Knowledge that Transforms

I. Earlier studies, 399. — Criticisms of these studies, 401. — Methods of meeting them, 402. — II. Assumptions underlying cross-section studies, 403. — The materials studied, 403. — III. The classical method, 406. — Frisch's method, 408. — Koopmans' method, 411. — IV. Values obtained for k and j, 414. — V. Analysis of averages per plant, 416. — VI. Probable flexibility and elasticity of the marginal productivity functions, 418. — VII. Analysis of labor's share, 419.

I. The problem, 455. — II. Sample and data: 149 out of 200 largest (1929) non-financial firms for which data are available, 457; basis for selecting executives for study, 457; sources and quality of data, 458. — III. Stockholdings: value and dividends, 460. — IV. Executive compensation, 465. — V. The various incentives compared, 466. — VI. Summary and conclusion, 470.

Purpose of the article, 130. — I. Dunlop's analysis of English data, 130. — Criticisms: movements of real wage rates in periods of rising money wages not very different from those in other periods, 132; rise in real wage rates due in some instances to a fall in the cost of living, 132. — Tarshis' analysis of data for the United States, 135. — His use of coefficient of association open to question, 135. — Other objections, 135. — Richardson's analysis of the English data involves analogous difficulties, 136. — II. Re-analysis of the English data, 137; of the American data, 143. — III. The concept of real wage rates used in these studies is of doubtful validity, 146. — Money wages and welfare, 148. — Conclusions, 149.

Scope and method, 1. — Two special cases: (1) spatial competition in one dimension, 2; entry into the market, 8; (2) brand and specification competition in one dimension, 12; entry into the market, 15. — Comparison between these two types of competition, 17. — Quality competition in four dimensions, 18. — The species market and the genus market, 18. — Comparison with Chamberlin's treatment, 19. — Entry into a genus market, 20. — Absorption of delivery charges, 22. — The difference between plant and enterprise, 24. — Price differentials and product diversification, 24. — The scale of output, 28. — The perfect competitive market: three assumptions of monopolistic competition, 28. — Conditions needed in order to establish a perfect competitive market, 30. — Perfect competition contrasted with monopolistic competition, 32. — Implications of the theory of monopolistic competition which remain to be explored, 34.

Chapter II: The Past and Future of Exchange Control Get access The Quarterly Journal of Economics, Volume 54, Issue 4_Part_2, August 1940, Pages 159–217, https://doi.org/10.2307/1882620 Published: 01 August 1940

“A new and penetrating light descends on the spectacle…” (The Dynasts)

I. Necessity of reexamining the received body of economic thought, 201. — II. Historical illustrations of the principle of relativity, 203.— III. Characteristics of an adequate theory, 206.— IV. Meaning of "interdependence, " 207.— The sociology of knowledge, 208.— V. Group problems overshadowed by the main problem of the dominant group, 208.— VI. A theory of value of a dominant group tends to become static, 210.— VII. The concrete purpose in formulating a theory of value, 212.— Approximation, 214.— VIII. The larger processes or fields of relevanee, 214.— IX. Conclusion, 216.

Revival of interest in the question of long-run investment opportunity, 64. — Doubts concerning population growth as an "offsetting factor, " 65. — Ways in which it might influence investment opportunity: (1) the propensity to consume, 66; (2) the composition of aggregate consumer demand, 66; (3) the supply of labor, 70; influence of competitive conditions, 72; effect of wage reductions, 73; the expanding economy, 74; labor supply a limiting rather than an initiating factor, 75; (4) broader phenomena affecting investment, 77.

I. Practice of discriminating monopolists often under conditions at variance with the common theoretical assumptions, 490. — II. The theoretical problem of unlimited and limited discrimination in its simplest form, 491. — III. Limiting conditions, 491. — IV. Fixed price difference, 492. — V. Varying price difference, 493. — VI. Adjusting the price difference to maximize profit, 495. — VII. Increase or decrease of prescribed price difference might increase profits, 496. — VIII. Comparison of discriminating monopoly and monopoly without discrimination, 496. — IX. The necessary restrictive assumptions, 497. — X. Illustration of proposition II, 499. — XI. Conclusion, 500.

Nature of the problem, 116. — The fiscal and institutional limits: avoidance of price inflation, 117; statutory provisions, 118. — The immediate real burden, 119. — The financial burden, 119. — Tax friction, 120. — Government spending and the growth of national money income, 121. — The case where government spending and deficit financing merely offset hoarding: "dead weight" spending, 123; spending for public works, 126. — Increasing difficulty in making the necessary injection, 128. — Conclusions, 129.