ABSTRACT We argue that arbitrage‐pricing theories (APT) imply the existence of a low‐dimensional nonnegative nonlinear pricing kernel. In contrast to standard constructs of the APT, we do not assume a linear factor structure on the payoffs. This allows us to price both primitive and derivative securities. Semi‐nonparametric techniques are used to estimate the pricing kernel and test the theory. Empirical results using size‐based portfolio returns and yields on bonds reject the nested capital asset‐pricing model and linear APT and support the nonlinear APT. Diagnostics show that the nonlinear model is more capable of explaining variations in small firm returns.

ABSTRACT Financial firms raise short‐term debt to finance asset purchases; this induces risk shifting when economic conditions worsen and limits their ability to roll over debt. Constrained firms de‐lever by selling assets to lower‐leverage firms. In turn, asset–market liquidity depends on the system‐wide distribution of leverage, which is itself endogenous to future economic prospects. Good economic prospects yield cheaper short‐term debt, inducing entry of higher‐leverage firms. Consequently, adverse asset shocks in good times lead to greater de‐leveraging and sudden drying up of market and funding liquidity.

In dealership markets disclosure of size and price of details of public trades is typically incomplete. We examine whether full and prompt disclosure of public-trade details improves the welfare of a risk-averse investor. We analyze a model of dealership market where a market maker first executes a public trade and then offsets her position by trading with other market makers. We distinguish between quantity risk and price revision risk. We show that if the market maker learns some information about the motive behind public trade, neither regime is unambiguously welfare superior. This is because greater transparency improves quantity risk sharing but worsens price revision risk sharing.

ABSTRACT Consistent with recent theoretical models where binding capital constraints lead to sudden liquidity dry‐ups, we find that negative market returns decrease stock liquidity, especially during times of tightness in the funding market. The asymmetric effect of changes in aggregate asset values on liquidity and commonality in liquidity cannot be fully explained by changes in demand for liquidity or volatility effects. We document interindustry spillover effects in liquidity, which are likely to arise from capital constraints in the market making sector. We also find economically significant returns to supplying liquidity following periods of large drops in market valuations.

ABSTRACT We study risk management in financial institutions using data on hedging of interest rate and foreign exchange risk. We find strong evidence that institutions with higher net worth hedge more, controlling for risk exposures, across institutions and within institutions over time. For identification, we exploit net worth shocks resulting from loan losses due to declines in house prices. Institutions that sustain such shocks reduce hedging significantly relative to otherwise‐similar institutions. The reduction in hedging is differentially larger among institutions with high real estate exposure. The evidence is consistent with the theory that financial constraints impede both financing and hedging.

The practices of preferencing and internalization have been alleged to support collusion, cause worse execution, and lead to wider spreads in dealership style markets relative to auction style markets. For a sample of London Stock Exchange stocks, we find that preferenced trades pay higher spreads, however they do not generate higher dealer profits. Internalized trades pay lower, not higher, spreads. We do not find a relation between the extent of preferencing or internalization and spreads across stocks. These results do not lend support to the “collusion” hypothesis but are consistent with a “costly search and trading relationships” hypothesis.

Using London Stock Exchange data, we test the central implication of the canonical model of Ho and Stoll (1983) that relative inventory differences determine dealer behavior. We find that relative inventories explain which dealers obtain large trades and show that movements between best ask, best bid, and straddle are highly correlated with both standardized and relative inventory changes. We show that the mean reversion in inventories is highly nonlinear and increasing in inventory levels. We show that a key determinant of variations in interdealer trading is inventories and that interdealer trading plays an important role in managing large inventory positions.

ABSTRACT This paper uses a nonlinear arbitrage‐pricing model, a conditional linear model, and an unconditional linear model to price international equities, bonds, and forward currency contracts. Unlike linear models, the nonlinear arbitrage‐pricing model requires no restrictions on the payoff space, allowing it to price payoffs of options, forward contracts, and other derivative securities. Only the nonlinear arbitrage‐pricing model does an adequate job of explaining the time series behavior of a cross section of international returns.