We investigate the impact of directors' and officers' insurance (D&O insurance) on stock price crash risk. We find that D&O insurance in China is negatively associated with stock price crash risk. This association is robust to a series of robustness checks including the use of alternative sample, Heckman two-step sample selection model, propensity score matching procedure, fixed effects model, the inclusion of some possibly omitted variables, and bootstrap method. Further analyses show that the impact of D&O insurance on crash risk is more pronounced in firms with lower board independence, non-Big 4 auditors, lower institutional shareholdings, and weaker investor protection; and the negative relationship between D&O insurance and crash risk is not driven by the eyeball effect. Moreover, we find that D&O insurance purchase is associated with less financial restatements and more disclosure of corporate social responsibility reports. Our findings provide support to the notion that D&O insurance appears to improve corporate governance.

Recent evidence shows that option volatility skews and volatility spreads between call and put options predict equity returns. This study investigates whether such predictive ability is driven by option traders’ information advantage. We examine the predictive ability of volatility skews and volatility spreads around significant information events including earnings announcements, other firm‐specific information events, and events that trigger significant market reactions. Consistent with option traders having an information advantage relative to equity traders before information events, we find that the option measures immediately before these events have higher predictive ability for short‐term event returns than they do in a more dated window or before a randomly selected pseudo‐event. We also find that option measures have predictive ability after information events. However, this predictive ability holds only for unscheduled corporate announcements, which suggests that, relative to equity traders, option traders have superior ability to process less anticipated information.

Capital controls segment the offshore credit market of Chinese renminbi from the onshore market. Using a novel administrative data set, we provide evidence that firms arbitrage the onshore-offshore interest differentials using bank-intermediated “entrepôt trades,” which supposedly re-export imports with little or no processing. Onshore-offshore interest differentials drive renminbi inflows from entrepôt trades, which strongly predict 1-year-forward outflows to settle bank-issued letters of credit. The patterns and timing of entrepôt trade flows are consistent with lending by onshore banks and borrowing from offshore banks through bank-intermediated trade finance. A larger interest differential allows transactions with a lower value to be profitable and induces entry into arbitrages. Our findings suggest that renminbi interest arbitrages are feasible but costly under capital controls.

Practical real-world activities consume energy and emit thermal infrared radiation (TIR). Leveraging this physical fact, we develop a direct, real-time measure of firms’ operating activity using satellite data. Tracking 28,236 factories of Chinese listed firms, we find TIR declines significantly following operational shocks and strongly forecasts subsequent sales growth, costs, investment, employment, and profits. TIR also predicts future stock returns, especially among opaque firms and those with limited investor access, yet sophisticated investors largely ignore this information. Our findings highlight TIR as a distinctive, under-exploited indicator of corporate fundamentals.

We study a model in which a capital provider learns from the price of a firm's security in deciding how much capital to provide for new investment. This feedback effect from the financial market to the investment decision gives rise to trading frenzies, in which speculators all wish to trade like others, generating large pressure on prices. Coordination among speculators is sometimes desirable for price informativeness and investment efficiency, but speculators' incentives push in the opposite direction, so that they coordinate exactly when it is undesirable. We analyze the effect of various market parameters on the likelihood of trading frenzies to arise.

We show that managers increase the volume of public financial guidance in response to decreases in analyst coverage of their firms, particularly to decreases that are driven by exogenous reduction in brokerage firm size. Managers do not respond to increases in analyst coverage. The managerial guidance response to decreases in coverage reflects the trade-off between the marginal benefits from analyst coverage and the marginal costs of providing guidance. Specifically, the response is concentrated within firms engaging in equity issuance activities, firms with low stock liquidity, and firms with low current guidance levels. The response is also concentrated within firms whose remaining analyst pool is smaller in number and/or has a lower percentage of analysts who are positive about the firm or who belong to a large brokerage house. Overall, our results shed insights on the interaction between managers and analysts and on how the value of analysts, as perceived by managers, varies in the cross-section with underlying firm and analyst characteristics. Data Availability: All data used in this study are publicly available from sources identified in the text.

The beta anomaly, negative (positive) alpha on stocks with high (low) beta, arises from beta’s positive correlation with idiosyncratic volatility (IVOL). The relation between IVOL and alpha is positive among underpriced stocks but negative and stronger among overpriced stocks (Stambaugh, Yu, and Yuan, 2015). That stronger negative relation combines with the positive IVOL-beta correlation to produce the beta anomaly. The anomaly is significant only within overpriced stocks and only in periods when the beta-IVOL correlation and the likelihood of overpricing are simultaneously high. Either controlling for IVOL or simply excluding overpriced stocks with high IVOL renders the beta anomaly insignificant.