Knowledge that Transforms

This article identifies a new type of cost associated with centralization. If workers are liquidity constrained, it may be less costly to motivate a worker who is allowed to work on his own idea than a worker who is forced to follow the manager’s idea. Thus, it may be optimal to let workers decide on the method for doing their job even if managers have better information. This conclusion holds even if more general contracts are considered that are based on communication of information between the worker and the manager, as long as these general contracts are not entirely costless.

This article investigates the relationship between employment and the use of marijuana and cocaine for males in National Longitudinal Survey of Youth data from 1984 and 1988. Previous studies yielding mixed evidence may have inadequately accounted for the simultaneity between drug consumption and employment. I implement an instrumental variable procedure that identifies drug use with variables that are empirically unrelated to employment, including the regional cocaine price and a state marijuana decriminalization indicator. Results indicate that the use of each drug substantially reduces the likelihood of employment. Exogeneity tests reveal that standard probit estimates are severely biased toward zero.

The gender wage gap in East Germany has narrowed by 10 percentage points in transition, but women have experienced much more severe employment difficulties than men. Using the German Socio‐Economic Panel for 1990–94, I show that on balance women have lost relative to men. Almost half the relative wage gain is due to exits from employment of the low skilled, who are disproportionately women. The female employment decline is not primarily voluntary: more than half the gender gap in the hazard rate from employment reflects a general fall in demand for low‐skilled workers. Reduced child care plays no role.

Breakthroughs with natural excludability are transferred to industry by top academic scientists (stars) working in or with firms. Movement to firms depends on scientists' quality, moving costs, and reservation wage. Scientists' quality, moving costs, trial frequency, interfering academic offers, and productivity of stars already in firms determine reservation wage. In group‐duration analysis for biotechnology, stars move to firms faster as their quality, human focus, and outside coauthorships increase; local firms and productivity of local stars in firms increase; and top local universities decrease. Stars move to firms full or part time similarly, but significance drops for rarer full‐time moves.

We examine how child maltreatment—including neglect, physical and sexual abuse, and other forms of maltreatment—is affected by parental economic circumstances. Using state‐level panel data on cases of maltreatment and numbers of children in foster care, we find that increases in the fractions of children with absent fathers and working mothers in a state are related to increases in many measures of maltreatment, as are increases in the share of families with two nonworking parents and those with incomes below 75% of the poverty line. Decreases in state welfare benefit levels are associated with increases in foster care placement.

We report a gift exchange experiment. Firms make wage offers; workers respond by determining an effort level. Higher effort is more costly to workers, and firms have no mechanism for punishing or rewarding workers. Consistent with the gift exchange hypothesis, workers provide more effort at higher wages, but undergraduates provide substantially less effort than MBAs. Evidence suggests this results from differences in prior work experience. Firms' nonbinding effort requests are at least partially honored, resulting in increased overall effort for undergraduates. Although higher wages are relatively more costly for lower productivity firms, workers do not provide them with more effort.

This article estimates a dynamic model of fertility and labor supply of married women drawn from the National Longitudinal Survey of Young Women, 1968–91. It distinguishes part‐time and full‐time employment sectors, which differ by pecuniary and nonpecuniary returns and transferability of human capital. The model with unobserved heterogeneity in earning ability and preferences for children fits the data and produces reasonable forecasts of labor force participation in decisions. The estimates unpack important features of the persistence in labor market decisions, intertemporal substitution of leisure over the life cycle, and the effect of work interruptions, due to childbirth, on lifetime utility.

For young male immigrants, naturalization facilitates assimilation into the U.S. labor market. Following naturalization, immigrants gain access to public‐sector, white‐collar, and union jobs, and wage growth accelerates—consistent with removal of employment barriers. The faster wage growth of immigrants who naturalize might alternatively result from greater human capital investment prior to naturalization, stemming from a long‐term commitment to U.S. labor markets, but there is no evidence that wage growth accelerates or the distribution of jobs improves until citizenship is attained. Finally, the gains from naturalization are greater for immigrants from less‐developed countries and persist when we control for unobserved productivity.

The 1986 Immigration Reform and Control Act (IRCA) granted amnesty to approximately 1.7 million long‐term unauthorized workers in an effort to bring them “out of the shadows” and improve their labor market opportunities. An analysis of wages using panel data for a sample of legalized men provides evidence that wage determinants are structurally different after amnesty for them but not for the comparison group as measured during the same time periods. The wage penalty for being unauthorized is estimated to range from 14% to 24%. The wage benefit of legalization under IRCA was approximately 6%.

This article examines the "added worker effect," which is the labor supply response of wives to their husbands' job losses. Unlike past studies, which focused on the husbands' current unemployment status, this article analyzes wives' responses before and after job losses to examine the life-cycle labor supply adjustments. Using Panel Study of Income Dynamics data reveals small predisplacement effects and large, persistent postdisplacement effects. The timing of the responses differs with type of displacement, possibly because of differences in the information acquired before job loss. Long-run labor supply increases compensate for over 25% of the husbands' lost income.