Knowledge that Transforms

This essay surveys the new monetarist approach to liquidity. Work in this literature strives for empirical and policy relevance, plus rigorous foundations. Questions include: What is liquidity? Is money essential in achieving desirable outcomes? Which objects can or should serve in this capacity? When can asset prices differ from fundamentals? What are the functions of commitment and collateral in credit markets? How does money interact with credit and intermediation? What can and should monetary policy do? The research summarized emphasizes the micro structure of frictional transactions, and studies how institutions like monetary exchange, credit arrangements, or intermediation facilitate the exchange process. (JEL E24, E31, E42, E44, E52, G10, G21)

We survey the literature on the economic consequences of the structure of social networks. We develop a taxonomy of “macro” and “micro” characteristics of social-interaction networks and discuss both the theoretical and empirical findings concerning the role of those characteristics in determining learning, diffusion, decisions, and resulting behaviors. We also discuss the challenges of accounting for the endogeneity of networks in assessing the relationship between the patterns of interactions and behaviors. (JEL D12, D83, D85, K42, Z13)

Many markets exhibit price dispersion across suppliers of observationally identical goods. Statistical agencies typically assume this dispersion reflects unobserved quality, so standard price indexes do not incorporate price declines when buyers substitute toward lower-price suppliers. We show that long-run price differences across suppliers can be used to infer unobserved quality differences and propose an index that accommodates quality-adjusted price dispersion. Using transaction-level data on contract semiconductor manufacturing, we document substantial quality-adjusted price dispersion and confirm that a standard index is biased above our proposed index.

The English rule prescribes that the loser of a lawsuit pays the winner's litigation costs. Previous research on the English rule finds that plaintiffs win more often at trial, receive higher awards, and receive larger settlements. Theory predicts that the English rule discourages settlement by raising the threshold payment necessary for settlement. In this paper, we reexamine the Florida experiment with the English rule by placing bounds on the selection effects. We find that the mean and median settlement amount increases. Collectively these findings are consistent with the predictions of the simplest models of the English rule's impact.

This paper suggests an identification and estimation approach based on quantile regression to recover the underlying distribution of bidders’ private values in ascending auctions under the IPV paradigm. The quantile regression approach provides a flexible and convenient parameterization of the private values distribution, with an estimation methodology easy to implement and with several specification tests. The quantile framework provides a new focus on the quantile level of the private values distribution—in particular, the seller’s optimal screening level, which can be very useful for bidders and seller. An empirical application using data from the USFS timber auctions illustrates the methodology.

In this paper, we discuss the key conditions for the identification and estimation of the local average treatment effect (LATE, Imbens and Angrist, 1994): the valid instrument assumption (LI) and the monotonicity assumption (LM). We show that the joint assumptions of LI and LM have a testable implication that can be summarized by a sign restriction defined by a set of intersection bounds. We propose an easy-to-implement testing procedure that can be analyzed in the framework of Chernozhukov, Lee, and Rosen (2013) and implemented using the Stata package of Chernozhukov, Kim, Lee, and Rosen (2013). We apply the proposed tests to the "draft eligibility" instrument in Angrist (1991), the "college proximity" instrument in Card (1993) and the "same sex" instrument in Angrist and Evans (1998).

This paper examines how the allocation of authority within an organization affects workers’ incentives and performance, using personnel data from a Chinese newspaper. Relying on an authority change that transferred the right of making editorial decisions from midlevel editors to top editors in four of the eight divisions in the newspaper, I find that the authority change improves reporters’ performance while reducing their activities for private gain and decreases midlevel editors’ journalistic initiative. To reconcile these findings, a synthesis of two theories on authority and incentives—the vertical and the horizontal allocation of authority—is needed.

We study the effect of public subsidies from the Hill-Burton program on hospital capacity, organization of the hospital industry, and utilization. We estimate that the program accounted for a net increase of over 70,000 beds nationwide and that these effects lasted well beyond twenty years. We also show that differences in the number of hospital beds per capita between high- and low-income counties, rural and urban counties, and the South and the rest of the country fell substantially. We conclude that the program largely achieved its goals, with substantial and long-lasting effects on the U.S. hospital industry.

Quantity surcharges occur when retailers carry a product in two sizes and offer a promotion on the small size: the large size then costs more per unit than the small one. When quantity surcharges occur, sales of the large size decline only slightly even though the same quantity can be purchased for less. We document this behavior in two data sets and four product categories. It is consistent with the notion of passive shoppers found in the industrial organization literature and the notion of rational inattention in macroeconomics. We discuss implications for consumer decision making, demand estimation, and firm pricing.