This paper examines trends in union membership during the twentieth century. The hypothesis is advanced that the provision of certain social welfare benefits by government substitutes for the private provision by unions, thereby reducing the attractiveness of union membership. The empirical implications of this hypothesis are examined using time-series data on aggregate union membership for the period 1904-80 and using pooled state data for the period 1964-80. These latter data are used to examine the effect of departures from the traditional doctrine of "employment at will." Both the time-series and the cross-section evidence suggest that government supply of "union-like" services reduces union membership.

While it is tempting to focus on new financial innovations in helping explain recent financial turmoil, more traditional causes should not be overlooked. As on many previous occasions, very rapid credit growth led to major increases in asset prices, which in turn encouraged consumption and investment decisions which could yet prove unsustainable. The natural “procyclicality” of the financial system could perhaps be contained through the introduction of a “new macrofinancial stability framework”. There are many practical impediments to realising such a suggestion, but there are also grounds for belief that these impediments could be removed.

As a result of poor asset allocation decisions by 401(k) participants, 72% of all plans now offer target date funds, and participants heavily invest in them. Here, we study the characteristics and performance of TDFs, providing a unique view by employing data on TDFs holdings. We show that additional expenses charged by TDFs are largely offset by the low-cost share classes they hold, not normally open to their investors. Additionally, TDFs are very active in their allocation decisions and increasingly bet on nonstandard asset classes. However, TDFs do not earn alpha from timing or their selection of individual assets.

Diversification by banks affects the systemic risk of the sector. Importantly, Wagner (2010) shows that linear diversification increases systemic risk. We consider the case of securitization, whereby loan portfolios are sliced into tranches with different seniority levels. We show that tranching offers nonlinear diversification strategies, which can reduce the failure risk of individual institutions beyond the minimum level attainable by linear diversification without increasing systemic risk.

This paper investigates factors associated with audit firm positions on Auditing Standards Board issues during the three-year period ending during 1984. The major finding is that firms with relatively structured audit technologies tend to favor proposed statements while firms with relatively unstructured technologies do not. Audit firm size is not associated with firm position. Also, Big 8 firms favoring proposed statements have lower staff-to-partner ratios and concentrate less in auditing. The staff-to-partner ratio is negatively associated with technology. The results' implications for auditing profession organization studies and auditing and financial reporting research are investigated.

This study addresses the relationship between the supply of auditing in the public sector and political competition expected in future elections. Empirical tests that use cross-sectional data from state governments reveal positive correlations between state audit budgets and measures of political competition. These results are consistent with an argument that public officials' incentives to supply auditing arise from contracting between the officials and their supporting interests.

Following a report of a possible seasonal in Australian share prices [Praetz (1973)], a study was made of the behaviour of share returns using different data and methodology to that of the original report. The test included forecasts of the seasonal using Box and Jenkins methods. Although the results indicate some evidence of a seasonal, it is shown that this is not prima facie evidence of market inefficiency. It is suggested that a more likely explanation is related to the structure of the economy, e.g., changing opportunity cost of money through the year.

The most recently issued, on-the-run, Treasuries are extremely liquid and frequently trade at a premium in both the cash and repo, or financing, markets. Previous research suggests that both the cash and repo premiums reflect demand from buy-and-hold investors who value the superior liquidity of these securities and are reluctant to lend them in the repo market. We find evidence that premiums in the repo market are also closely related to market participants’ demand to hedge interest rate risk associated with their holdings of fixed income securities.

Of key importance in the governance structure of firms is the role of financial incentives for each major player. The main contribution of this article is an analysis of how an insider's concentration of wealth in his or her bank investment affects incentives to take risk. Major empirical findings are that, first, bank earnings variation falls when bank managers have more of their wealth concentrated in their banks; second, hired-manager banks become less risky when a person who has significant motivation to monitor bank management has his or her wealth highly concentrated in the bank; and third, stock ownership by hired managers can increase total risk of a bank. Further analysis suggests that community banks in our sample control earnings variation by manipulating idiosyncratic risk, credit risk, and leverage but not systematic risk or the loan-to-asset ratio.