Knowledge that Transforms

Unemployment: Macroeconomic Performance and the Labour Market by Richard Layard, Stephen Nickell, and Richard Jackman (Oxford University Press 2005) is the second edition of a book first published in 1991. The second edition is identical to the first except for a long introduction, which reviews the conclusions of the first edition in the light of the following fifteen years. I basically agree with the authors that the book's framework and conclusions have withstood the test of time very well. I then assess progress since 1991 and point to a number of directions in which progress needs to be achieved.

Richard Posner's Catastrophe: Risk and Response (Oxford University Press, 2004) examines four risks whose worst cases could end advanced human civilization or worse: asteroid impacts, a catastrophic chain reaction initiated in high-energy particle accelerators, global climate change, and bioterrorism. He argues that these all warrant more thought and response than they are receiving, and that they can usefully be assessed using a simple analytic framework based on cost–benefit analysis. This essay reviews knowledge of these risks and critically examines Posner's claims for a consistent analytic approach. While the conclusions that each risk merits more thought and effort appear persuasive, these rely on ad hoc arguments specific to each risk. The general analytic claims do not hold up well, as Posner develops his proposed framework thinly and applies it unevenly. Applying such a framework consistently to catastrophic risks would require engaging some fundamental problems that Posner does not address. The book's major contributions are to identify and describe these risks, highlight the inadequate attention they are receiving, and advance a persuasive argument for their more serious examination.

In this review, the author reflects on the heated debates around views about Russia's postcommunist transition expressed in essays collected in new Andrei Shleifer's book, A Normal Country: Russia after Communism (Harvard University Press, 2005), which were initially published at different times during transition. She focuses on the three questions that have been in the center of the debate among academics and policymakers: What should the sequencing and the speed of reforms be? Should a country have political centralization for fiscal decentralization to be efficient? Is Russia normal? The author argues that Russia's most recent history provides convincing evidence in support of the logic of political and economic transformation as it was understood by Shleifer as early as the beginning of the 1990s.

Avner Greif's Institutions and the Path to the Modern Economy: Lessons from Medieval Trade (Cambridge University Press, 2006) is a major work in the ongoing project of many economists and economic historians to show that institutions are the fundamental driver of all economic history and of all contemporary differences in economic performance. This review outlines the contribution of this book to the project and the general status of this long standing ambition.

I wish to express my appreciation to thefollowingfor their comments and suggestions either in their capacity as the referees of this journal or otherwise: Anthony Atkinson, Zvi Griliches, Martin Bronfenbrenner, Rudolph Blitz, James Buchanan, Milton Friedman, James Meade, Jacob Mincer, Franco Modigliani, Naomi Perlman, John Rawls, Paul Schultz, Gerald Sazama, Joseph Stiglitz, Paul Taubman, Lester Thurow, and Charles Wilson. None of them, however, bears any responsibility for my errors and my appraisal of different theories. I dedicate this paper to the memory of Harry G. Johnson, my teacher, who died at the early age of 53 on 9 May 1977, a few months after we had exchanged correspondence on this survey and had plans for further discussion, especially on the development of his ideas about cultural inheritance. Alas, that was the end.

This essay reviews Lucian A. Bebchuk and Jesse M. Fried's Pay without Performance: The Unfulfilled Promise of Executive Compensation. Bebchuk and Fried criticize the standard view of executive compensation, in which executives negotiate contracts with shareholders that provide incentives that motivate them to maximize the shareholders' welfare. In contrast, Bebchuk and Fried argue that executive compensation is more consistent with executives who control their own boards and who maximize their own compensation subject to an “outrage constraint.” They provide a host of evidence consistent with this alternative viewpoint. The book can be evaluated from both positive and normative perspectives. From a positive perspective, much of the evidence they present, especially about the camouflage and risk-taking aspects of executive compensation systems, is fairly persuasive. However, from a normative perspective, the book conveys the idea that policy changes can dramatically improve executive compensation systems and consequently overall corporate performance. It is unclear to me how effective potential reforms designed to achieve such changes are likely to be in practice.

This paper reviews recent contributions to the economics and economic history of famine. It provides a context for the history of famine in the twentieth century, which is unique. During the century, war and totalitarianism produced more famine deaths than did overpopulation and economic backwardness; yet by its end, economic growth and medical technology had almost eliminated the threat of major famines. Today's high-profile famines are “small” by historical standards. Topics analyzed include the role played by food markets in mitigating or exacerbating famine, the globalization of disaster relief, the enhanced role of human agency and entitlements, distinctive demography of certain twentieth-century famines, and future prospects for “making famine history.”

Geography, flat or not, creates special relationships between buyers and sellers who reside in the same neighborhoods, but Friedman turns this metaphor inside-out by using The World is Flat to warn us of the perils of a relationship-free world in which every economic transaction is contested globally. In his “flat” world, your wages are set in Shanghai. In fact, most of the footloose relationship-free jobs in apparel and footwear and consumer electronics departed the United States several decades ago, and few U.S. workers today feel the force of Chinese and Indian competition, notwithstanding the alarming anecdotes about the outsourcing of intellectual services. Of course, standardization, mechanization, and computerization all work to increase the number of footloose tasks, but innovation and education work in the opposite direction, creating relationship-based activities—like the writing of this review. It may only be personal conceit, but I imagine there is a reason why the Journal of Economic Literature asked me to do this review.

When the quality of a good is at the discretion of the seller, how can buyers assure that the seller provides the mutually efficient level of quality? Contracts that provide a bonus to the seller if the quality is acceptable or impose a penalty on the seller if quality is unacceptable can, in theory, provide efficient incentives. But how are such contracts enforced? While the courts can be used, doing so involves high real costs. Informal enforcement, involving a loss of reputation and future access to the market for any party that defaults on a contract, may often be a better alternative. This paper explores the use of both formal and informal enforcement mechanisms, provides a rationale for a variety of observed market mechanisms, and then generates a number of testable hypotheses.

Recent social experiments have evaluated two reforms of the unemployment insurance (UI) system: reemployment bonuses and job search programs. The bonus experiments show that economic incentives affect the length of UI receipt and provide weak evidence that an earlier return to work does not decrease earnings. The experiments do not show the favorability of a permanent bonus program as they ignore its effect on the number of the claimants. The job search experiments test several more promising reforms. Nearly all of the combinations of services and increased enforcement reduce UI receipt and have favorable cost/benefit analyses. Earnings often increase, though the estimates are imprecise.