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Why are IPOs underpriced? Evidence from Japan's hybrid auction-method offerings

Journal of Financial Economics 2007 85(3), 637-666
We document discretionary underpricing and partial adjustment of IPO prices in the public offer tranche of Japan's hybrid auction regime, in which investor information differences are not important, there are no roadshows, preferential allocations are negligible, institutional investing is low, and the public offer tranche cannot fail. The magnitude and variation of underpricing in our sample, which spans relatively hot and cold markets, are similar to those reported for US IPOs. The evidence is most consistent with underpricing arising from an implicit contract to allocate risk related to initial mispricing where, in exchange for guaranteeing a minimum price, the underwriter participates indirectly in upside performance. The results raise important questions about interpretations of IPO underpricing in the US.

Capital raising, underwriting and the certification hypothesis

Journal of Financial Economics 1986 15(1-2), 261-281
This paper develops a theory of the role of the underwriter in certifying that risky issue prices reflect potentially adverse inside information. The theory derives from the literature on the use of reputational capital to guarantee product quality. An underwriting cost/benefit paradigm is employed to generate testable implications related to announcement effects, issue underpricing, the choice of competitive versus negotiated underwriting, and the level of underwriter compensation as a function of firm-specific information. Existing empirical literature is reviewed in the context of the certification hypothesis and several new tests are conducted. All of the findings are supportive of the hypothesis.

Determinants of Contract Choice: The Use of Warrants to Compensate Underwriters of Seasoned Equity Issues

Journal of Finance 1996 51(1), 363-380
The issuer's decision to include warrants as compensation to underwriters is studied for a sample of 1,991 negotiated firm commitment issues of seasoned equity. Using a two‐stage logit model to correct for self‐selection bias, we find direct evidence that warrant compensation functions as a bond, substituting for reputational capital and enabling the underwriter to certify the issue price. To a lesser degree, the decision also is affected by regulations on underwriter compensation and on the use of underwriter warrants. Issuers' decisions are consistent with an objective of minimizing total underwriting cost, including cash compensation, warrants, and underpricing.

Determinants of Contract Choice: The Use of Warrants to Compensate Underwriters of Seasoned Equity Issues

Journal of Finance 1996 51(1), 363
The issuer's decision to include warrants as compensation to underwriters is studied for a sample of 1,991 negotiated firm commitment issues of seasoned equity. Using a two-stage logit model to correct for self-selection bias, we find direct evidence that warrant compensation functions as a bond, substituting for reputational capital and enabling the underwriter to certify the issue price. To a lesser degree, the decision also is affected by regulations on underwriter compensation and on the use of underwriter warrants. Issuers' decisions are consistent with an objective of minimizing total underwriting cost, including cash compensation, warrants, and underpricing.

Likelihood Ratio Specification Tests

Econometrica 1997 65(3), 627
Moment based tests for mispecification of parametric models (e.g., of mean equals variance in a Poisson model) are studied. The moment restrictions under test are embedded in an extension of the model so that the moment test is a score test of the hypothesis that a vector of added parameters is zero. Second-order asymptotic properties of the likelihood ratio version of this test are studied. Unlike the conventional test, the likelihood ratio version is Bartlett correctable. The correction depends on the curvature at the origin of the function used to incorporate the moment restriction in the extended model.

Why do IPO issuers grant overallotment options to underwriters?

Journal of Corporate Finance 2017 44, 34-47
In contrast to prior studies suggesting that overallotment option (OAO) provisions reflect underwriters' exploitation of IPO firms, we provide evidence that issuers benefit in several ways. We estimate that OAO provisions lead to lower total issue cost, less negative post-IPO performance, lower post-IPO volatility, and larger IPOs. OAO provisions are more likely for large firms undertaking relatively large IPOs, especially where a large portion of the shares are offered by selling shareholders. Our evidence also indicates that managers and other insiders may benefit if their shareholdings would be locked up unless the OAO call option feature was exercised.

An Exogeneity Test for a Simultaneous Equation Tobit Model with an Application to Labor Supply

Econometrica 1986 54(3), 679
A test of weak exogeneity in the simultaneous equation Tobit model is proposed and illustrated using a female labour supply model estimated using cross-section data. The test statistic can be simply output from any standard Tobit maximum likelihood package, and is asymptotically efficient. The procedure provides consistent estimators for the simultaneous Tobit model whose asymptotic covariance matrix is a simple extension of the usual Tobit formula. We also provide the Lagrange Multiplier test of weak exogeneity. (This abstract was borrowed from another version of this item.)