This paper presents estimates of the concentration of personal wealth in the United States from 1922 to 1969. These estimates lead us to conclude that the distribution of wealth (1) became significantly more equal in the 1930's and early 1940's, two periods of massive government intervention in the marketplace, and (2) has remained essentially unchanged since 1945.1 In what follows, we compare the wealth held by the richest 1.0 and 0.5 percent of the population to that of all persons. The wealth of the richest 1.0 and 0.5 percent was estimated by the estate multiplier technique.2 The wealth of all persons was derived from national balance sheets.3 The estimates presented here for the period before 1953 were developed by Robert J. Lampman using highly aggregated Internal Revenue Service (IRS) data. For 1953 and 1958 we use detailed estimates (from special IRS tabulations) by Lampman and Smith, modified slightly to take account of current knowledge. Estimates for 1962, 1965, and 1969 are new detailed estimates developed by the authors using microdata files of estate tax returns prepared by the IRS for its routine publications. Here we focus on the years since 1953. Information available from estate tax returns varies from year to year, so a number of adjustments were made to bring the estimates for individual years into conceptual alignment with one another. The alignment problem was exacerbated because the IRS has destroyed tapes of returns filed before 1963, leaving only Lampman's and Smith's printed tabulations for 1953 and 1958.4 It was impractical to reestimate the distributions for 1953 and 1958 by better methods based on current knowledge. Consequently, the estimates for 1962, 1965, and 1969 were made consistent with those for 1953 and 1958 * The Urban Institute and the Pennsylvania State University. The work reported here is part of the Urban Institute's research program on income and wealth distribution. The support of the National Science Foundation is gratefully acknowledged. 1 We wish to make clear that our concern is with temporal change and that we have sacrificed best estimates for individual years to achieve consistency over the time series. Individual figures have a downward bias of 10 to 15 percent from our best estimates of concentration. (Best estimates for 1969 may be found in Smith; similar estimates for other years will appear later.) 2 Detailed descriptions of the methodology and attendant problems can be found in Smith and Staunton Calvert, Robert J. Lampman, and Smith. I National balance sheets were constructed for a person's sector using data supplied by the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System. Helen Stone Tice did the basic work on these special sector balance sheets. Smith provides a detailed description of the balance sheet. I A further problem resulted from the fact that the IRS erased the age field from the 1965 tape. This was most unfortunate because of all years for which the IRS has coded estate tax returns, 1965 had the most detailed classification of information. The erased data was restored by a stochastic process which took into account the relationship between age and other characteristics observable in the files for 1962 and 1969.

In this study we examine whether managers’ affective reactions influence their risk–taking tendencies in capital budgeting decisions. Prior research on risky decision making indicates that decision makers are often risk averse when choosing among alternatives that yield potential gains, and risk taking when the alternatives yield losses. The results reported here indicate that negative or positive affective reactions can change this commonly found risky behavior. Managers were generally risk avoiding (taking) for gains (losses) in the absence of affective reactions, as predicted by prospect theory. However, when affect was present, they tended to reject investment alternatives that elicited negative affect and accept alternatives that elicited positive affect, resulting in risk taking (avoiding) in gain (loss) contexts. The results also indicate that affective reactions can influence managers to choose alternatives with lower economic value, suggesting that managers consider both financial data and affective reactions when evaluating the utility of a decision alternative. These findings point to the importance of considering affective reactions when attempting to understand and predict risky decision making in accounting contexts.

While human capital has been used with some success to analyze recent changes in racial income differences, scholars have repeatedly pointed to a major empirical problem that appears to severely limit the historical relevanlce and scope of skill-based theories as applied to racial questions. The challenge they raise is legitimate. Put simply, if measured skill disparities between the races narrowed throughout the twentieth century, why did income ratios first begin to converge in the 1960's? In this paper, I address this question relying on some unexploited census data by race on education, literacy, occupations, and income. Using these data that begin with the 1890 Census, I present new estimates of agespecific relative income positions of black men for all postslavery birth cohorts. In addition to reconciling the apparently inconsistent skill and income series, these income ratios offer a very different historical record than many economists believe to have been the case. To cite a prominent example, Gunnar Myrdal's classic work (1944) saw the economic position of his contemporary black America not only as dismal, but made even more so by its sense of hopelessness, given the absence of any hint of progress or change. While Myrdal's pessimism is understandable, it appears that even in his day seeds had long been sown that were already permanently altering and improving the relative economic status of black men.

This paper extends financial option theory by developing a methodology for the valuation of claims on a real asset: an offshore petroleum lease. Several theoretical and practical problems, not present in applying option pricing theory to financial assets, are addressed. Most importantly, we show the necessity of combining option pricing techniques with a model of equilibrium in the market for the underlying asset (petroleum reserves). The advantages of this approach over conventional discounted cash flow techniques are emphasized. The methodological development provides important insights for both company behavior and government policy. Promising empirical results are reported.