We characterize the operating-activities section of the indirect-approach statement of cash flows as backward because it presents reconciling adjustments in a way that is opposite from the intuitively appealing, future-oriented, Conceptual Framework definitions of assets, liabilities, and the accruals process. We propose that the reversed-accruals orientation required in the currently mandated indirect-approach statement of cash flows is unnecessarily complex, causing information-processing problems that result in increased cash flow forecast error and dispersion. We also predict that the mixed pattern (i.e., +/−, −/+) of operating cash flows and operating accruals reported by most companies impedes investors’ ability to learn the time-series properties of cash flows and accruals. We conduct a carefully controlled experiment and find that (1) cash flow forecasts have lower forecast error and dispersion when the indirect-approach statement of cash flows starts with operating cash flows and adds changes in accruals to arrive at net income and (2) cash flow forecasts have lower forecast error and dispersion when the cash flows and accruals are of the same sign (i.e., +/+, −/−); with the sign-based difference attenuated in the forward-oriented statement of cash flows. We also conduct a quasi-experiment to test our mixed-sign versus same-sign hypotheses using archival samples of publicly available I/B/E/S and Value Line cash flow forecasts. We find that the passively observed samples of cash flow forecasts exhibit a similar pattern of mixed-sign versus same-sign forecast error as documented in our experiment.

We examine how fair-value-income measurement affects commercial bank equity analysts' risk and value judgments. Normatively, holding information and other underlying economics constant, bank analysts' risk and valuation assessments should distinguish between banks with different risks, but should not depend on how banks measure income. In our experiment, we vary income measurement—full-fair-value (all fair-value changes recognized in income) versus piecemeal-fair-value (some fair-value changes recognized in income, others disclosed in the notes). We also vary interest-rate-risk exposure (exposed versus hedged). We find that bank analysts' risk and value judgments distinguish banks' exposure to interest-rate risk only under full-fair-value-income measurement. Our evidence contributes to research concerned with financial performance reporting, risk, and fair-value accounting by demonstrating that differences in income measurement affect fundamental judgments of specialist analysts. Our findings are striking because they: (1) point toward an important role for measurement and recognition of fair-value gains and losses in income, and (2) suggest that note disclosure is not a substitute for financial-statement recognition (even for professional analysts specializing in banks and working in a context that involves assessment of core operations of a bank). These results should be of interest to accounting standard setters as they evaluate whether to require full-fair-value-income measurement.