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Interest-rate exposure and bank mergers

Journal of Banking & Finance 1999 23(2-4), 255-285
This study examines how interest rates and interest-rate exposures affect the level of acquisition activity, the identities of targets and acquirers, and the pricing of acquisitions in the banking industry. Using a sample of 477 large mergers from 1980 to 1994, we find that the level of acquisition activity is more positively correlated with equity indices and more negatively correlated with interest rates for banks than for non-banks. Although we find that targets and acquirers have significantly different interest-rate exposures, we find little evidence that one group is consistently better or worse positioned, ex post, for various interest-rate environments. Finally, we find some evidence that merger pricing is a function of the interest-rate environment, with acquirers paying higher prices and earning lower returns when rates are low (and when more deals are announced).

Corporate ownership and ESG performance

Journal of Corporate Finance 2025 91, 102732
Using a sample of 3083 firms from 62 countries over 18 years, we analyze how the structure and identity of firms' material owners influence their Environmental, Social, and Governance (ESG) performance. We find that firms with founding families or other individual investors as owners underperform, unless family members serve as CEOs, when they outperform all others. Non-family management and government entities also perform significantly better in most analyses. These results are robust to multiple data and methodological stress tests. Our findings show that ownership matters for ESG performance and give us an indication of the preferences of different types of owners regarding ESG.

Mutual Fund Fees Around the World

Review of Financial Studies 2009 22(3), 1279-1310
Using a new database, we study fees charged by 46,580 mutual fund classes offered for sale in 18 countries, which account for about 86% of the world fund industry in 2002. We examine management fees, total expense ratios, and total shareholder costs (including load charges). Fees vary substantially across funds and from country to country. To explain these differences, we consider fund, sponsor, and national characteristics. Fees differ by investment objectives: larger funds and fund complexes charge lower fees; fees are higher for funds distributed in more countries and funds domiciled in certain offshore locations (especially when selling into countries levying higher taxes). Substantial cross-country differences persist even after controlling for these variables. These remaining differences can be explained by a variety of factors, the most robust of which is that fund fees are lower in countries with stronger investor protection.

Selling company shares to reluctant employees: France Telecom's experience

Journal of Financial Economics 2004 71(1), 169-202
In 1997, France Telecom went through a partial privatization. Using a database that tracks over 200,000 eligible participants, we analyze employees’ decisions whether to participate; how much to invest; and what stock alternatives to select. The results are broadly consistent with a neoclassical model of investing behavior. We report four anomalous findings: (1) The firm specificity of human capital has a negligible effect on employees’ investment decisions; (2) the amount invested seems driven by different forces than the decision to participate, and we attempt to measure an apparent “threshold effect”; (3) employees “left on the table” benefits worth one to two months’ salary by failing to participate; and (4) most participants underweighted the most valuable asset.

Assessing the Costs and Benefits of Brokers in the Mutual Fund Industry

Review of Financial Studies 2009 22(10), 4129-4156
Many investors purchase mutual funds through intermediated channels, paying brokers or financial advisors for fund selection and advice. This article attempts to quantify the benefits that investors enjoy in exchange for the costs of these services. We study broker-sold and direct-sold funds from 1996 to 2004, and fail to find that brokers deliver substantial tangible benefits. Relative to direct-sold funds, broker-sold funds deliver lower risk-adjusted returns, even before subtracting distribution costs. These results hold across fund objectives, with the exception of foreign equity funds. Further, broker-sold funds exhibit no more skill at aggregate-level asset allocation than do funds sold through the direct channel. Our results are consistent with two hypotheses: that brokers deliver substantial intangible benefits that we do not observe and that there are material conflicts of interest between brokers and their clients. The Author 2009. Published by Oxford University Press on behalf of The Society for Financial Studies. All rights reserved. For Permissions, please e-mail: [email protected]., Oxford University Press.

Bouncing out of the banking system: An empirical analysis of involuntary bank account closures

Journal of Banking & Finance 2012 36(4), 1224-1235
Using a new database, we document the determinants of involuntary consumer bank account closures. During 2001–2005, approximately 30 million debit accounts were involuntarily closed for excessive overdrafting. We focus on multiple factors to explain this phenomenon: household economics and financial decision-making ability, social capital, bank policies, and the alternative financial services sector. Involuntary closures are more frequent in US counties with a larger fraction of single mothers, lower education levels, lower wealth, and higher unemployment. Closures are higher in communities with high property crime rates and low electoral participation. Bank policies have an independent relation to closures, with counties having more competitive banking markets and more multi-market banks experiencing higher closure rates; bank structure also seems to affect the speed at which banks adjust their policies to changes in household income. Finally, using both national data and a state-level shift in regulation, we find evidence that access to payday lending leads to higher rates of involuntary account closure.

What drives corporate liquidity? An international survey of cash holdings and lines of credit☆

Journal of Financial Economics 2010 98(1), 160-176
We survey chief financial officers from 29 countries to examine whether and why firms use lines of credit versus non-operational (excess) cash for their corporate liquidity. We find that these two liquidity sources are employed to hedge against different risks. Non-operational cash guards against future cash flow shocks in bad times, while credit lines give firms the option to exploit future business opportunities available in good times. Lines of credit are the dominant source of liquidity for companies around the world, comprising about 15% of assets, while less than half of the cash held by companies is held for non-operational purposes, comprising about 2% of assets. Across countries, firms make greater use of lines of credit when external credit markets are poorly developed.

Cases in Financial Engineering: Applied Studies of Financial Innovation.

Journal of Finance 1995 50(5), 1780
1. Financial Innovation and The Financial System. 2. Securities Innovation: A Historical and Functional Approach. CASES. 1. Financial Engineering and Debt Securities. 1.1 Arbitrage Fundamentals. Cougars. RJRCHC 1991. Arb in Government Bonds. Coca Cola--Harmless Warrants.1.2 Taxes, Regulation and Accounting: Stimuli to Innovation. Citicorp 1985. Note: Eurodollar Bond. New England Property and Casualty. Schroeders Perpetual. Metromedia.1.3 Securitization. Travelers. Note: MBS. Amex TRS Case. Lehman Case.2. Financial Engineering and Equity Securities. 2.1 Addressing Information Asymmetries. Arley. Avon PERCs. GM PERCs. ALZA series (A-B1-B2-C). British Telecom. RJR 1990. Sally Jameson.2.2 Taxes, Regulation and Accounting: Stimuli to Innovation. ARPPS. MMP. Dart and Kraft. Waste Management.3. Managing Issuers' Exposures. 3.1 Managing Issuers' Exposures. B.F. Goodrich-Rabobank. GM--Liab Management. State of CT Muni Swap. Walt Disney. Gaz de France. American Barrick. Enron.3.2 Managing Investors' Exposures. SLH (A&B). Goldman Sachs Nikkel Put Warrants. Commodity Linked Debt. Note: Commodity Futures. Fidelity Case. Diamond Shamrock Natomas. BEA Associates. LOR: Portfolio Insurance. LOR: SuperTrust.FOUNDATION NOTES. Note: U.S. Government Debt Markets. Note: Foreign Exchange. Note: FX Swaps. Note: Introduction to Options. Note: Option Pricing. Note: Contingent Claims Analysis. Note: Financial Futures. Note: Interest Rate Derivatives.

The Global Financial System: A Functional Perspective.

Journal of Finance 1997 52(2), 915
Leading financial scholars present essays examining the performance of the basic financial functions underlying global financial systems: payments, lending and investing, pooling funds, allocating risk, providing information, and dealing with incentive issues - with particular emphasis on how their performance is changing and implications for the future.