This paper reports the findings of a field study aimed at providing a better understanding of how and why managers of corporations with multiple divisions set the levels of achievability of annual profit center budget targets. The data, gathered from 54 profit centers in 12 corporations, show that most budget targets are set to be achievable an average of eight or nine years out of ten. This finding Contrasts with the proscription made in most management accounting textbooks suggesting that for optimum motivation budget targets should be achievable less than 50 percent of the time. Managers maintain, however, that these highly achievable targets provide considerable challenge, and the high achievability actually provides many advantages, including improved corporate reporting, resource planning, control, and, combined with other control system elements, even motivation.

This paper describes the findings of a study aimed at providing an international replication of a US-based study by Gibbs et al. [Gibbs, M., Merchant, K., Van der Stede, W., & Vargus, M. (2004). Determinants and effects of subjectivity in incentives. The Accounting Review, 79(2), 409-436; Gibbs, M., Merchant, K., Van der Stede, W., & Vargus, M. (2006). The structure of incentive contracts: Evidence from auto dealerships. Working Paper, University of Chicago, University of Southern California, London School of Economics and University of Texas-Dallas] focused on the incentive compensation practices of firms in the automobile retailing industry. The purpose was to determine the extent to which these practices and their effects were similar across countries. Theory provides conflicting predictions as to whether international practices should reflect a situational "best fit" or "global best practices." We collected a dataset comparable to that of Gibbs et al. from Dutch automobile retailers. The findings reveal dramatic differences in practices across the two countries. As compared to the US firms, the Dutch firms are much less likely to provide their managers with incentive compensation in any form. Where Dutch firms do offer incentive compensation, the payouts are smaller and their bonus awards are less likely to be based on profit measures of performance. But where the Dutch firms use incentive compensation, their performance/reward functions are more complex. Moreover, unlike in the US firms, in the Dutch firms the effects of the use of incentive compensation on net profit and pay satisfaction are negative.

This study explores decisions related to formal empirical tests of business models and interpretations and uses of those tests. Business models describe managers' rationales as to how their organizations will achieve success. This study documents a test of one company's business model under seemingly favorable conditions for such a test—a successful single-product firm following a consistent strategy over a long period of time with stable management and publicly traded stock. Although the findings provide only weak support for the hypothesized business model, the confidence of the company's top managers in their business model remained high. Further analyses reveal that the managers' response to the test results is consistent with that expected of Bayesian-rational agents. Our analyses provide the basis for development of a framework for understanding the expected value of testing business models in various circumstances. This framework might explain apparent contradictions between previous studies containing normative statements regarding the value of testing business models. Data Availability: The data used in this study are derived from a proprietary dataset and public sources.

This study examines two questions: When do firms make greater use of subjectivity in awarding bonuses? What are the effects of subjectivity on employee pay satisfaction and firm performance? We examine these questions using data from a sample of 526 department managers in 250 car dealerships. First, the findings suggest that subjective bonuses are used to complement perceived weaknesses in quantitative performance measures and to provide employees insurance against downside risk in their pay. Specifically, use of subjective bonuses is positively related to: (1) the extent of long-term investments in intangibles; (2) the extent of organizational interdependencies; (3) the extent to which the achievability of the formula bonus target is both difficult and leads to significant consequences if not met; and (4) the presence of an operating loss. Second, we find that the effects of subjective bonuses on pay satisfaction, productivity, and profitability are larger the greater the manager's tenure, consistent with the idea that subjectivity improves incentive contracting when there is greater trust between the subordinate and supervisor