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Pricing Initial Audit Engagements: A Test of Competing Theories
Two competing theories of initial engagement audit pricing are examined empirically. DeAngelo's (1981a) model predicts initial engagement discounts in all settings, while Dye's (1991) model specifically predicts discounting will not occur in settings where audit fees are publicly disclosed. Unlike the United States and most countries, audit fees are publicly disclosed in Australia. Our study examines initial engagement pricing in Australia during a time period when comparable U.S. studies report discounts of 25 percent (Ettredge and Greenberg 1990; Simon and Francis 1988). The Australian evidence finds initial engagement discounting only for upgrades from non-Big 8 to Big 8 auditors. Discounting for upgrades to Big 8 auditors is consistent with economic theories of discount pricing by sellers of higher-priced, higher-quality experience goods as an inducement to purchase when uncertainty about product quality is resolved through buying (experiencing) the goods. The evidence in our study is generally consistent with Dye's (1991) conclusion that public disclosure of audit fees precludes initial engagement discounting and the potential independence problems arising from such discounting.
Auditor Changes: A Joint Test of Theory Relating to Agency Costs and Auditor Differentiation.
This study tests whether them is a positive association between a firm's agency costs and its demand for a quality-differentiated audit. Audit firm quality is represented in two ways: a continuous size model in which a direct association is posited between auditor size (measured by clients' sales) and audit quality, and a "brand name" model in which the Big Eight group of auditors is defined as higher quality suppliers. The tests are supportive of the brand name model of audit quality: agency cost proxies are significant as a group, after controlling for client size and growth, only in the brand name model. The results are also supportive (albeit weakly In some Instances) of the following individual agency-related Incentives for higher quality audits: monitoring of Incentive performance contracts, diffusion of ownership, owner-debtholder conflict, and the subsequent Issue of public securities after the auditor change. However, the explanatory power of the models tested is low, after controlling for client size and growth.
Acquisition profitability and timely loss recognition
We investigate if timely loss recognition is associated with acquisition-investment decisions. Using a Basu (1997) piece-wise linear regression model, we find that firms with more timely incorporation of economic losses into earnings make more profitable acquisitions, measured by the bidder's announcement returns and by changes in post-acquisition operating performance. These firms are also less likely to make post-acquisition divestitures (consistent with better ex ante investment decisions), but act more quickly to divest. We also find that the positive association between timely loss recognition and acquisition profitability is more pronounced for firms with higher ex ante agency costs.
Common Auditors and Private Bank Loans*
We show that when banks and borrowers share the same audit firm, borrowers receive lower interest rates, after controlling for potentially confounding director connectedness. The common auditor effect is observed only for opaque borrowers, and is greatest when the same audit engagement office audits the bank and borrower. A common auditor connection also matters more for longer‐tenured auditors, for geographically proximate borrowers, and when the syndicate involves fewer lenders. The effect does not hold for auditors recently sanctioned by the PCAOB. Finally, the interest rate discount is not the consequence of homophily or biased decision making, based on a comparison of postloan performance of firms with common auditor loans versus those with noncommon auditor loans.
The Joint Effect of Investor Protection and Big 4 Audits on Earnings Quality around the World*
Accounting Accruals and Auditor Reporting Conservatism*
Accounting accruals are managers' subjective estimates of future outcomes and cannot, by definition, be objectively verified by auditors prior to occurrence. This causes audits of high‐accrual firms to pose more uncertainty than audits of low‐accrual firms because of potential estimation error and a greater chance that high‐accrual firms have undetected asset realization and/or going concern problems that are related to the high level of accruals. One way that auditors can compensate for this risk exposure is to lower their threshold for issuing modified audit reports, an action that will increase modified reports and, therefore, lessen the likelihood of failing to issue a modified report when appropriate. We call this auditor reporting conservatism and test if high‐accrual firms in the United States, are more likely to receive modified audit reports for asset realization uncertainties and going concern problems. Empirical results for a large sample of U.S. publicly listed companies support the hypothesis that auditors are more conservative, that is, more likely to issue both types of modified audit reports for high‐accrual firms. Further analyses show that income‐increasing accruals are somewhat more likely to result in reporting conservatism than income‐decreasing accruals, and that only the Big Six group of auditors show evidence of reporting conservatism. These findings add to our understanding of the audit report formation process and the potentially important role played by accounting accruals in that process.
Auditor brand name reputations and industry specializations
The development of both brand name reputation and industry specialization by Big 8 auditors is argued to be costly and therefore to increase audit fees. For a sample of 1484 Australian publicly listed companies we estimate audit fee premia for Big 8 auditors. On average, industry specialist Big 8 auditors earn a 34% premium over nonspecialist Big 8 auditors, and the Big 8 brand name premium over non-Big 8 auditors averages around 30%. These results support that industry expertise is a dimension of the demand for higher quality Big 8 audits and a basis for within Big 8 product differentiation.
The Contagion Effect of Low-Quality Audits
We investigate if the existence of low-quality audits in an auditor office indicates the presence of a “contagion effect” on the quality of other (concurrent) audits conducted by the office. A low-quality audit is defined as the presence of one or more clients with overstated earnings that were subsequently corrected by a downward restatement. We document that the quality of audited earnings (abnormal accruals) is lower for clients in these office-years (when the misreporting occurred) compared to a control sample of office-years with no restatements. This effect lasts for up to five subsequent years, indicating that audit firms do not immediately rectify the problems that caused contagion. We also find that an office-year with client misreporting is likely to have subsequent (new) client restatements over the next five fiscal years. Overall, the evidence suggests that certain auditor offices have systematic audit-quality problems and that these problems persist over time. Data Availability: All data are publicly available.
Big 4 Office Size and Audit Quality
Larger offices of Big 4 auditors are predicted to have higher quality audits for SEC registrants due to greater in-house experience in administering such audits. We test this prediction by examining a sample of 6,568 U.S. firm-year observations for the period 2003–2005 and audited by 285 unique Big 4 offices. Results are consistent with larger offices providing higher quality audits. Specifically, larger offices are more likely to issue going-concern audit reports, and clients in larger offices evidence less aggressive earnings management behavior. These findings are robust to extensive controls for client risk factors and to controls for other auditor characteristics. While the evidence suggests audit quality is higher on average in larger Big 4 offices, we make no claims that audit quality is unacceptably low in smaller offices.