This paper explores the effect of exclusionary ethical investing on corporate behavior in a risk-averse, equilibrium setting. While arguments exist that ethical investing can influence a firm's cost of capital, and so affect investment, no equilibrium model has been presented to do so. We show that exclusionary ethical investing leads to polluting firms being held by fewer investors since green investors eschew polluting firms' stock. This lack of risk sharing among non-green investors leads to lower stock prices for polluting firms, thus raising their cost of capital. If the higher cost of capital more than overcomes a cost of reforming (i.e., a polluting firm cleaning up its activities), then polluting firms will become socially responsible because of exclusionary ethical investing. A key determinant of the incentive for polluting firms to reform is the fraction of funds controlled by green investors. In our model, empirically reasonable parameter estimates indicate that more than 20% green investors are required to induce any polluting firms to reform. Existing empirical evidence indicates that at most 10% of funds are invested by green investors.

In a dynamic framework, the advantage of leverage depends upon the firm's recapitalization policy. We show that if bonds are callable at par, then equityholders have an incentive to recapitalize too early. Call premia and issue discounts, however, mitigate the agency problem of early recapitalization. The model provides the optimal call premium and issue discount as a function of firm-specific characteristics. An analysis of a bond sample supports the model's prediction that the optimal call premium is positively related to firm risk.

This paper analyzes the role of capital structure in the presence of intrafirm influence activities. The hierarchical structure of large organizations inevitably generates attempts by members to influence the distributive consequences of organizational decisions. In corporations, for example, top management can reallocate or eliminate quasi rents earned by their employees, while at the same time, they must rely on these employees to provide them with information vital to their decision making. This creates the opportunity for lower level managers to influence top management's discretionary decisions. As a result, divisional managers may attempt to inflate the corporate perception of their relative contributions to the firm, or to take actions that make the elimination of their rents more costly for the firm. This incentive to influence is especially acute when managers fear losing their jobs, for example in the event of a divestiture. Since the firm's capital structure can affect future divestiture decisions, it can be chosen to reduce or increase the divisional managers' incentives to influence top management's decisions. The control of influence activities arises at the expense of restrictions on future divestiture decisions. Hence, there emerges an optimal capital structure that trades off the costs of influence activities against the costs of making poor divestiture decisions. The findings suggest that capital structure can also be chosen to control influence activities that arise under less extreme motivations. We identify several key factors that determine the optimal capital structure: the top management's prior assessment of the likelihood that it will be optimal to divest a specific division; the costs of influence activities to the firm and to the divisional managers; and the difference in the valuation of the division's assets in the current firm and under alternative uses.

The unique natural experiment of the fall of the iron curtain led to large institutional and governance differences across countries. This allows us to observe the evolution of ownership and control after an initial shock. We utilize this cross-time/cross-country variation in institutions and privatization methods to analyze the determinants and effects of individual investor control in a large sample of firms in 11 CEE countries over the period 2000–2007. Controlling for possible endogeneity and firm effects, we find that large individual investors add value to the firms they control. They do so predominantly compared to state controlled firms but also compared to other privately controlled firms. If large individual investor firms employ professional managers and (only) supervise them actively, they achieve the better performance improvements in Tobin's q than the firms managed by their controlling shareholders. Concerning the determinants of ownership, large individual shareholders substitute for missing good country governance institutions, and ownership is very sticky, since initial conditions (privatization methods) still matter. It appears that secondary markets do not converge on the same ownership equilibria as primary markets do.

We analyze determinants of secondary debt market liquidity, identifying conditions under which a large investor can profitably buy stakes from small bondholders and offer unilateral debt relief to a distressed firm. We show that endogenous trading by small bondholders may result in multiple equilibria. Some equilibria entail vanishing liquidity and sharp increases in yields absent changing fundamentals. In turn, anticipation of illiquid equilibria induces firms to eschew public debt financing, since such equilibria create higher bankruptcy costs and debt illiquidity discounts. The model thus offers a rational micro-foundation for stylized facts commonly attributed to investor sentiment and CFO market timing. Finally, we show that the vulnerability of debt markets to multiple equilibria is highest during downturns, when small bondholders face severe adverse selection. The Author 2011. Published by Oxford University Press on behalf of The Society for Financial Studies. All rights reserved. For Permissions, please e-mail: [email protected]., Oxford University Press.

This paper develops a model of dynamic capital structure choice in the presence of recapitalization costs. The theory provides the optimal dynamic recapitalization policy as a function of firm-specific characteristics. We find that even small recapitalization costs lead to wide swings in a firm's debt ratio over time. Rather than static leverage measures, we use the observed debt ratio range of a firm as an empirical measure of capital structure relevance. The results of empirical tests relating firms' debt ratio ranges to firm-specific features strongly support the theoretical model of relevant capital structure choice in a dynamic setting.

This paper develops a model of dynamic capital structure choice in the presence of recapitalization costs. The theory provides the optimal dynamic recapitalization policy as a function of firm‐specific characteristics. We find that even small recapitalization costs lead to wide swings in a firm's debt ratio over time. Rather than static leverage measures, we use the observed debt ratio range of a firm as an empirical measure of capital structure relevance. The results of empirical tests relating firms' debt ratio ranges to firm‐specific features strongly support the theoretical model of relevant capital structure choice in a dynamic setting.

We examine the dynamics of assets under management (AUM) and management fees at the portfolio manager level in the closed-end fund industry. We find that managers capitalize on good past performance and favorable investor perceptions about future performance, as reflected in fund premiums, through AUM expansions and fee increases. However, the penalties for poor performance or unfavorable investor perceptions are either insignificant, or substantially mitigated by manager tenure. Long tenure is generally associated with poor performance and high discounts. Our findings suggest substantial managerial power in capturing CEF rents. We also document significant diseconomies of scale at the manager level.

We show that risk characteristics of projects' cash flows are endogenously determined by the investment decisions of all firms in an industry. As a result, in reasonable settings, financial structures which create incentives to expropriate debtholders by increasing risk are shown not to reduce value in an industry equilibrium. Without taxes, capital structure is irrelevant for individual firms despite its effect on the equityholders' incentives, but the maximum total amount of debt in the industry is determinate. Allowing for a corporate tax advantage of debt, capital structure becomes relevant but firms are indifferent between distinct alternative debt levels.