main messages is that the set of stable allocations is non-empty under a substitutes condition. We show that an additional irrelevance of rejected contracts (IRC) condition is implicitly assumed throughout their analysis, and in the absence of IRC several of their results, including the guaranteed existence of a stable allocation, fail to hold.

This paper examines the missing transmission mechanism in Friedman's and Schwartz's monetary explanation of the Great Depression. We review the challenge provided by the decline in nominal interest rates in the early 1930s, and show that the monetary explanation requires not just that there were expectations of deflation, but that they were caused by monetary contraction. Using a detailed analysis of Business Week magazine, we find evidence that monetary contraction and Federal Reserve policy contributed to expectations of deflation during the downturn. This suggests that monetary shocks may have depressed spending and output in part by raising real interest rates.