This paper examines the impact of internal bank governance on bank liquidity creation in the U.S. before, during and after the 2007–2009 financial crisis. Using bank holding company level data, we analyze whether better-governed banks create higher levels of liquidity. We find that this effect is positive and significant but only for large bank holding companies. Further analysis reveals that specific internal governance categories: CEO education, compensation structure, progressive practices, and ownership have a significant effect on bank liquidity. However, this positive effect occurs mostly during the crisis period, and for large banks that are also high liquidity creators. Finally, we find that the effect of governance on liquidity creation increases during the crisis period. These findings are robust even while controlling for liquidity measures, bank size, and endogeneity problems between governance and liquidity creation

The paper investigates the impact of solvency and liquidity regulation as well as market shocks on banks’ balance sheet structure. It contributes in particular to the debate on the use of liquidity buffers by banks, as initiated by Goodhart’s (2008), “last taxi” argument. The volatility of long-term markets observed during the Covid-19 pandemic shows that periods of sharp increase in risk aversion still result in liquidity strains for banks. The latter react differently depending on the diversity of their funding sources and their risk profile. Indeed, during a crisis, due to interactions between funding and market liquidity, as well as regulatory constraints, one may wonder whether banks may increase or decrease liquidity. According to a simple portfolio allocation model banks’ liquidity increases when the regulatory constraint is binding, as banks hoard extra liquidity, while they do not if the regulatory constraint is not binding. We show that in times of crisis, measured by large deviations of a financial variable capturing international markets’ risk aversion, French banks actually decreased the liquidity coefficient, with our results mostly driven by less liquid banks. However, while we do find that the solvency ratio has a weakly significant effect on the liquidity coefficient, we were not able to establish a firm causal relationship between the two variables on the basis of Granger causality tests

We examine whether U.S. banks subject to the Liquidity Coverage Ratio (LCR) reduce lending (an unintended consequence) and/or become more resilient to liquidity shocks, as intended by regulators. We find that LCR banks tighten lending standards, and reduce liquidity creation that occurs mainly through lower lending relative to non-LCR banks. However, covered banks also contribute less to fire-sale externalities relative to exempt banks. For LCR banks, we estimate that the total after-tax benefits of reduced fire-sale risk (net of the costs associated with foregone lending) exceed $50 billion from 2013Q2 to 2017, mostly accruing to the largest LCR banks. Non-LCR regulations enacted during our sample period cannot fully account for these findings. For the banking sector as a whole, lending migrates to smaller, non-LCR banks so that lending shares increase but fire-sale risk does not decrease. Our results highlight the trade-off between liquidity creation and resiliency arising from liquidity regulations that underlie the debate on whether the LCR should be extended following the banking crisis of March 2023

Governments provide bank guarantees, such as deposit insurance. While risk effects are well researched, impacts on bank output remain largely unexplored. We investigate bank output effects using data from 75 countries/regions on bank liquidity creation, a comprehensive bank output measure. We address reverse causality, examining home-country guarantee effects on liquidity creation by subsidiary banks in foreign host nations, and mitigate omitted-variables concerns with host country × year fixed effects and home country controls. Findings suggest home-country guarantees decrease subsidiary bank liquidity creation up to 10%, and hold prior to, during, and after the Global Financial Crisis

We use a unique data set that comprises each Euro area bank’s daily recourse to the ECB’s marginal lending facility (MLF) and all its bids placed in the ECB’s main refinancing operations (MROs) that were conducted as variable rate tenders until October 2008. We show that the more aggressive a bank bids in a MRO, the higher is its propensity to subsequently draw on the MLF. Our results indicate that particularly with the beginning of the financial crisis, the interest rate paid by a bank in a variable rate tender auction strongly reflects its private value for liquidity, i.e. its opportunity costs of obtaining short-term funding in money markets, and thus, the risk premium it is charged in the private market. This suggests 1) that variable rate tender auctions preserve some market discipline and contain moral hazard issues, especially in times when a central bank is extending its liquidity provision and 2) that the average interest rate paid in an auction can be a useful indicator for bank supervisors to gauge a bank’s access to liquidity in money markets

This paper uses a sample of quarterly observations of insured US commercial banks to examine whether the effect of bank capital on lending differs depending upon the level of bank liquidity. We find that the effect of an increase in bank capital on credit growth, defined as growth rate of net loans and unused commitments, is positively associated with the level of bank liquidity only for large banks and that this positive relationship has been more substantial during the recent financial crisis period. This result suggests that bank capital exerts a significantly positive effect on lending only after large banks retain sufficient liquid assets

This paper analyzes the evolution of bank funding structures in the run up to the global financial crisis and studies the implications for financial stability, exploiting a bank-level dataset that covers about 11,000 banks in the U.S. and Europe during 2001–09. The results show that banks with weaker structural liquidity and higher leverage in the pre-crisis period were more likely to fail afterward. The likelihood of bank failure also increases with pre-crisis bank risk-taking. In the cross-section, the smaller domestically-oriented banks were relatively more vulnerable to liquidity risk, while the large cross-border (Global) banks were more vulnerable to solvency risk due to excessive leverage. In fact, a 3.5 percentage point increase in the pre-crisis capital buffers of Global banks would have caused a 48 percentage point in their probability of failure during the crisis. The results support the proposed Basel III regulations on structural liquidity and leverage, but suggest that emphasis should be placed on the latter, particularly for the systemically-important institutions. Macroeconomic and monetary conditions are also shown to be related with the likelihood of bank failure, providing a case for the introduction of a macro-prudential approach to banking regulation

This paper examines bank fund reallocation and regional economic growth based on 1991–2005 provincial-level data of four state-owned commercial banks of China that practice fund reallocation nation-wide. We find no correlation between bank fund reallocation and regional economic growth or between bank loans and regional economic growth. We find, however, a positive association between bank deposits and growth. It appears economic growth leads financial development in China, not the other way around. Furthermore, as China’s market-oriented reforms deepen, fund reallocation and loans start to manifest positive effects on growth even though the banks are government owned

We estimate the causal effect of liquidity regulation on bank balance sheets. We take advantage of the heterogeneous implementation of tighter liquidity regulation by the UK Financial Services Authority in 2010. We find that banks adjusted the composition of both assets and liabilities, increasing the share of high quality liquid assets and non-financial deposits while reducing intra-financial loans and short-term wholesale funding. We do not find evidence that the tightening of liquidity regulation caused banks to shrink their balance sheets, nor reduce the amount of lending to the non-financial sector

We study the liquidity behavior of commercial banks in response to negative capital shocks. Using pre-Basel III data, U.S. banks with assets less than $1 billion treated (unregulated) liquidity and (regulated) capital as substitutes. Following exogenous shocks to their regulatory capital ratios, these banks shifted away from loans, loan commitments, and dividend payouts, actions that both repaired their capital ratios and enhanced their liquidity positions. We find little similar behavior at larger banks. We conclude that a minimum capital constraint naturally mitigates liquidity risk at community banks, justifying the exemption of these banks from the Basel III liquidity standards