This article explores the information effect of financial risk management. Financial hedging improves the informativeness of corporate earnings as a signal of management ability and project quality by eliminating extraneous noise. Managerial and shareholder incentives regarding information transmission may differ, however, leading to conflicts regarding an optimal hedging policy. We show that these incentives depend on the accounting information made available by the firm. Under some circumstances, if hedge transactions are not disclosed (i.e., firms report only aggregate earnings), managers hedge to achieve greater risk reduction than they would if full disclosure were required. In these cases, it is optimal for shareholders to request only aggregate accounting reports.

We develop an agency model of financial contracting. We derive long-term debt, a line of credit, and equity as optimal securities, capturing the debt coupon and maturity; the interest rate and limits on the credit line; inside versus outside equity; dividend policy; and capital structure dynamics. The optimal debt-equity ratio is history dependent, but debt and credit line terms are independent of the amount financed and, in some cases, the severity of the agency problem. In our model, the agent can divert cash flows; we also consider settings in which the agent undertakes hidden effort, or can control cash flow risk.

Agency problems limit firms' access to capital markets, curbing investment. Firms and investors seek contractual ways to mitigate these problems. What are the implications for investment? We present a theory of a firm's investment dynamics in the presence of agency problems and optimal long-term financial contracts. We derive results relating firms' investment decisions, current and past cash flows, firm size, capital structure, and dividends. Among the results, optimal investment is increasing in current and past cash flow; and optimal investment is positively serially correlated over time (after controlling for investment opportunities). These results hold for a range of agency problems.

We analyze the optimal trading and ownership policy of a large shareholder who must trade off diversification and monitoring incentives. Without commitment, the problem is similar to durable goods monopoly: the share price today depends on expected future trades. We show that the large shareholder ultimately trades to the competitive price‐taking allocation, even though it entails inefficient monitoring. With continuous trading, the large shareholder trades immediately to this allocation if moral hazard is weak enough that her private valuation of a share is decreasing in her stake. Otherwise, the large shareholder adjusts her stake gradually. We consider implications for asset pricing, IPO underpricing, and lockup provisions.

A privately informed seller seeks to liquidate a portfolio to raise cash. Each asset’s liquidity thus depends on the impact of its sale on the value of the entire portfolio. We demonstrate the importance of cross-signaling and derive sufficient conditions for a liquidity “pecking order” that determines the order of sale. For assets backed by a common pool, liquidity naturally aligns with seniority. Finally, we extend the portfolio liquidation game to consider security design and demonstrate the optimality of pooling securities and selling senior tranches or debt secured by the pool, with retention increasing in asset quality or informational asymmetry.

Self-regulation is a feature of a number of professions. For example, in the U.S. the government delegates aspects of financial market regulation to self-regulatory organizations (SROs) like the New York Stock Exchange and the National Association of Securities Dealers. We analyse one regulatory task of an SRO, enforcing antifraud rules so agents will not cheat customers. Specifically, we model contracting/enforcement as a two-tier problem. An SRO chooses its enforcement policy: the likelihood that an agent is investigated for fraud and a penalty schedule. Given an enforcement policy, agents compete by offering contracts that maximize customers' expected utility. We assume that the SRO's objective is to maximize the welfare of its members, the agents. We show that the SRO chooses a more lax enforcement policy—meaning less frequent investigations—than what customers would choose. A general conclusion is that control of the enforcement policy governing contracts confers substantial market power to a group of otherwise competitive agents. We also investigate government oversight of the self-regulatory process. The threat of government enforcement leads to more enforcement by the SRO, just enough to pre-empt any government enforcement.

Existence of equilibrium with incomplete markets is problematic because demand functions are typically not continuous. Discontinuities occur at prices for which a marketed asset suddenly becomes redundant. The authors show that this discontinuity disappears if they allow an agent in the economy to introduce a new asset when such redundancies occur. This enables them to prove generic existence with incomplete markets using a standard path-following argument. Moreover, the authors' approach suggests a simple algorithm for computing equilibria when markets are incomplete. They demonstrate this by computing equilibrium for a numerical example.

Regulating insider trading lessens the adverse selection problem facing market makers, enabling them to quote better prices. An Optimal enforcement policy must balance these benefits against the costs of enforcement. Such a policy must specify (i) the conditions under which the regulator conducts an investigation, (ii) the penalty schedule imposed if an insider is caught, and (iii) a transaction tax to fund enforcement. We derive the policy that maximizes investors welfare. This policy entails investigations following large trading volumes or large price movements or both. Insiders caught making large trades are assessed the maximum penalty, but small trades are not penalized. Given this policy, insiders trade most aggressively on news with an intermediate price impact but refrain from trading on moderate or extreme news.

Firms’ inability to commit to future funding choices has profound consequences for capital structure dynamics. With debt in place, shareholders pervasively resist leverage reductions no matter how much such reductions may enhance firm value. Shareholders would instead choose to increase leverage even if the new debt is junior and would reduce firm value. These asymmetric forces in leverage adjustments, which we call the leverage ratchet effect, cause equilibrium leverage outcomes to be history-dependent. If forced to reduce leverage, shareholders are biased toward selling assets relative to potentially more efficient alternatives such as pure recapitalizations.

Firms’ inability to commit to future funding choices has profound consequences for capital structure dynamics. With debt in place, shareholders pervasively resist leverage reductions no matter how much such reductions may enhance firm value. Shareholders would instead choose to increase leverage even if the new debt is junior and would reduce firm value. These asymmetric forces in leverage adjustments, which we call the leverage ratchet effect , cause equilibrium leverage outcomes to be history‐dependent. If forced to reduce leverage, shareholders are biased toward selling assets relative to potentially more efficient alternatives such as pure recapitalizations.