Knowledge that Transforms

Building on administrative data and machine-learning models, I develop a firm-specific measure of regulatory intensity: cost of compliance with all federal paperwork regulations. Regulatory intensity increases the cost of goods sold and overhead spending (SGA). It also incentivizes companies to reduce capital investment, hire fewer employees, and lobby more. The effects are particularly strong among financially constrained firms and those with irreversible investment opportunities, suggesting that regulation affects companies through budgetary pressures and heightened uncertainty. The findings highlight the real effects of regulation and the underlying mechanisms.

Using novel shadow bank funding data, I find that shadow banks are funded by the very banks they compete with when originating mortgages. Evidence suggests that banks have market power in the upstream market for shadow banks’ funding, which in turn softens mortgage market competition through their strategic behaviors in both markets. I build and calibrate a quantitative model of vertical integration and competition to show that those consumers who would most benefit from shadow bank services are the ones to bear the costs. Secondary market innovation could increase downstream competition by reducing shadow banks’ reliance on their competitors.

We study the effect of dealer exit on prices and quantities in a model of an over-the-counter market featuring a core-periphery network with bilateral trading costs. The model is calibrated using regulatory data on the entire U.S. credit default swap (CDS) market between 2010 and 2013. Prices depend crucially on the risk-bearing capacity of core dealers, yet unlike standard models featuring a dealer sector, we allow for heterogeneity in dealer risk-bearing capacity. This heterogeneity is quantitatively important. Depending on how well dealers share risk, the exit of a single dealer can cause credit spreads to rise by 8 % to 24%.

We identify a novel economic mechanism through which passive ownership positively affects informational efficiency in the cross-section of firms. Passive investors’ inelastic demand lowers a firm’s cost-of-capital, inducing it to take more risk. The higher cash flow variance, in turn, incentivizes active investors to acquire more precise private information, pushing up price informativeness for firms with high passive ownership. High passive ownership also implies higher stock prices and higher stock-return variances. An increase in the aggregate size of passive investors amplifies these cross-sectional differences. We also document complementarities in firms’ real investment and investors’ information choices that can cause information crashes. Received May 31, 2020; editorial decision January 4, 2023 by Editor Holger Mueller.

Municipal bond markets began pricing sea-level rise (SLR) exposure risk in 2013, coinciding with upward revisions to worst-case SLR projections and accompanying uncertainty around these projections. The effect is larger for long-maturity bonds and not solely driven by near-term flood risk. We use a structural model of credit risk to quantify the implied economic impact and distinguish between the effects of underlying asset values and of uncertainty. The SLR exposure premium exhibits a trend different from house prices and is unaffected by house price controls. Together, our results highlight the importance of climate uncertainty in driving municipal bond prices.

We investigate the strategic role of a recommender who cares about accuracy and whose recommendations influence product quality. In the presence of such feedback effects, recommendations have a self-fulling property: the recommendation agent can select any firm that will end up being the firm with the best quality. This produces important inefficiencies that include (a) a lack of incentive to acquire valuable information, (b) a status quo bias, and (c) the avoidance of risky innovations. Monetary payments from firms may work in mitigating these inefficiencies, while competition between recommenders and monetary payments from consumers are ineffective.

This paper examines how employee earnings respond to a one-time cash flow shock in the form of a government R&D grant. In a regression discontinuity design, we find that the grant immediately increases average annual employee-level earnings by 2.9%. This benefit accrues only to incumbent employees and rises with job tenure. The grant also affects firm growth, but the initial wage patterns do not appear to reflect growth or productivity. Instead, the evidence supports implicit equity financing within the firm, where employees initially accept lower wages from financially constrained firms and earn more when the firm has ability to pay.