This paper describes and elaborates a process first discovered by Edward H. Clarke that motivates individuals to reveal their true preferences for public goods. The essence of the process is that each individual is offered a chance to change the outcome that would occur without his vote by paying a special charge equal to the net cost to others that results from including his vote in the decision. Because the special charge on any one person is not paid to any other person, a very small budget surplus results. Applications to both discrete and continuous decisions are illustrated.

Journal Article On the Income Distribution as a Public Good Get access Harold M. Hochman, Harold M. Hochman The Urban Institute Search for other works by this author on: Oxford Academic Google Scholar James D. Rodgers, James D. Rodgers Pennsylvania State University Search for other works by this author on: Oxford Academic Google Scholar Gordon Tullock Gordon Tullock Virginia Polytechnic Institute and State University Search for other works by this author on: Oxford Academic Google Scholar The Quarterly Journal of Economics, Volume 87, Issue 2, May 1973, Pages 311–315, https://doi.org/10.2307/1882193 Published: 01 May 1973