Knowledge that Transforms

[T]he literature of risk aversion and risk preference [is] one of the richest sources of ad hoc assumptions concerning tastes. ... [N]o significant behavior has been illuminated by assumptions of differences in tastes. ... [Such theories] have been a convenient crutch to lean on when the analysis has bogged down. ... They give the appearance of considered judgement, yet really have only been ad hoc arguments that disguise analytical failures. -George J. Stigler and Gary S. Becker (1977 p. 89)

The frequency of foreign conflict initiations in the United States is found to be significantly greater following the onset of recessions during a president's first term than in other periods. The authors develop an economic theory of the political use of wars which links the election cycle, war decisions, and economic performance consistent with the observed relationships among these events. An incumbent leader with an unfavorable economic performance record may initiate a war to force the learning of his war leadership abilities and thus salvage, with some probability, his reelection. This obtains despite voter rationality and informational symmetry.

Experimental evidence shows that an important reason why people tend to imitate others, to exhibit "herd behavior" is that they assume that the others have information that justifies their actions. The information cascade models of Banerjee [1992] and Bikhchandani et al. [1992] are significant developments in showing some general equilibrium and welfare effects of such rational imitative behavior. But these models as specified may be of limited applicability since they assert that differences across groups in herd behavior can be attributed to the random decisions of first movers. Differences across groups in herd behavior might be explained more often in terms of different modes of interpersonal information transmission. Patterns of human conversation imply great selectivity to the kinds of information transmitted within groups.

The authors present a structural model of the U.S. economy that combines their price-contracting specification with a term-structure relationship, an aggregate demand curve, and a monetary-policy reaction function. The model matches important features of postwar data well and provides a structural explanation of the correlation between real output and the short-term nominal rate of interest. The authors perform a battery of monetary-policy experiments that show that, as viewed through the lens of this model, monetary policy has struck a good balance recently among competing monetary-policy objectives.

The authors report the first results for Japanese firms on the effects of employee stock-ownership plans (ESOPs) and bonuses by estimating production functions using new panel data. They find that the introduction of an ESOP will lead to a 4-5 percent increase in productivity; this productivity payoff takes three to four years. There is a modest productivity gain from the bonus system. The authors also find evidence that the productivity effect of bonuses is enhanced by the existence of ESOPs, suggesting that ESOPs may create a climate conducive to profit-sharing by enhancing long-term commitment and peer monitoring.