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You’re Fired! New Evidence on Portfolio Manager Turnover and Performance

Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis 2015 50(4), 729-755
We study managerial turnover for both internally managed mutual funds and those managed externally by subadvisors. We argue that turnover of subadvisors provides sharper tests and helps address several unresolved issues and puzzles from the previous literature. We find dramatically stronger inverse relations between subadvisor departures and lagged returns, and new evidence on how past flow predicts turnover. We find no evidence of improvements in return performance related to departures, but flow improvements are associated with departures of poor past performers. Our findings represent new evidence on how investors, sponsors, and boards learn about and evaluate mutual fund management performance.

Private Information, Trading Volume, and Stock-Return Variances

Review of Financial Studies 1990 3(2), 233-253
New evidence is provided on the determinants of stock-return variances. First, when the Tokyo Stock Exchange is open on Saturday, the weekend variance increases; weekly variance is unaffected, however, despite an increase in weekly volume. Second, the listing of U.S. stocks in Tokyo substantially increases the number of trading hours, but Tokyo volume is negligible for these U.S. stocks and their 24-hour variance is unaffected. The overall results are consistent with the predictions of private-information-based rational trading models, but inconsistent with both the irrational trading noise and public-information hypotheses.

The distribution of power among corporate managers, shareholders, and directors

Journal of Financial Economics 1988 20, 3-24
This article surveys the seventeen papers in this special issue of the Journal of Financial Economics, and related work. The major findings are: (1) patterns of stock ownership by insiders and outsiders can influence managerial behavior, corporate performance, and stockholder voting in election contests; (2) corporate leverage, inside stock ownership by managers, and the control market are interrelated; (3) departures from one share/one vote affect firm value and efficiency; (4) takeover resistance through defensive restructurings or poison pill provisions is associated with declines in share price; and (5) top management turnover is inversely related to share price performance.

Using daily stock returns

Journal of Financial Economics 1985 14(1), 3-31
This paper examines properties of daily stock returns and how the particular characteristics of these data affect event study methodologies. Daily data generally present few difficulties for event studies. Standard procedures are typically well-specified even when special daily data characteristics are ignored. However, recognition of autocorrelation in daily excess returns and changes in their variance conditional on an event can sometimes be advantageous. In addition, tests ignoring cross-sectional dependence can be well-specified and have higher power than tests which account for potential dependence.

Measuring security price performance

Journal of Financial Economics 1980 8(3), 205-258
Event studies focus on the impact of particular types of firm-specific events on the prices of the affected firms' securities. In this paper, observed stock return data are employed to examine various methodologies which are used in event studies to measure security price performance. Abnormal performance is introduced into this data. We find that a simple methodology based on the market model performs well under a wide variety of conditions. In some situations, even simpler methods which do not explicitly adjust for marketwide factors or for risk perform no worse than the market model. We also show how misuse of any of the methodologies can result in false inferences about the presence of abnormal performance.

Measuring Innovation and Product Differentiation: Evidence from Mutual Funds

Journal of Finance 2020 75(2), 779-823
We study innovation and product differentiation using a uniqueness measure based on textual analysis of prospectuses. We find that small and start‐up families have higher start rates than larger families, and their products are more unique. Unique strategies attract more inflows in the first three years, and investors respond more to text‐based uniqueness than other measures such as holdings or returns uniqueness. For established funds, word uniqueness has weak negative power for explaining returns, so investors in competitive equilibrium do not sacrifice much performance to get specialized products. Uniqueness attenuates the flow‐performance relation, reducing the risk of investor outflows.

Why Do Mutual Fund Advisory Contracts Change? Performance, Growth, and Spillover Effects

Journal of Finance 2011 66(1), 271-306
We examine changes in equity mutual funds' investment advisory contracts. We find substantial advisory compensation rate changes in both directions, with typical percentage fee shifts exceeding one‐fourth. Rate increases are associated with superior past market‐adjusted performance, whereas rate decreases reflect economies of scale associated with growth, and are not associated with extreme poor performance. There are within‐family spillover effects. Superior (e.g., star) performance for individual funds is associated with rate increases for a family's other funds. Rate reductions post‐2004 by family funds involved in market timing scandals do not have large industry spillover effects.

Stock prices and top management changes

Journal of Financial Economics 1988 20, 461-492
This paper studies the association between a firm's stock returns and subsequent top management changes. Consistent with internal monitoring of management, there is an inverse relation between the probability of a management change and a firm's share performance. This relation can result from monitoring by the board, other top managers, or blockholders. However, unless share performance is extremely good or bad, logit models have no predictive ability. No average stock price reaction is detected at announcement of a top management change.