Knowledge that Transforms

We examine whether the largest place‐based, firm‐specific corporate subsidies (“Megadeals”) awarded by state and local governments affect local firms’ innovation. First, we document that (1) subsidy firms innovate in the subsidized county and (2) subsidy firms bring inventors from other counties into the subsidized county, consistent with subsidy firms generating new knowledge locally. In our main test, we use a stacked cohort design with stringent fixed effects to document that local firms increase patenting following a Megadeal. Cross‐sectionally, effects are increasing (1) in subsidy firm innovativeness, (2) in the technological closeness of subsidy firms and local firms, (3) when subsidy and local firms share an industry, and (4) when the subsidized location has a heavy college presence. Additionally, we document that following a Megadeal, local firms increasingly make citations to subsidy firm patents and that the patent similarity of local and subsidy firms increases. We document that subsidy firm inventors are more likely to move to local firms following a Megadeal. We also find that subsidies for labs, headquarters, and high‐tech manufacturing plants drive our main results. These results are consistent with knowledge spillovers being one channel through which we observe an increase in local firm patenting following Megadeals.

In July 2013, Moody’s unexpectedly increased the amount of equity credit speculative-grade firms receive for preferred stock from 50% to 100%. Firms affected by the rule change were suddenly considered less levered by Moody’s, even though their balance sheets did not change. These firms responded by issuing debt to restore the original leverage ratio as defined by Moody’s and growing their assets. The rule change transferred value from debt to equity holders and led to an increase in preferred stock issuance. How rating agencies assess risk thus has a significant causal impact on firms’ financing, investment, and security design decisions.

Motivated by a secular increase in the concentration of the U.S. banking industry, I develop a new macroeconomic model with oligopolistic financial intermediaries and heterogeneous firms. Market power allows banks to price discriminate and charge firm-specific markups, exerting greater market power over productive and more financially constrained firms. This dampens capital accumulation and amplifies the effects of macroeconomic shocks. During a crisis, banks exploit the higher share of financially constrained firms to extract higher markups, inducing a larger decline in real activity. When a large bank fails, the remaining banks use their increased market power to restrict credit supply, worsening and prolonging the downturn.

We examine the impact of abortion restrictions on the geographic mobility of college‐educated skilled women. Exploiting the staggered adoption of Targeted Regulation of Abortion Providers (TRAP) laws across US states that restrict women's access to abortion, we find that skilled women who relocate exhibit a greater propensity to move to states without TRAP laws (non‐TRAP states) than they did prior to the TRAP law adoption. This pattern is stronger among women in more liberal and less religious areas than among women in more conservative and more religious areas. These findings are consistent with the view that relocation decisions are often driven by the alignment between personal values and the local policy environment. We use the audit industry as a specific setting to address the implications for employer performance. We find that TRAP law adoption increases female auditor turnover at local offices relative to same‐firm offices in non‐TRAP states, and the resulting loss of human capital lowers audit quality.

Why do fire sales occur if many risks are hedgeable? We study a version of Brunnermeier and Sannikov (2014, American Economic Review 104, 379–421) in which all fundamental risks can be hedged frictionlessly. Our analysis shows that fire sales are inherently self‐fulfilling. Fundamental shocks can never cause fire sales, and an efficient, safe equilibrium exists. On the other hand, there exists an equilibrium in which agents coordinate fire sales on nonfundamental shocks. A simple refinement based on vanishingly small perceived fundamental risk eliminates the safe equilibrium and selects the fire‐sale equilibrium as the unique outcome.

This paper constructs the first global dataset on inter-sectoral capital service expenditures. I use this data to disaggregate capital services and intermediate inputs in a dynamic multi-sector trade model. Steady state allocations and responses to shocks are determined by a capital-augmented global input-output matrix. Two properties of the measured network deliver larger long-run consumption gains from globalization than existing estimates, as well as larger gains in more capital-intensive countries. First, more trade-exposed sectors supply capital to more consumption-influential producers. Second, heterogeneity in the network reallocates sectoral expenditures towards producers with larger declines in capital rental prices. These reallocations raise capital incomes and lower consumption price indices.