This paper investigates empirically how the value of publicly traded firms is affected by arrangements that protect management from removal. Staggered boards, which a majority of U.S. public companies have, substantially insulate boards from removal in either a hostile takeover or a proxy contest. We find that staggered boards are associated with an economically meaningful reduction in firm value (as measured by Tobin's Q). We also provide suggestive evidence that staggered boards bring about, and not merely reflect, a reduced firm value. Finally, we show that the correlation with reduced firm value is stronger for staggered boards that are established in the corporate charter (which shareholders cannot amend) than for staggered boards established in the company's bylaws (which shareholders can amend).

Research joint ventures (RJV's) between private firms and government bureaus play a central position in the Clinton Administration's R&D strategy to promote productivity and of American firms. The government's role in the programs varies from subsidizing private projects to providing the expertise and facilities of the federal research laboratories. A substantial literature now exists that investigates the economic efficiency of private RJV's. The purpose of this paper is to expand the debate to consider the conditions under which the government will choose to subsidize RJV's and whether these conditions are likely to yield desirable economic results. It is useful to characterize the government as a consortium member who differs from the private venturers in several critical ways. First, these programs are based on the presumption that private firms are far better than government at choosing projects with commercial merit. Even in those programs where the government contributes scientists and facilities, industry partners usually have primary responsibility for initiating projects. Second, the objective function of the government differs from industry members. Indeed, it is in part because government actors have goals other than competitiveness that these programs are intended to keep government bureaucrats at arm's length from technical choices. Finally, the financial contribution of the government is usually a set share of the total bill. Introducing this form of subsidy changes the research investment strategies employed by a joint venture, and the incentives facing firms either to participate in a consortium or to oppose its establishment. The basic premise of this analysis is that a subsidized joint venture will persist only when all members, including the government, are satisfied. A viable policy depends on economic consequences to member firms, and to the extent that they have access to policy-making, to nonmember firms and consumers. Furthermore, some of the relevant consequences follow predictably from market and technology characteristics.

This paper analyzes the workings and potentials of French planning as a prototype model of modern capitalist planning. Its principal concern is methodological. How can we analyze, categorize, compare, and criticize planning processes? The French planning process is not a streamlined design of smoothly fitting parts. Its formal structure tells little about its functional structure. Its explicit targets do not define its operational role. The plan is a collection of activities which have never been integrated into a single, coherent process. That is perhaps why there has been so much confusion about the way it operates; it operates in several ways at once. The French plan has two principal components. Each is a complex system possessing a powerful logic of its own. Each is based on a different planning model and each model implies a radically different conception of the political function of planning. Each pulls the plan in a different direction. The first component is a complex institution of daily, pragmatic state intervention in the activities of the major industries. The second is a formally coherent set of output targets-the general resource allocation plan.

The dividend decision is a residual corporate decision and yet it is not a residual corporate decision. This theme runs through Professor Higgins' paper. It is based on the one hand on Higgins' belief that other decisions are more important and should take precedence over the dividend decision, and on the other, that the dividend decision is a function of these more important decisions. If dividends were truly residual, they would be explained by the corporate budget identity. In the empirical analysis, however, dividends are a function of other balance sheet decisions. In this sense the decision is neither active nor residual but passive. The reader wonders why the author insists on this role for dividends when interdependency in decision making is the more appealing (and inevitable) framework.

The pros and cons of bank mergers and multiple-office banking are in the forefront of bank policy consideration today [8, p. 19] Commercial banks have Joined the industrial and merchandising files., as well as the transportation companies, to sweil a rising tide of merger; The Comptroller of the Currency has reported that nearly 2, 000 banks with resources of over $40 billion, were acquired by other banks between 1950 and 1962, inclusive, [47, p. ll].

The boom stock market is a well known phenomenon of our time. The investor (and public) interest in the market, however, does not seem to be shared by the monetary policy makers. Certainly, if we use the 1920's as the benchmark, the Federal Reserveexhibits considerably less anxiety over the present boom market than it did then.

Kalman J. Cohen, Risk Aversion and Information Structure: An Experimental Study of Price Variability in the Securities Markets: Discussion, The Journal of Finance, Vol. 40, No. 3, Papers and Proceedings of the Forty-Third Annual Meeting American Finance Association, Dallas, Texas, December 28-30, 1984 (Jul., 1985), pp. 845-846