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Insider pledging in the U.S.

Journal of Financial Stability 2021 53, 100830
Utilizing a hand-collected comprehensive dataset covering U.S. public traded firms from 2006 to 2014, we present descriptive evidence regarding insider pledging behavior in the U.S. and study its determinants. We find an insider’s propensity to pledge company stock is positively associated with her risk exposure and pledgeability of company stock, and negatively with the company’s corporate governance quality. These findings suggest that risk-averse corporate insiders pledge to hedge. Further, we find ISS’s denouncement of pledging in 2012 reduces insider pledging.

Debt maturity dispersion and the cost of bank loans

Journal of Corporate Finance 2021 70, 102049
This paper examines the relation between corporate debt maturity dispersion and the pricing and terms of bank loans. Analyzing a sample of U.S. bank loans from 2002 to 2016, we find that firms with a dispersed debt maturity structure pay a lower interest rate. The rate-reduction effect is significant only for firms without a credit rating. For these firms, spreading debt maturity dates also results in lower commitment fees, fewer covenant restrictions, and less collateral in their loan contracts. The impact of debt maturity dispersion on the pricing and structure of bank loans is stronger when borrowers have higher rollover risk or when the need for monitoring is greater. Our results suggest that dispersion in debt maturity structure mitigates the agency problem associated with shareholder–creditor conflicts by reducing rollover risk and alleviating the need for monitoring, which results in borrowers receiving more favorable terms in loan contracts.

Financial development and wage income: Evidence from the global football market

Journal of Banking & Finance 2023 149, 106813
This study examines the empirical relation between football players’ wage income and financial development at the individual level. Using a large panel dataset of 237,631 football players from 153 countries from 2010 to 2020 and the International Monetary Fund's Financial Development Indices, we show that financial development significantly raises players’ wages. Players’ wages increase by 25.77% as the Financial Development Index rises by one standard deviation. Our main findings are robust to using subindices of financial development and instrumental variable regressions. We further point out that football players of low capability, with low wages, and who play for low-reputation clubs benefit more from financial development.

Dissecting bankruptcy frictions

Journal of Financial Economics 2021 142(3), 975-1000
How efficient is corporate bankruptcy in the United States? Two frictions, asymmetric information and conflicts of interest among creditors, can cause several inefficiencies: excess liquidation, excess continuation, and excess delay. We find large bankruptcy inefficiencies, mainly due to excess delay. Eliminating information asymmetries would increase average total payouts by 4%, and eliminating conflicts of interest would increase them by 18% more. Without these frictions, 14% more cases would be resolved pre-court, and court cases would be 73% shorter. With less delay, bankruptcy’s indirect costs would be much lower. In contrast, inefficiencies from excess liquidation and excess continuation are quite small.

Industry characteristics and financial risk contagion

Journal of Banking & Finance 2015 50, 411-427
This article proposes a new measure of tail risk spillover: the conditional coexceedance (CCX), defined as the number of joint occurrences of extreme negative returns in an industry, conditional on an extreme negative return in the financial sector. The empirical application provides evidence of significant volatility and tail risk spillovers from the financial sector to many real sectors in the U.S. economy from 2001 to 2011. These spillovers increase in crisis periods. The CCX in a given sector is positively related to its amount of debt financing and negatively related to its valuation and investment. Therefore, real economy sectors—which require relatively high debt financing and whose value and investment activity are relatively lower—are prime candidates for stock price volatility and depreciation in the wake of a financial sector crisis. Evidence also suggests that the higher the industry’s degree of competition, the stronger the tail risk spillover from the financial sector.

Hedge Funds and Chapter 11

Journal of Finance 2012 67(2), 513-560
This paper studies the presence of hedge funds in the Chapter 11 process and their effects on bankruptcy outcomes. Hedge funds strategically choose positions in the capital structure where their actions could have a bigger impact on value. Their presence, especially as unsecured creditors, helps balance power between the debtor and secured creditors. Their effect on the debtor manifests in higher probabilities of the latter's loss of exclusive rights to file reorganization plans, CEO turnover, and adoptions of key employee retention plan, while their effect on secured creditors manifests in higher probabilities of emergence and payoffs to junior claims.

Debt maturity and the cost of bank loans

Journal of Banking & Finance 2020 112, 105235
This study explores the extent to which a firm's debt maturity structure affects the cost of bank loans. By examining the U.S. syndicated loans from 1990 and 2014, we find that debt maturity structure is a major determinant of loan spreads, after accounting for firm- and loan-specific variables and firm and year fixed effects. A one standard deviation increase in the ratio of short-term debt to total assets is associated with an increase of 11.44 basis points in loan spread, representing an additional $0.644 million in interest expenses. The results support the rollover risk hypothesis, which predicts that short-term debts intensify the shareholder and bondholder conflicts and lead to greater credit risk. In addition, high-growth firms experience significantly smaller increases in their loan spreads than low-growth firms when the short-term debt ratio increases. This finding is consistent with the asset substitution theory that short-term debt mitigates the managerial/shareholders’ risk-taking incentives, leading to a decrease in firm risk. Our results remain strong when we use alternative short-term debt proxies, address endogeneity concerns, and perform various robustness tests.