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Persistence of Power, Elites, and Institutions

American Economic Review 2008 98(1), 267-293
We construct a model to study the implications of changes in political institutions for economic institutions. A change in political institutions alters the distribution of de jure political power, but creates incentives for investments in de facto political power to partially or even fully offset change in de jure power. The model can imply a pattern of captured democracy, whereby a democratic regime may survive but choose economic institutions favoring an elite. The model provides conditions under which economic or policy outcomes will be invariant to changes in political institutions, and economic institutions themselves will persist over time. (JEL D02, D72) The domination of an organized minority … over the unorganized majority is inevitable. The power of any minority is irresistible as against each single individual in the majority, who stands alone before the totality of the organized minority. At the same time, the minority is organized for the very reason that it is a minority. —Gaetano Mosca (1939, 53).

De Facto Political Power and Institutional Persistence

American Economic Review 2006 96(2), 325-330
Much of the empirical work and the conceptual discussion of the impact of institutions on economic development either implicitly or explicitly assumes that institutions persist. Although Acemoglu et al. (2001) provide evidence that constraints on the executive persist, many aspects of institutions change frequently. Less-developed countries cycle between democracy and dictatorship and often change their constitutions. Relatedly, while the current economic problems in Latin America are often traced back to colonial times (Stanley L. Engerman and Kenneth L. Sokoloff, 1997; Acemoglu et al., 2002), the specific institutions that once underpinned the colonial economy, such as the encomienda, the mita, or slavery, vanished long ago. These observations suggest that we need to develop a framework in which changes in certain dimensions of institutions are consistent with overall institutional persistence. In this paper, we make an attempt to highlight some important mechanisms for understanding simultaneous change and persistence in institutions. Institutional persistence, in this context, refers to the persistence of a cluster of economic institutions, such as the extent of enforcement of property rights for a broad cross section of society (Acemoglu et al., 2001). Such lack of property rights enforcement may be driven by quite different specific institutions, e.g., risk of expropriation, entry barriers, or economic systems such as serfdom or slavery. In turn, these different specific economic institutions may exist under different political institutions, including dictatorships, absolutist monarchies, oligarchies, and corrupt or even populist democracies. Given this rich array of possibilities, a useful framework must specify which aspects of institutions can change, which others have a tendency to persist in equilibrium, and how the persistence of certain types of institutions could have lasting effects on economic outcomes. In this paper, we provide a simple model of the coexistence of change and persistence in institutions. First we describe some existing approaches to the persistence of social arrangements, as well as the essence of the mechanism we propose. Next, we illustrate the key issues using the experience of the southern United States, and last we provide a simple model that formalizes the main mechanism in the paper. We conclude by discussing a complementary mechanism to the one presented in this paper.

A Theory of Political Transitions

American Economic Review 2001 91(4), 938-963
We develop a theory of political transitions inspired by the experiences of Western Europe and Latin America. Nondemocratic societies are controlled by a rich elite. The initially disenfranchised poor can contest power by threatening revolution, especially when the opportunity cost is low, for example, during recessions. The threat of revolution may force the elite to democratize. Democracy may not consolidate because it is redistributive, and so gives the elite an incentive to mount a coup. Highly unequal societies are less likely to consolidate democracy, and may end up oscillating between regimes and suffer substantial fiscal volatility.

Political Losers as a Barrier to Economic Development

American Economic Review 2000 90(2), 126-130
Per-capita income in many sub-Saharan African countries, such as Chad and Niger, is less than 1/30th of that of the United States. Most economists and social scientists suspect that this is in part due to institutional failures that stop these societies from adopting the best technologies. A particularly interesting historical example comes from the di®usion of railways in the nineteenth century. While railways are regarded as a key technology driving the industrial revolution, there were large lags in its di®usion. For example, in 1850 the United States had 14,518km of track, Britain 9,797km and Germany 5,856km, in the Russian and Hapsburgh Empires there were just 501km and 1,357km, respectively (all data from Mitchell, 1993). Why do societies, as in this example, fail to adopt the best available technologies? One answer is that existing powerful `interest groups ' block the introduction of new technologies in order to protect their economic rents, and societies are able to make technological advances only if they can defeat such groups. Economic monopolies may be one example. A monopolist might wish to block the intro-

The Structure of Wages and Investment in General Training

Journal of Political Economy 1999 107(3), 539-572
In the human capital model with perfect labor markets, firms never invest in general skills and all cost of general training are borne by workers. When lobor market frictions compress the structure of wages, firms may pay for these investments. The distortion in the wage structure turns "technologically" general skills into de facto "specific " skills. Credit market imperfections are neither neccessary nor sufficient for firm‐sponsored training. Since labor market frictions and insititutions shape the wage structure, they may have an important impact on the financing and amount of human capital investments and account for some international differences in training practices.

Determinants of Vertical Integration: Financial Development and Contracting Costs

Journal of Finance 2009 64(3), 1251-1290
We study the determinants of vertical integration in a new data set of over 750,000 firms from 93 countries. We present a number of theoretical predictions on the interactions between financial development, contracting costs, and the extent of vertical integration. Consistent with these predictions, contracting costs and financial development by themselves appear to have no effect on vertical integration. However, we find greater vertical integration in countries that have both greater contracting costs and greater financial development. We also show that countries with greater contracting costs are more vertically integrated in more capital‐intensive industries.

Equalizing Superstars: The Internet and the Democratization of Education

American Economic Review 2014 104(5), 523-527
Internet-based educational resources are proliferating rapidly. One concern associated with these (potentially transformative) technological changes is that they will be disequalizing—as many technologies of the last several decades have been—creating superstar teachers and a winner-take-all education system. These important concerns notwithstanding, we contend that a major impact of web-based educational technologies will be the democratization of education: educational resources will be more equally distributed, and lower-skilled teachers will benefit. At the root of our results is the observation that skilled lecturers can only exploit their comparative advantage if other teachers complement those lectures with face-to-face instruction. This complementarity will increase the quantity and quality of face-to-face teaching services, potentially increasing the marginal product and wages of lower-skill teachers.

A Model of Online Misinformation

Review of Economic Studies 2024 91(6), 3117-3150
We present a model of online content sharing where agents sequentially observe an article and decide whether to share it with others. This content may or may not contain misinformation. Each agent starts with an ideological bias and gains utility from positive social media interactions but does not want to be called out for propagating misinformation. We characterize the (Bayesian–Nash) equilibria of this social media game and establish that it exhibits strategic complementarities. Under this framework, we study how a platform interested in maximizing engagement would design its algorithm. Our main result establishes that when the relevant articles have low-reliability and are thus likely to contain misinformation, the engagement-maximizing algorithm takes the form of a “filter bubble”—creating an echo chamber of like-minded users. Moreover, filter bubbles become more likely when there is greater polarization in society and content is more divisive. Finally, we discuss various regulatory solutions to such platform-manufactured misinformation.

Population and Conflict

Review of Economic Studies 2020 87(4), 1565-1604
Medical innovations during the 1940s quickly resulted in significant health improvements around the world. Countries with initially higher mortality from infectious diseases experienced larger increases in life expectancy, population, and subsequent social conflict. This cross-country result is robust across alternative measures of conflict and is not driven by differential trends between countries with varying baseline characteristics. A similar effect is also present within Mexico. Initial suitability conditions for malaria varied across municipalities, and anti-malaria campaigns had differential effects on population growth and social conflict. Both across countries and within Mexico, increased conflict over scarce resources predominates and this effect is more pronounced during times of economic hardship (specifically, in countries with a poor growth record and in drought-stricken areas in Mexico). At least during this time period, a larger increase in population made social conflict more likely.