This article is concerned with hours worked per employee in unionized labor markets. First the determination of hours is examined in the context of various bargaining models and, in the process, these models are nested in a general framework. Then cross-section and time-series data are drawn on to quantify the effects of unionism on hours worked. The time-series data from 1920 to 1980 imply a negative impact of unionism on full-time hours while cross-section data for 1978 suggest some notable differences in both the direction and the magnitude of this impact across occupations and industries.

The wages and employment of typographers are examined to see whether they can be usefully characterized as the outcome of a process by which the union maximizes an objective function containing wages and employment and is constrained by a trade-off between these two variables as represented by the employer's labor demand function. Our functional form assumptions permit investigation of some familiar special cases of union behavior. The parameter implications of both the wage bill maximization hypothesis and the rent maximization hypothesis provide inferior explanations of the movement of wages and employment of these workers compared with our more general formulation.

Though it is routinely posited that organizations with different property rights will not exhibit the same responses to changes in their economic environment, compelling evidence of such behavior is difficult to find. We collected observations on two types of firms--conventional proprietorships and worker-owned cooperatives--operating in the same industry, in the same location, and at the same period of time. We compare the firms' reactions to changes in their input and output prices and ask whether their reactions are consistent with orthodox models of profit and dividend maximization.

Using data collected by the authors on the largest and most durable of worker-owned firms in U.S. manufacturing, this paper is addressed to two questions. First, are the responses of cooperatives to changes in their economic environment different from those of conventional firms? It appears that cooperatives are more inclined to adjust pay than employment. Second, how profitable has membership in the cooperatives been? Using information on share prices, the authors find membership to have been extremely profitable and, in this sense, the prices of co-ops' shares have been underpriced. The riskiness of cooperative memberships is discussed.